


**Post Fukushima
NATIONAL ACTION PLAN
of the
SLOVAK REPUBLIC**



Update

Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic

December 2021

Content

ABBREVIATIONS.....	2
I. INTRODUCTION.....	5
II. BASIC APPROACH AND MONITORING	7
III. STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION	11
REFERENCES	56

Abbreviations

AC	Alternating Current
CCS	Central Crisis Staff
DG	Diesel Generator
EBO34	Bohunice Nuclear Power Plant Units 3 and 4
EMO12	Mochovce Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2
EMO34	Mochovce Nuclear Power Plant Units 3 and 4
ENSREG	The European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group
ESFAS	Engineering Safety Features Actuation System
EOP	Emergency Operating Procedures
ERC	Emergency Response Centre
ERO	Emergency Response Organization
ESW	Essential Service Water
EU	European Union
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IPSART	International Probabilistic Safety Assessment Review Team
IRRS	Integrated Regulatory Review Service
MOD V-2	Programme on Modernization and Improvement of NPP Bohunice 3&4
NAcP	National Action Plan
NPP	Nuclear Power Plant
NSSS	Nuclear Steam Supply System
OCG	Operational Control Group
OSART (Pre OSART)	(Pre) Operational Safety Review Team
PC	Primary Circuit
PRZ	Pressurizer
PSA	Probabilistic Safety Assessment
PSR	Periodic Safety Review
RLS	Reactor Limitation System

RPS	Reactor Protection System
RTS	Reactor Trip System
RPV	Reactor Pressure Vessel
SAM	Severe Accident Management
SAMG	Severe Accident Management Guidelines
SBO	Station Black-out
SG	Steam Generator
SSG	IAEA Specific Safety Guide
SCRMN	Slovak Centre of Radiation Monitoring Network
SEFWS	Super Emergency Feed Water System
SE, a. s.	Slovenské Elektrárne, Inc.
SFP	Spent Fuel Pool
SHMÚ	Slovak Hydrometeorological Institute
SO	Secondary Circuit
SSEL	Safe Shutdown Equipment List
STN	Slovak Technical Standards
TSSM	Technical Specifications for Safety Measures
UJD SR	Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the SR
UVZ SR	Public Health Authority of the SR
WANO	World Association of Nuclear Operators
WENRA	Western European Nuclear Regulators' Association

Preface

This report updates the information contained in the 2019 report including the progress in implementing each of the individual actions within the NAcP. Members of ENSREG agreed to update their NAcPs on biannual bases until all measures are completed.

This report is available on the web page of ENSREG and on UJD SR web page (www.ujd.gov.sk).

I. Introduction

Following the accident at Fukushima Daiichi in 2011, the European Union (EU) countries that operate nuclear power plants each produced a national action plan (NAcP). These plans identified the actions necessary to enhance nuclear safety focusing on nuclear power plants (NPPs), and within the Terms of Reference of ENSREG.

The NAcP follows the Structure proposed in the ENSREG Action Plan. It contains comprehensive information on the actions planned/complete/under implementation after Fukushima as well as information on safety improvements and measures adopted before Fukushima.

The first NAcP workshop was held on 22 – 26 April 2013 and the second on 20 – 24 April 2015 to discuss and review the status of implementation of the NAcPs for the EU countries together with Switzerland and Ukraine. The workshop reports are available on the ENSREG website.

Most of the measures listed are completed. The remaining ones are in an advanced stage of implementation.

Slovakia is committed to continue in implementing the NAcP until all measures had been completed. Safety improvement is a continuous process which will continue even the activities within the NAcP are completed. Periodic safety reviews, international peer reviews and other instruments are an important elements of this process.

General information

Regulatory Framework

The state regulatory authority performing the state supervision upon nuclear safety of nuclear installations is the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic (UJD SR). The state supervision over nuclear safety is performed in accordance with the Atomic Act (No. 541/2004 Coll.) and subsequent set of regulations, in particular Regulation No. 430/2011 (as amended) laying down details on requirements for nuclear safety. The whole set of legislative bases is regularly reviewed and /or updated in line with the progress in the development of the IAEA Safety Standards and WENRA Reference Levels. Radiation protection is performed by the Public Health Authority (ÚVZ SR) in accordance with the Act No. 87/2078 Coll. on radiation protection

WENRA Reference Levels

One of the objectives of WENRA, as stated in its terms of reference, is to develop a harmonized approach to nuclear safety and radiation protection issues and their regulation in Europe. A significant contribution to this objective was the publication, in 2006, of a report on harmonisation of reactor safety in WENRA countries. This report addressed the nuclear power plants in operation and it included “Safety Reference Levels” (SRLs), which reflected expected practices to be implemented in the WENRA countries. The SRLs were updated in 2007, 2008 and 2014.

The SRLs have been established for greater harmonisation within WENRA countries raising the level of nuclear safety in Europe by their implementation in the national regulatory framework and in NPPs. The emphasis of the SRLs has been on nuclear safety, primarily focussing on safety of NPPs. Up to now the SRLs specifically exclude nuclear security and with a few exceptions, radiation safety.

Full harmonisation of safety regulations with WENRA SRL 2008 has been achieved /1/. As regards WENRA SRL 2014, there are 331 RLs out of 342 transposed into the regulatory framework (as of end 2020).

Nuclear Power Plants

Currently there are 4 WWER-440/V213 nuclear units in operation in Slovakia, 2 units in Jaslovské Bohunice and another 2 in Mochovce site. In Mochovce there are also two WWER- 440/V213 units with significantly upgraded design in commissioning. The owner and operator (the holder of the operating permit) of all operating and constructed nuclear units in Slovakia is the stock company Slovenské elektrárne, a. s. (SE, a. s.).

Basic data about all units covered by this report are in the table.

Plant	NPP Bohunice 3&4	EMO12 NPP	EMO34 NPP
Site	Bohunice	Mochovce	Mochovce
Reactor type	WWER-440/V213	WWER-440/V213	WWER-440/V213
Reactor thermal power, MWt	1471	1471	1375
Gross electric power, MWe	505	505	470
Plant status	In operation	In operation	Under Commissioning/construction
Date of first criticality	1984-85	1998-99	-


Upgrading of the plants since the original design

The NPPs have been significantly upgraded throughout their operation. In spite of the robustness of the original design, several modifications based on operational experience and by international and national safety assessments/reviews have been carried out (see picture below). Improvement of the containment tightness/integrity of existing plants is one of the major achievements.

All nuclear power plants have their safety reports (SAR) that are continuously updated according to legal requirements and reviewed by the regulator. In accordance with the national legislation. Probabilistic Safety Assessments (PSA Level 1 and Level 2) confirm that the NPPs meet internationally recognized safety targets. The Probabilistic Safety Assessments (PSA Level 1 and Level 2) are regularly updated.

All operating units have been subject of a number of international missions performing independent review of their safety level. Since 1991 there were more than 20 IAEA missions (site review, design review, OSART, IPSART missions), several WANO missions, 2 RISKAUDIT missions and 1 WENRA mission. The latest (Pre-OSART follow up) mission at the Mochovce unit 3 took place in September 2021.

Just after Fukushima and based on WANO recommendations during the period from April to October 2011, non-standard tests and checks of equipment important for coping with extreme conditions exceeding the basic design were successfully performed on the operating units. The tests included e.g. verification of the long-term run of diesel generators, the possibility for delivery of cooling water from the bubbler-condenser to the spent fuel pool, feed water supply to steam generators from a mobile source, supplying of water from cooling towers to essential service water system, connection of a back-up power supply from the hydro power plant, and others.



Pic 1: History of safety upgrades

II. Basic approach and monitoring

Several ENSREG recommendations adopted on the basis of the stress tests coincided with the projects on:

1. Severe accidents management (SAM) such as
 - To analyse the necessity of filtered venting of the containment to support SAM,
 - To analyse a response to severe accidents at multi units at the same site.
2. NPP resistance against external risks with very low probability of occurrence (occurrence less than 1.10^{-4} /year)
 - External floods (spreading of floods inside the power plant, drain system capacity etc.),
 - Seismic event.

The measures, from which some have already been implemented before Fukushima, are divided into the following groups:

- Short-term – finished by 31/12/2013
- Medium-term – finished by 31/12/2015
- Additional measures, which resulted from analyses performed or have been identified during implementation.

Monitoring of the Action Plan implementation

Majority of tasks resulting from the NAcP are covered by UJD SR decisions issued in the past and in particular after completion of the periodic safety assessment of NPPs in the years 2008 (NPP Bohunice) and 2011 (NPP Mochovce). According to these decisions the operator was obliged to report to UJD SR on the progress and the results achieved annually.

Due to the specific nature of the stress tests and as a provision for accepting the measures proposed by the licensee, UJD SR performed inspections within its annual inspection plans the aim of which were to monitor the implementation of measures.

The inspection results confirmed the operator's overall compliance with the Action plan in terms of substance and deadlines as well. Some measures have been completed before deadline. The previously identified delays related to verification and validation of SAMGs were resolved during 2018 and the verification and validation of SAMG were completed for the operating units. However, few activities are still ongoing.

Status of ongoing activities:

Units EBO34:

ID 3 - Prevention of accidents because of natural risks and limitation of their consequences. The remaining activity concerns risks caused by strong wind based on the outcomes of the study /2/. The relevant design modification documentation was developed by the licensee for the reinforcement of SSC (e.g. forced draft cooling towers of ESW, central pumping station etc.) in accordance with /9/. The implementation is in an advanced stage of implementation (expected finishing beginning of 2022). Based on the progress achieved this activity is considered as closed. Meteorological data are regularly reviewed within the PSR and based on events in the region.

ID 31 - Bunkered/Hardened systems. The original project documentation for sheltering of mobile DG and cabling was revised to avoid impact of surrounding buildings. The mDGs are temporally placed in an existing seismically reinforced building within the site. The construction permit for the new shelter which withstands external hazards (strong wind, seismicity etc.) was issued by UJD in 2021 and the construction is ongoing. Based on the progress achieved this action is considered as closed. (Com.: as an action of the latest PSR the existing mobile cable connection is reviewed and an upgrade will be made. A similar approach is applied for EMO 12)

Units EMO 12:

ID 3 - Prevention of accidents because of natural risks and limitation of their consequences. In 2018 delays in the completion of seismic reinforcement of units EMO1 and 2 were identified by UJD and confirmed by the licensee – SE a.s.. The assessment of seismic capacity of SSC which are on the SSEL list is ongoing. Vast majority of SSC comply with the seismic capacity.

In parallel to the assessment of seismic capacity of SSC, seismic reinforcement of buildings/structures have been completed (since 2019 e.g. the diesel generator station, nuclear auxiliary service building) or is ongoing e.g.:

- Fire station building – completed
- Emergency feed water system - completed
- Emergency Response Centre – completed
- Air duct to venting stack - completed
- Venting stack - completed
- Diesel Generator Station – completed
- Diesel oil system – completed
- Central pumping station of ESW and firefighting water - completed
- Forced draft cooling towers of ESW system - completed
- Nuclear auxiliary service building - completed
- Reactor building of EMO12 - ongoing
- Electrical switchboards - ongoing
- etc.

From the procedural aspect the Act on environmental impact assessment is applied. This process in conjunction with the administrative proceedings under the Atomic Act, Construction Act, Act on Administrative Order and particularly the Act on Public Procurement significantly influencing the implementation of safety related projects particularly in case of complex projects like the project on seismic reinforcement.

Based on these facts and taking into account the complexity of the project on seismic reinforcement UJD accepted the proposal of the licensee to reschedule the date for the completion of seismic reinforcement until 2022 provided that the licensee – SE a.s. will provide reports to UJD on the status of implementation and planned measures on annual bases.

In the above mentioned cases UJD SR apply a more thorough review of the progress made supported by in depth inspections annually.

Unit Mochovce 3:

The NAcP contains also information on the implementation for Mochovce unit 3 (MO34) which is in commissioning.

- The Pre OSART mission (December 2019) at Mochovce unit 3 identified findings (suggestions and recommendations) and made observations some of which related to the stress test action plan.

The licensee developed a specific action plan to resolve findings of the Pre OSART mission. In September 2021 the Pre OSART follow up took place which concluded that the plant had fully resolved issues or made satisfactory progress towards resolution of findings. No issue was assessed as having made insufficient progress.

Development of the NAcP:

The following documents served to develop the Post - Fukushima NAcP:

- ENSREG Compilation of recommendations
- Peer review country report
- EC Communication Annex
- Extraordinary meeting under the Convention on Nuclear Safety (XCNS)

Several actions in these documents are similar or identical, however the NAcP addresses each of them and makes reference to the relevant document.

Technical details of the Action Plan are reported in Chapter III.

III. Status of implementation

RECOMMENDATIONS OF TOPIC 1 (NATURAL RISKS)

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
1.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 2.2	<u>Periodic safety review</u>	<p>Review of natural risks as a part of periodic safety review (PSR)</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>According to UJD SR Regulation No. 33/2012 Coll., Section 2 (is based on IAEA SSG-25) the licensee is obliged to conduct periodic review. The objective of PSR (§9) is to assess the extent, up-to date and quality of deterministic safety evaluations, probability-related safety evaluations and analyses of the effect of internal and external hazards, as well as in terms of future developments (expectations) until the next periodic review (see Picture 1 in chapter I).</p>	Completed	Completed	Not relevant
2.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 2.3 EC Communication – specific to Slovakia 5.11 XCNS	<u>Confinement integrity</u>	<p>To analyse a necessity of filtered venting of the containment and other potential technical measures for long-term heat removal from the containment and reduction of radiation load of the environment taking into account activities in this area at other operators of WWER-440/V213 NPP types and considering measures implemented within the SAM project.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>Analyses completed.</p>	Completed	Completed	Completed

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
			(Com.: The meteorological hazards are continuously reviewed based on the latest knowledge).			
4.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.1.1 XCNS	<u>Hazard frequency related to weather</u>	<p>To evaluate resistance of selected systems, structures and components (SSC) at extreme external events (floods caused by heavy rain, high and low external temperatures, direct wind and other relevant events for the given locality) on the basis of updated new studies on meteorological conditions for Jaslovské Bohunice and Mochovce localities, and to consider events with intensity corresponding to the probability of occurrence once per 10,000 years or less; to prepare a plan for implementation of additional measures or to implement them.</p> <p>Status: Metrological studies for the site were developed for EBO /2/ and for EMO /3/. The meteorological hazards are continuously reviewed based on the latest knowledge.</p>	Completed	Completed	Completed

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
5.	EC Communication Annex	<u>Hazard frequency related to seismicity</u>	<p>To analyse seismic margins of selected systems, structures and components (SSC). To evaluate the resistance of selected SSC at a seismic event with intensity corresponding to the probability of occurrence less than once per 10,000 years.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>Seismic margins of civil structures evaluated /4/.</p> <p>* see chapter II</p>	Completed	In progress*	Included in the basic design
6.	EC Communication Annex EC Communication–specific to Slovakia 5.11	<u>Seismicity – minimum peak ground acceleration 0,1 g</u>	<p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>Bohunice site: PGA value is 0.344 g.</p> <p>Mochovce site: PGA value is 0.15g</p>	Completed	Completed	Included in the basic design
7.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.1.2	<u>Secondary effects of earthquakes</u>	<p>To prepare a scenario for putting the NPP units into safe condition after a seismic event.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>Updated scenarios were incorporated into Operating Instructions for Emergency Situations.</p> <p>(See ID 21)</p>	Completed	Completed	Included in the basic design

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
			<p><u>Additional measures:</u></p> <p>Contract concluded with the Research institute of Transport on analysis of critical roads at the plant. Reports for EBO and EMO completed and the outcomes were analysed. Measures for safe shut down after a seismic event have been adopted.</p> <p>(See ID 55)</p>			
8.	<p>ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.1.3</p> <p>Peer review country Report of the SR 4.3</p> <p>EC Communication Annex</p> <p>EC Communication – specific to Slovakia 5.11</p>	<p><u>Protection against penetration of water into buildings.</u></p> <p><u>Proving of protection against floods for identified rooms and</u></p>	<p>To evaluate resistance of selected systems, structures and components (SSC) at extreme external events (floods caused by heavy rain, high and low external temperatures, direct wind and other relevant events for the given locality) on the basis of updated new studies on meteorological conditions for Jaslovské Bohunice and Mochovce sites, and to consider events with intensity corresponding to the probability of occurrence once per 10,000 years or less; to prepare a plan for implementation of additional measures or to implement them.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p><u>Short term (immediate) measures:</u></p> <p>Based on WANO recommendations during the period from April to October 2011 the non-standard tests and inspections of equipment important for coping with extreme conditions</p>	Completed	Completed	

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
			<p>exceeding the basic design were successfully performed. (Immediate measures - flood protection bags were implemented in buildings where safety systems are located).</p> <p><u>Long-term measures:</u></p> <p>The procurement process and the implementation of measures in EBO and EMO is completed. All measures for protection against penetration of water into buildings as well as protection against floods for identified rooms are implemented.</p> <p>Updated scenarios were incorporated into Operating Instructions for Emergency Situations.</p>	Completed	Completed	Included in the basic design
9.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.1.4	<u>Notices on time warning</u>	<p>To implement the warning and notification system in case of deteriorating weather and to implement procedures of NPP operating staff response.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>Procedures No. 0-HP/3006, OHP-3005, OHP-3006 – EMO12, MO34, 4LPS-064, 065 – EBO34 - For measures against extreme climatic conditions were prepared and implemented.</p> <p><u>Additional measures:</u></p> <p>Contract concluded with the Hydro-meteorological institute on providing data.</p>	Completed	Completed	Completed

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
10.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.1.5 EC Communication Annex	<u>Monitoring of seismicity</u>	Arrangement of Bohunice, Mochovce seismic monitoring stations was proposed and built based on detailed seismic and geological survey prepared by the Geophysical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Science and reviewed by IAEA missions in 1998 and 2004. Monitoring results are summarized in quarterly reports. Updated scenarios were incorporated into Operating Instructions for Emergency Situations	Completed	Completed	Included in the basic design
11.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.1.6	<u>Qualified walkdowns</u>	To prepare regulations for qualified walk downs related to natural risks and to update them after preparation of an international guide. <u>Status:</u> Guidelines for the walk down checks of equipment which are defined for the management of external events (seismicity, floods, low and high temperatures, wind) were updated (e. g. EMO/NA-332.0201). Procedures for the actions necessary in response to EEE are developed, implemented and exercised in accordance with the plan of emergency exercises (e. g. EBO 2015). (See ID 21)	Completed	Completed	Completed
12.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.1.7	<u>Assessment of reserves for floods</u>	To analyse maximal potential water levels in the locality on the basis of 10,000 annual values. To specify places where water collects.			

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
13.	Peer review country report of the SR 2.3.3	<u>Reserves at external risks</u>	<p>The National Action Plan covers all tasks in an integrated/comprehensive manner.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p><u>Short term (immediate) measures:</u></p> <p>Based on WANO recommendations during the period from April to October 2011 the non-standard tests and inspections of equipment important for coping with extreme conditions exceeding the basic design were successfully performed. (Immediate measures - flood protection bags were implemented in buildings where safety systems are located).</p> <p><u>Long-term measures:</u></p> <p>* See chapter II</p>	Completed	Completed	Included in the basic design
14.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.1.8	<u>Protection against extreme weather conditions</u>	<p>The National Action Plan covers all tasks in an integrated/comprehensive manner.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p><u>Short term (immediate) measures:</u></p> <p>Based on WANO recommendations during the period from April to October 2011 the non-standard tests and inspections of equipment important for coping with extreme conditions exceeding the basic design were successfully performed.</p>	Completed	Completed	

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
			<p><u>Long-term measures:</u></p> <p>* See chapter II</p>	Completed*	Completed	Included in the basic design
15.	Peer review country report of the SR 2.2.3 EC Communication–specific to Slovakia 5.11 XCNS	<u>Regulatory monitoring of actions (flooding)</u>	<p>The activity is subject to regulatory review and inspection.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>The inspection plans contained inspection activities.</p>	Completed	Completed	Completed
16	Peer review country report of the SR 2.3.3 EC Communication–specific to Slovakia 5.11 XCNS	<u>Regulatory monitoring of actions (extreme weather conditions)</u>	<p>The activity is subject to regular regulatory review and inspection.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>The inspection plans contains inspection activities.</p>	In progress	In progress	In progress
17	Peer review country Report of the SR 2.1.3	<u>Regulatory monitoring of actions (seismic upgrade)</u>	<p>The activity is subject to regular regulatory review and inspection.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>The inspection plans contains inspection activities.</p> <p>* See chapter II</p>	Completed	In progress*	In progress

RECOMMENDATIONS OF TOPIC 2 (LOSS OF SAFETY SYSTEMS)

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
18.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.2.1	<u>Alternative cooling and heat sink</u>	<p>a) To diversify the emergency feed water source to SG by assurance of mobile high-pressure sources.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>Feed water make-up pumps to steam generators for each reactor units were purchased in 2012. The pumps are situated on a fire truck chassis.</p> <p>In 2014, flow rate sensors were additionally installed on the mobile feed water source high-pressure pump discharge pipe.</p> <p>The mobile feed water sources are regularly tested during operation and main overhauls as well.</p>	Completed	Completed	Included in the basic design
			<p>b) To review physical availability of technology needed for gravity filling of SG from feed water tanks in case of SBO.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>Physical access for gravity filling of SG was tested. Because of the necessity of physical manipulation with selected valves it was decided to procure power supply to ensure a remote operation of these valves. This measure is part of EOP.</p> <p>In addition: electricity generators for control of selected valves were tested.</p>	Completed	Completed	Included in the basic design
			<p>c) To finish required modifications of existing equipment for connection of</p>	Completed*	Completed*	Included in the basic design

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
			<p>diverse mobile feed water and power sources resistant to external events.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>* See Chapter II</p>			
			<p>d) To analyse and if needed to ensure means for cooling water make up from in-site and off-site water sources in the case of lack of cooling water, incl. preparation of respective procedures.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>Necessary equipment has been analysed and purchased for example: portable pumps, portable switchboards.</p> <p>Training programmes for the diverse mobile devices for cooling water make up from in-site and off-site water sources were prepared implemented and through emergency exercises tested (e. g. EBO 2015).</p> <p><u>Additional measures:</u></p> <p>Contract concluded with the Research Institute of Transport on analysis of critical roads at the plant. Reports for EBO and EMO completed. The outcomes were analysed.</p> <p>Measures for putting the unit into safe condition after a seismic event have been adopted.</p>	Completed	Completed	Included in the basic design

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
19.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.2.2	<u>AC Power supplies</u>	<p>a) To install a 400 kV circuit breaker in the local substation for disconnection of units from the power grid and thus to enable operation in the home consumption mode in the case of damaged transmission lines.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>Modifications to the power outlet and power supply schemes of EMO12 at the 400kV EMO12 substation together with installation of circuit breakers are completed.</p>	Completed	Completed	Included in the basic design
			<p>b) To update the operating documentation for DG (in case of failure of DG connection to the 6kV section of the emergency power supply of the 2nd category).</p>	Completed	Completed	Included in the basic design
			<p>c) To diversify emergency power sources by assurance of mobile DG.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>Mobile DG 0.4 kV with connecting cabling were purchased in 2012 for all units.</p> <p>*(See also ID 18).</p>	Completed*	Completed*	Included in the basic design
20.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.2.3	<u>Power supply (DC)</u>	<p>To diversify emergency power sources by assurance of mobile DG for charging of accumulator batteries.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p>	Completed	Completed	Included in the basic design

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
			<p>Mobile DG 0.4 kV with connecting cabling were purchased in 2012 for all units.</p> <p><u>Additional measures:</u></p> <p>Mobile rectifiers 240 V, 24 V for each units to charge accumulators from the mobile 0.4 kV DG were supplied.</p>			
21.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.2.4	<u>Operating and training activities</u>	<p>To prepare operating procedures and to implement training programmes for operators of diverse mobile devices.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>Updated scenarios were incorporated into Operating Instructions for Emergency Situations</p> <p>Procedures for the actions necessary in response to EEE are developed, implemented and exercised in accordance with the plan of emergency exercises (e. g. EBO 2015).</p>	Completed	Completed	Completed
22.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.2.5	<u>Instrumentation and monitoring</u>	<p>To specify a list of important parameters needed for monitoring of safety functions.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>a) EBO34, EMO12 - A list of important parameters needed for monitoring of safety functions has been defined.</p>	Completed	Completed	Completed

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
			b) To analyse the availability of important parameters. It was decided to have mobile measuring units which can use stable sensors also without standard power supply.	Completed	Completed	Completed
23.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.2.6	<u>Improvement of shutdown</u>	a) To diversify emergency power sources by assurance of mobile DG. <u>Status:</u> Mobile DG 0.4 kV with connecting cabling were purchased in 2012 for all units. (See ID 19, 20)	Completed	Completed	Included in the basic design
			b) To finish required modifications of existing equipment to enable connection of diverse feed water sources and power sources ensuring physical access and resistance under conditions evoked by an external event. <u>Status:</u> * see Chapter II (and ID 18c, ID 31c).	Completed*	Completed*	Included in the basic design (completed)
24.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.2.7	<u>Seals of reactor coolant pumps (RCP)</u>	a) To check if the existing procedures sufficiently solve the situation after de-sealing of RCP glands. <u>Status:</u>	Completed	Completed	Completed

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
			<p>The sufficiency of existing procedures checked JSC VNIAS-All Russian Scientific Institute for NPP Operation 109507, Russian Federation, Moscow, May 2013.</p> <p>b) To obtain data documenting behaviour of RCP glands at long-term failure of cooling (more than 24 hours) and to prepare a plan of potential necessary measures.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>The analyses made by VNIAS are available. Resistance of RCP glands GCN-317 for 72 hours confirmed.</p>			
25.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.2.8	<u>Ventilation</u>	<p>To analyse conditions of the environment of rooms where equipment for control of events with long-term station blackout (SBO) and events with long-term loss of ultimate heat sink (UHS) and severe accidents is situated. To prepare a plan of required measures.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>Environment of rooms, where safety systems ensuring fulfilment of key safety function in the main reactor building and safety systems which are in direct contact with the external environment (ESW, AFWS, DGS) were analysed /6/. Impact of extreme external climate conditions in selected rooms (for both NPPs).</p>	Completed	Completed	Completed

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
			The SAM project includes also the habitability of the main control room and the control of selected equipment from the ERC. Preliminary analysis indicates that no additional measures are necessary.			
26.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.2.9	<u>Main control room and emergency control room</u>	<p>a) To diversify emergency power sources by assurance of mobile DG.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>Mobile DG 0.4 kV with connecting cabling are available for both EBO34 and EMO12 units. (See also ID 18).</p> <p><u>Additional Measures:</u> Mobile rectifiers 240 V, 24 V for each unit to charge accumulators from the mobile 0,4 kV DG were supplied.</p>	Completed	Completed	Included in the basic design
			<p>b) Remote control of selected equipment installed within the SAM project in all EMO units in the ongoing project of EMO Emergency Centre modification.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>EMO12 - The SAM project requiring remote control of selected equipment installed within the project in all EMO units (1,2,3,4) has been considered in the project of EMO Emergency Response Centre upgrade. As a result remote control (including severe accidents) of EMO12 and MO34 is possible</p>	Completed	Completed	Included in the basic design

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
			<p>from a common sheltered Emergency Response Centre at the site and from the backup Emergency Centre located at Levice town.</p>			
27.	EC Communication Annex	<u>External hazard safety</u>	<p>To analyse seismic margins of selected systems, structures and components (SSC). To evaluate the resistance of selected SSC at a seismic event with intensity corresponding to the probability of occurrence less than once per 10,000 years.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>** The procurement process and the implementation of measures in EMO is ongoing. Some of the measures are already implemented. Measures resulting from assessment of EMO12 civil structures are incorporated into the ongoing seismic reinforcement documentation.</p> <p>(See ID 4, 8, 12, 13, 14)</p>	Completed	In progress**	Included in the basic design
27.bis	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.2.10	<u>Spent fuel pool</u>	<p>To analyse the SAM project from the viewpoint of severe accident management at multi units (all) at the same site (fuel situated in the reactor core and in the spent fuel pool); to modify the SAM project, if needed, so that sufficient measures can be implemented. To prepare a plan of implementation of additional measures for extension of the SAM project to improve the severe accident manageability at its simultaneous occurrence in all units at the same site.</p>			

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
			<u>Status:</u>			
			a) SAMG are developed and implemented and cover all plant states (for single units) – full power, shut down, spent fuel pool, ...	Completed	Completed	Completed
			b) The analysis of severe accident management at all units on the site (including reactors at full power, reactors in shutdown and spent fuel pool) has been prepared (Report No. CVV 12/2014-01 “Management of Severe Accidents on All Units on Site”).	Completed	Completed	Completed
			c) To prepare a plan of implementation of additional measures for extension of the SAM project to improve the severe accident manageability at its simultaneous occurrence in all units at the same site. Comm.: The licensee performed a self-assessment on the implementation of severe accident management /7/ and /8/.	Completed	Completed	Completed
			d) Necessary measures are being implemented and inspected by UJD. Post Fukushima SAMG update to implement Post Fukushima Westinghouse Owners Group /Pressurized Water Reactor Owners Group enhancement is completed. (See ID 32, 34. 39, 41, 43, 44)	Completed	Completed	Included in the basic design

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
28.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.2.11	<u>Isolation and independency</u>	<p>a) To diversify the emergency feed water source to SG by assurance of mobile high-pressure sources.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>Feed water make-up pumps to steam generators for each reactor unit were purchased in 2012. The pumps are situated on a fire truck chassis.</p> <p>In 2014, flow rate sensors were additionally installed on the mobile feed water source high-pressure pump discharge pipe.</p> <p>The mobile feed water sources are regularly tested during operation and main overhauls as well.</p>	Completed	Completed	Included in the basic design
			<p>b) To diversify emergency power sources by assurance of mobile DG.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>Mobile DG 0.4 kV with connecting cabling are available for both EBO34 and EMO1,2 units.</p> <p>(See also ID 18, 26)</p> <p><u>Additional measures:</u></p> <p>Mobile rectifiers 240 V, 24 V for each unit to charge accumulators from the mobile 0.4 kV DG were supplied and were tested.</p>	Completed	Completed	Included in the basic design
			<p>c) To finish required modifications of existing equipment to enable connection</p>	Completed*	Completed*	Included in the basic design

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
			<p>of diverse feed water sources and power sources ensuring physical access and resistance under conditions evoked by an external event.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>* Original project documentation for sheltering of mobile DG and cabling was revised to upgrade the original solution. (See Chapter II and ID 18c, 23)</p>			
29.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.2.12	<u>Flow path and access availability</u>	<p>a) To prepare operating procedures and to implement training programmes for operators.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>Updated scenarios were incorporated into Operating Instructions for Emergency Situations Training programmes for the diverse mobile devices were prepared implemented and through exercises tested at EBO and EMO. Procedures for the actions necessary in response to EEE are developed, implemented and exercised in accordance with the plan of emergency exercises (e. g. EBO 2015).</p> <p>(See ID 11, 21)</p>	Completed	Completed	Completed
			<p>b) To diversify emergency power sources by assurance of mobile DG.</p>	Completed	Completed	Included in the basic design

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
			<p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>Mobile DG 0.4 kV with connecting cabling are available for both EBO34 and EMO12 units.</p> <p><u>Additional Measures:</u></p> <p>Mobile rectifiers 240 V, 24 V for each unit to charge accumulators from the mobile 0.4 kV DG were supplied.</p> <p>(See ID 18, 26, 28)</p> <p>Physical access to critical equipment is ensured (e. g. bypass to turne stilles).</p>			
			<p>c) To finish required modifications of existing equipment to enable connection of diverse feed water sources and power sources ensuring physical access and resistance under conditions evoked by an external event.</p> <p>(See ID 18)</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>* Original project documentation for sheltering of mobile DG and cabling was revised to upgrade the solution.</p> <p>(See Chapter II and ID 18, 23, 28)</p>	Completed*	Completed*	Included in the basic design

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
			<p>d) To diversify the emergency feed water source to SG by assurance of mobile high-pressure sources.</p> <p>(See ID 18a)</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>Feed water make-up pumps to steam generators for each reactor unit were purchased in 2012. The pumps are situated on a fire truck chassis.</p> <p>In 2014, flow rate sensors were additionally installed on the mobile feed water source high-pressure pump discharge pipe.</p> <p>The mobile feed water sources are regularly tested during operation and main overhauls as well.</p>	Completed	Completed	Included in the basic design
30.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.2.13	<u>Mobile devices</u>	<p>a) To diversify the emergency feed water source to SG by assurance of mobile high-pressure sources.</p> <p>(See ID 18a, 28a, 29)</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>Feed water make-up pumps to steam generators for each reactor unit were purchased in 2012. The pumps are situated on a fire truck chassis. In 2014, flow rate sensors were additionally installed on the mobile feed water source high-pressure pump discharge pipe.</p>	Completed	Completed	Included in the basic design

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
			<p>The mobile feed water sources are regularly tested during operation and main overhauls as well.</p>			
			<p>b) To diversify emergency power sources by assurance of mobile DG.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>Mobile DG 0.4 kV with connecting cabling are available for both EBO34 and EMO12 units.</p> <p><u>Additional Measures:</u></p> <p>Mobile rectifiers 240 V, 24 V for each unit to charge accumulators from the mobile 0.4 kV DG were supplied.</p> <p>(See ID 20, 26, 28, 29)</p>	<p>Completed</p>	<p>Completed</p>	<p>Included in the basic design</p>
			<p>c) To finish required modifications of existing equipment to enable connection of diverse feed water sources and power sources ensuring physical access and resistance under conditions evoked by an external event.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>*Original project documentation for sheltering of mobile DG and cabling was revised to upgrade the situation.</p> <p>(See chapter II and ID 18, 23, 28, 29)</p>	<p>Completed*</p>	<p>Completed*</p>	<p>Included in the basic design</p>

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
			<p>d) To prepare operating procedures and to implement training programmes for operators of diverse mobile devices.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>Updated scenarios were incorporated into Operating Instructions for Emergency Situations</p> <p>Training programmes for the diverse mobile devices were prepared implemented and through exercises tested at EBO and EMO. Procedures for the actions necessary in response to EEE are developed, implemented and exercised in accordance with the plan of emergency exercises (e. g. EBO 2015).</p> <p>(See ID 11, 21, 29)</p>	Completed	Completed	Completed
31.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.2.14	<u>Bunkered/Hardened systems</u>	<p>To finish required modifications of existing equipment to enable connection of diverse feed water sources and power sources ensuring physical access and resistance under conditions evoked by an external event.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>*Original project documentation for sheltering of mobile DG and cabling was revised to upgrade the situation.</p> <p>(See Chapter II and ID 18, 23, 28, 29, 30)</p>	Completed*	Completed*	Included in the basic design

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
32.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.2.15	<u>Multiple accidents</u>	<p>To analyse the SAM project from the viewpoint of severe accident management at multi units (all) at the same site (fuel situated in the reactor core and in the spent fuel pool); to modify the SAM project, if needed, so that sufficient measures can be implemented. To prepare a plan of implementation of additional measures for extension of the SAM project to improve the severe accident manageability at its simultaneous occurrence in all units at the same site.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>a) The analysis of severe accident management at all units on the site (including reactors at full power, reactors in shutdown and spent fuel pool) has been prepared (Report No. CVV 12/2014-01 "Management of Severe Accidents on All Units on Site").</p>	Completed	Completed	Completed
			<p>b) To prepare a plan of implementation of additional measures for extension of the SAM project to improve the severe accident manageability at its simultaneous occurrence in all units at the same site.</p> <p>Comm.: The licensee performed a self-assessment on the implementation of severe accident management /7/ and /8/.</p>	Completed	Completed	Completed
			<p>c) Necessary measures are being implemented and inspected by UJD. Post</p>	Completed	Completed	Completed

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
			<p>Fukushima SAMG update to implement Post Fukushima Westinghouse Owners Group /Pressurized Water Reactor Owners Group enhancement is completed.</p> <p>(See ID 27bis, 34, 39, 41, 43)</p>			
33.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.2.16	<u>Equipment inspection and training programmes</u>	<p>To prepare operating regulations and to implement training programmes for operators of diversity mobile devices.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>Updated scenarios were incorporated into Operating Instructions for Emergency Situations.</p> <p>Training programmes for the diverse mobile devices were prepared implemented and through exercises tested at EBO and EMO.</p> <p>Procedures for the actions necessary in response to EEE are developed, implemented and exercised in accordance with the plan of emergency exercises (e. g. EBO 2015).</p> <p>(See ID 11, 21, 29, 30)</p>	Completed	Completed	Completed
34.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.2.17	<u>Further studies to address uncertainties</u>	<p>To analyse the SAM project from the viewpoint of severe accident management at multi units (all) at the same site (fuel situated in the reactor core and in the spent fuel pool); to modify the SAM project, if needed, so that sufficient measures can be implemented. To prepare a plan of implementation of</p>			

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
			<p>additional measures for extension of the SAM project to improve the severe accident manageability at its simultaneous occurrence in all units at the same site.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>a) The analysis of severe accident management at all units on the site (including reactors at full power, reactors in shutdown and spent fuel pool) has been prepared (Report No. CVV 12/2014-01 "Management of Severe Accidents on All Units on Site").</p> <p>(See ID 27bis, 32, 7 and 18d)</p>	Completed	Completed	Completed
			<p>b) To prepare a plan of implementation of additional measures for extension of the SAM project to improve the severe accident manageability at its simultaneous occurrence in all units at the same site.</p> <p>Comm.: The licensee performed a self-assessment on the implementation of severe accident management /7/ and /8/.</p>	Completed	Completed	Completed
			<p>c) Necessary measures are being implemented and inspected by UJD. Post Fukushima SAMG update to implement Post Fukushima Westinghouse Owners Group /Pressurized Water Reactor</p>	Completed	Completed	Completed

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
			<p>Owners Group enhancement is completed.</p> <p>(See ID 34, 39, 41, 43)</p>			
35.	EC Communication Annex	<u>The time the operator has at disposal for recovery of safety functions in case of SBO and/or loss of UHS should be longer than an hour.(without human action)</u>	<p>Heat removal from PC:</p> <p>Due to interruption of feed water supply and failure of RCP after SBO, the residual heat removal from the core in the natural circulation regime is to the detriment of gradual reduction of the secondary circuit coolant. Exploitation of nominal inventory of coolant in SG occurs during 5 hours.</p> <p>Containment integrity: After two days, 60 °C is expected in the containment wall centre. The containment integrity isn't endangered at this temperature.</p> <p>Coolant inventory in PC: Time reserve: PC coolant inventory is sufficient for fuel cooling for 24 hours.</p>	Completed	Completed	Included in the basic design
36.	EC Communication Annex	<u>EOPs should cover all conditions of a power plant (from full power to shut-down reactor)</u>	<p>Symptom oriented procedures for design basis and beyond design basis emergency conditions were fully implemented in EMO12 and EBO34 in 1999 (for events initiated during power operation) and in 2006 (for events initiated at shut-down reactor or in SFP). Long-term maintenance programme with Westinghouse provides for the cutting edge status of EOPs.</p>	Completed	Completed	Completed

RECOMMENDATIONS OF TOPIC 3 (SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT)

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
37.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.3.1	<u>Reference WENRA levels</u>	<p>A. In corporation of reference WENRA values related to severe accident management (SAM) to the national legal framework.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>The Atomic Act takes into account new EU legal documents: e. g. Directive 2014/87/Euratom, Directive 2013/59/Euratom.</p> <p>Full harmonisation of regulatory framework with WENRA Reference Levels (2008) has been achieved in Slovakia. As regards WENRA SRL 2014, there are 322 RLs out of 342 transposed into the regulatory framework.</p>	Implemented	Implemented	Implemented
38.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.3.2 XCNS	<u>SAM technical measures</u>	<p>To implement the SAM project.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>SAM project implemented and completed at EBO and EMO. The licensee performed a self-assessment on the implementation of severe accident management /7/ and /8/. The plan of implementation of additional measures has been implemented.</p>	Completed	Completed	Included in the basic design

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
39.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.3.3	<u>Evaluation of SAM measures after severe external events</u>	<p>To analyse the SAM project from the viewpoint of severe accident management at multi units (all) at the same site (fuel situated in the reactor core and in the spent fuel pool); to modify the SAM project, if needed, so that sufficient measures can be implemented. To prepare a plan of implementation of additional measures for extension of the SAM project to improve the severe accident manageability at its simultaneous occurrence in all units at the same site.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>a) The analysis of severe accident management at all units on the site (including reactors at full power, reactors in shutdown and spent fuel pool) has been prepared (Report No. CVV 12/2014-01 "Management of Severe Accidents on All Units on Site").</p>	Completed	Completed	Completed
			<p>b) To prepare a plan of implementation of additional measures for extension of the SAM project to improve the severe accident manageability at its simultaneous occurrence in all units at the same site.</p> <p>Comm.: The licensee performed a self-assessment on the</p>	Completed	Completed	Completed

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
			implementation of severe accident management /7/ and /8/.			
			c) Necessary measures are being implemented and inspected by UJD. Post Fukushima SAMG update to implement Post Fukushima Westinghouse Owners Group /Pressurized Water Reactor Owners Group enhancement is completed. (See ID 27bis, 34. 41, 43)	Completed	Completed	Completed
40.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.3.4	<u>Update of severe accident management guidelines (SAMG)</u>	To analyse the SAM project with regard to potential damage of infrastructure, including violation of communication at a level of power plant, branch and state, long-term accidents (taking several days) and accidents with an impact on several units and neighbouring industrial facilities.	Completed	Completed	Completed
41.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.3.5	<u>SAMG verification</u>	To analyse the SAM project from the viewpoint of severe accident management at multi units (all) at the same site (fuel situated in the reactor core and in the spent fuel pool); to modify the SAM project, if needed, so that sufficient measures can be implemented. To prepare a plan of implementation of additional measures for extension of the SAM project to improve the severe accident	Completed	Completed	Completed

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
			<p>manageability at its simultaneous occurrence in all units at the same site.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>Verification and validation of SAMG according to legal requirements following their post Fukushima SAMG update with Westinghouse to implement up to date Post Fukushima Westinghouse Owners Group / Pressurized Water Reactor Owners Group enhancement is completed.</p>			

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
42.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.3.6	<u>SAM exercises</u>	<p>a) To prepare conditions for cooperation with selected external organisations at emergency response control during external events and severe accidents.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>Agreement with the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic on mutual assistance and cooperation and its provision at occurrence of an extraordinary event in nuclear installation (No. SE/2012/22100-01). The cooperation tested during the emergency exercise (2014) in EBO and EMO (2015).</p> <p>(See ID 50)</p>	Completed	Completed	Completed
			<p>b) Review of the national emergency arrangements based on the outcomes of the so called HAVRAN exercise.</p> <p><u>Status</u></p> <p>(See ID 57)</p>	Completed	Completed	Completed
43.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.3.7	<u>SAM training</u>	<p>a) Based on the extended SAM to modify the SAM training taking into account the severe accident</p>	Completed	Completed	Completed

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
			<p>occurrence at multi (all) units at the same site.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>The analysis of severe accident management at all units on the site (including reactors at full power, reactors in shutdown and spent fuel pool) has been prepared (Report No. CVV 12/2014-01 “Management of Severe Accidents on All Units on Site”). The licensee performed a self-assessment on the implementation of severe accident management /7/ and /8/.</p>			
			<p>b) Modifications to training materials</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>Regular training and practical training in the area of severe accidents for members of Emergency Response Organization have been introduced. Training programs, training cards and long-term plans for this preparation have been revised for both shift personnel and the Emergency Response Organization.</p> <p>(See ID 27bis, 32, 34, 39, 41)</p>	Completed	Completed	Completed
44.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.3.8	<u>Extension of SAMG to all plant states</u>	To analyse the SAM project from the viewpoint of severe accident			

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
	EC Communication Annex		<p>management at multi units (all) at the same site (fuel situated in the reactor core and in the spent fuel pool); to modify the SAM project, if needed, so that sufficient measures can be implemented.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>a) SAMG are developed and implemented and cover all plant states (for single units) – full power, shut down, spent fuel pool, ...</p> <p>b) The analysis of severe accident management at all units on the site (including reactors at full power, reactors in shutdown and spent fuel pool) has been prepared (Report No. CVV 12/2014-01 “Management of Severe Accidents on All Units on Site”).</p> <p>c) To prepare a plan of implementation of additional measures for extension of the SAM project to improve the severe accident manageability at its simultaneous occurrence in all units at the same site.</p> <p>Comm.: The licensee performed a self-assessment on the implementation of severe accident management /7/ and /8/.</p>			
				Completed	Completed	Completed
				Completed	Completed	Completed
				Completed	Completed	Completed

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
			d) Necessary measures are being implemented and inspected by UJD. Post Fukushima SAMG update to implement Post Fukushima Westinghouse Owners Group /Pressurized Water Reactor Owners Group enhancement is completed.	Completed	Completed	Completed
45.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.3.9	<u>Improved communications</u>	Remote control of selected equipment installed within the SAM project in all EMO units in the ongoing project of EMO Emergency Centre modification. <u>Status:</u> Remote control of selected equipment and technological information system installed.	Completed	Completed	Included in the basic design
46.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.3.10 EC Communication Annex	<u>Presence of hydrogen in unexpected places</u>	To implement the SAM project. To analyse the SAM project from the viewpoint of potential migration of hydrogen to other places. <u>Status:</u> a) Analyses completed. The main outcomes are as follows: the atmosphere of the reactor hall is inertized by steam and probability of hydrogen detonation is very low; migration to selected rooms outside the containment identified.	Completed	Completed	Included in the basic design

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
			b) Relevant measures included in updated revision of SAMG.	Completed	Completed	Completed
47.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.3.11	<u>Large volumes of contaminated water</u>	<p>To prepare solutions for treatment of large volumes of contaminated water after an accident at a study level from the conceptual viewpoint.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>Study completed. The aim of the study was the preparation of a conceptual study for addressing issues, dealing with high activity liquid wastes after severe accident.</p>	Completed	Completed	Completed
48.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.3.12	<u>Radiation protection</u>	<p>To implement the SAM project. To analyse the SAM project from the viewpoint of severe accident management at multi units (all) at the same site (fuel situated in the reactor core and in the spent fuel pool); to modify the SAM project, if needed, so that sufficient measures can be implemented. To prepare a plan of implementation of additional measures for extension of the SAM project to improve the severe accident manageability at its simultaneous occurrence in all units at the same site.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>The analysis of severe accident management at all units on the site</p>	Completed	Completed	Included in the basic design

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
			<p>(including reactors at full power, reactors in shutdown and spent fuel pool) has been prepared (Report No. CVV 12/2014-01 "Management of Severe Accidents on All Units on Site")</p> <p>The SAM project includes also the habitability of the main control room and the control of selected equipment from the ERC. The licensee performed a self-assessment on the implementation of severe accident management /7/ and /8/.</p> <p>This self-assessment contained a chapter dealing with local radiation conditions in those technological premises to which access is necessary for long term control of SAM.</p> <p>(See ID 27bis., 32, 34, 39, 41, 43, 44)</p>			
49.	<p>ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.3.13</p> <p>EC Communication Annex</p>	<p><u>On site emergency center</u></p>	<p>Remote control of selected equipment installed within the SAM project in all EMO units in the ongoing project of EMO Emergency Centre modification.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>Remote control of selected equipment for all EMO units (1,2,3,4) has been completed within the project of Emergency Response Centre upgrade.</p> <p>The seismic reinforcement project – technology in the emergency centre (e.g. reinforcement of air-condition,</p>	Completed	Completed	Included in the basic design

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
			electrical cabinets, etc.) – has been completed. (See ID 45)			
50.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.3.14	<u>Support of local operators</u>	To prepare conditions for cooperation with selected external organisations at emergency response control during external events and severe accidents. <u>Status:</u> Agreement with the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic on mutual assistance and cooperation and its provision at occurrence of an extraordinary event in nuclear installation (No. SE/2012/22100-01). The cooperation was tested during the all-plant emergency exercise in EBO (2014) and EMO (2015). (See ID 42)	Completed	Completed	Completed
51.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.3.15	<u>Level 2 Probabilistic Safety Assessment</u>	The PSA Level 2 were prepared for EBO34, EMO12 and for MO3 and are continuously updated.	Completed	Completed	Completed
52.	ENSREG Compilation of recommendations 3.3.16	<u>Severe accident studies.</u>	To analyse the SAM project from the viewpoint of severe accident management at multi units (all) at the same site (fuel situated in the reactor core and in the spent fuel pool); to modify the SAM project, if needed, so that sufficient measures can be	Completed	Completed	Completed

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
			<p>implemented. To prepare a plan of implementation of additional measures for extension of the SAM project to improve the severe accident manageability at its simultaneous occurrence in all units at the same site.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>The analysis of severe accident management at all units on the site (including reactors at full power, reactors in shutdown and spent fuel pool) has been prepared (Report No. CVV 12/2014-01 “Management of Severe Accidents on All Units on Site”). The licensee performed a self-assessment on the implementation of severe accident management /7/ and /8/.</p> <p>(See ID 27bis, 32, 34, 39, 41, 43, 44)</p>			
53.	Peer review country Report of the SR 4.3 EC Communication–specific to Slovakia 5.11	<u>SAM modification implemented according to the proposed schedule</u>	The activity is subject to regulatory review and inspection.	Annually In progress	Annually In progress	Annually

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
54.	Peer review country Report of the SR 4.3	<u>To verify leak-tightness of all penetrations (e.g. RPV cap, SG cap) through the containment under severe accident conditions (in particular leak-tightness of seals).</u>	<p>To analyse the SAM project from the viewpoint of resistance of seals and penetrations of the containment under severe accident conditions.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>A study (including experimental verification) was prepared by UJV Řež to test the sealing under SA conditions. This study was prepared within the implementation of SAM project.</p> <p><u>Additional measures:</u></p> <p>Replacement of seals at the reactor pressure vessel cavity lids completed. Sealing of doors in line with the maintenance schedules.</p>	Completed	Completed	Completed

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
55.	Regulatory initiative	<u>The concept of large-area fire control – (bigger than considered in the design)</u>	<p>To prepare the fire control documentation – operative plan of large-area fire control.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>A report was prepared by the Technical University in Ostrava.</p> <p>Based on the analysis, the fire brigade on the site prepared an operative fire control plan. Plan of procurement of technology, training of the personnel in cooperation with external organisations in progress.</p> <p><u>Additional measures:</u></p> <p>Purchase of special streamlines large-scale fire extinguishing flammable liquids, hose wagon with automatic laying, etc. for both EBO and EMO.</p>	Completed	Completed	Completed
56.	Regulatory initiative	<u>Physical protection</u>	<p>To harmonise the implementation of additional SAM measures with potential new increased requirements for physical protection in case of aggravated assaults.</p> <p>All equipment which are part of SAM measures are located within the physical protection barriers of the NPPs (e.g. fire brigade, mobile equipment).</p>	Completed	Completed	Completed

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
57.	Regulatory initiative	<u>Emergency arrangements</u>	<p>Comprehensive review of the national emergency arrangements based on the outcomes of the so called HAVRAN exercise.</p> <p><u>Status:</u></p> <p>Government Resolution No. 28/2013 requested the Minister of Interior to submit to the Government a report on the progress in implementing the measures resulting from the HAVRAN 2012 exercise. The report was submitted to the government in January 2014 and took note of the progress achieved.</p> <p><u>Additional measures:</u></p> <p>A comprehensive review of the civil protection and emergency management has been initiated. The Ministry of Interior proposes that an amendment to Law No. 42/1994 Coll. on Civil Protection of Citizens to be prepared. This amendment is also necessary to implement the Directive 2012/18/EU on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances.</p> <p>The Government by its resolution No. 3/2016 approved "The National Strategy for the Management of Security Risks (Emergency situations)". The material dealing with management of security/emergency risks, register</p>	Completed	Completed	Completed

ID	Source	Recommendation	Fulfilment of recommendation	EBO34	EMO12	MO34
			<p>and assessment of security/emergency risks, risk mitigation measures, financing options, processes of continuous improvement, etc.</p> <p>The Government approved “The Assessment Report on the Conduct and Evaluation of the Crisis Management Exercise INEX 5 in the Slovak Republic” and adopted measures for further improvements in November 2015.</p>			

References

- /1/ WENRA: Qualitative Reporting on Status of Harmonisation of Safety of Existing Reactors.
- /2/ Report of the SHMÚ for the Jaslovské Bohunice site, Bratislava, Január 2012.
- /3/ Report of the SHMÚ for the Mochovce site, Bratislava, Marec 2011.
- /4/ Report on estimation of limit seismic margin of civil structures for EBO, EMO12).
- /5/ Seismic PSA for seismic re-evaluation of the 1st and 2nd NPP EMO-Final Report.
- /6/ Impact of extreme external climate conditions in selected rooms (for both NPPs) STMSE000015.
- /7/ Report on targeted self-assessment in the area of civil accidents according to WANO methodology (POC 2013 – 1) at EMO.
- /8/ Report on targeted self-assessment in the area of civil accidents according to WANO methodology (POC 2013 – 1) at EBO.
- /9/ STN EN 1991-1-4:2005 : Actions on structures - Part 1-4: General actions - Wind actions