

NATIONAL REPORT OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC



COMPILED IN TERMS OF THE
JOINT CONVENTION ON THE SAFETY OF
SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT AND ON THE
SAFETY OF RADWASTE MANAGEMENT

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Abbreviations

ALARA	As low as reasonably achievable
AZ	Reactor core
BIDSF	<i>Bohunice International Decommissioning Support Fund</i>
BOZP	Occupational Health & Safety
BS	Safety Report
BSC	Bohunice Treatment Centre
BSVP	Storage pool for spent nuclear fuel
CO	Civil Protection
ČSSR	Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
ČSKAE	Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Commission
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EGP	Energoprojekt (general designer for NPP V-1, V-2)
FS KRAO	Final processing of KRAO
HRK	Emergency and control rod
HÚ	Deep repository
HVB	Main generating unit
ICRP	International Commission for Radiation Protection
IED	Individual dose equivalent
INES	International Nuclear Event Scale
ISM	Integrated Management System
JAVYS, a. s.	Jadrová a vyrábacia spoločnosť / Nuclear and Decommissioning Company
JE	Nuclear Power Plant
JE A-1	Nuclear Power plant Bohunice A -1
JE V-1	Nuclear Power Plants V-1 Jaslovské Bohunice (Units 1 & 2)
JE V-2	Nuclear Power Plants V-2 Jaslovské Bohunice (Units 3& 4)
JE Mochovce EMO	Nuclear Power Plants Mochovce
JM	Final processing of KRAO
JP	Emergency and control rod
JPC	Deep repository
JZ / JEZ	Main generating unit
KED	International Commission for Radiation Protection
KHP	Hermeticity test of fuel cladding
KGO	Tightness test of fuel cladding
KRAO	Liquid radwaste
KRH	Slovak Government Commission for Radiation Accidents

KV	Complex testing
LaP	Limits and Conditions for operation
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
MH SR	Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic
MPSVR SR	Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family of the Slovak Republic
MSVP	Interim Spent Fuel Storage
MV SR	Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic
MZ SR	Ministry of Health of the Slovak Republic
MŽP SR	Ministry of Environment of the Slovak Republic
NF	Nuclear fuel, QA system code
NIP	National Labour Inspectorate
NJF	National Nuclear Fund
NS	National Report
NR SR	National Council of the Slovak Republic
NUSS	Nuclear Safety Standards
ORS	Operative – management group
PDS	Long-term storage enclosure
PPBS	Pre-operational safety report
PHARE	EU Initiative for economic integration of CEE countries
PKV	Pre-complex testing
PO	Primary circuit
PRAO	Solid radwaste
PS	Operational set
PSA	Probabilistic safety assessment
QA	Quality Assurance
Ra	Radioactive
RAO	Radioactive waste
RF	Russian Federation
RS	Reactor hall
RÚ RAO	National Radwaste Repository
SE, a. s.	Slovenské elektrárne, joint stock company
SE - EBO	Nuclear Power Plants, plant of SE, a. s.
SE - EMO	Nuclear Power Plants Mochovce, plant of SE, a. s.
SE - VYZ	Decommissioning of NI and radwaste and spent fuel management, former plant of SE, a. s.
SKR	I&C System
SR	Slovak Republic

SÚRMS	Slovak Headquarters for Radiation Monitoring Network
STN	Slovak technical standard
ŠFL JEZ	State Fund for Decommissioning of NI (now NJF)
TK	Transportation container
TK C-30	Transportation container for VJP of C-30 type
ŤK	Heavy metal
t _{řk}	Tons of heavy metal uranium
TNR	Reactor pressure vessel
TTČ	Transport technology part
TSÚ RAO	Technology of treatment and conditioning of RAW
TV	Television
UBN	Event without consequences
ÚJD SR	Úrad jadrového dozoru Slovenskej republiky /Nuclear Regulatory Authority of SR
ÚKŠ	Central Emergency Staff
US NRC	US NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ÚVZ SR	Public Health Authority of SR
VBK	Fibre-concrete container
VDL	Large scale decontamination line
VICHR	Chrompik vitrification plant
VJP	Spent nuclear fuel
VRAO	High active radwaste
VUJE, a. s.	VUJE, a. s. Trnava – Engineering, design and research organization
WWER	Water-water power reactor
VZT	Air management
WANO	World Association of Nuclear Operators
ZFK	<i>Equipment for sludge fixing</i>
ZRAM	Captured radioactive materials
ZS	Fuel loading machine
Z. z.	Collection of laws
ZSSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
ŽP	Environment
ŽSR	Railways of the Slovak Republic

A Introduction

The Slovak Republic deposited the instrument of ratification of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (hereinafter only as the “Joint Convention”) on 6 October 1998. The presented National Report describes measures adopted with the aim to implement each commitment of the Joint Convention. It was compiled in accordance with article 32 of the Joint Convention and its structure respects recommendations and the guidelines regarding the form and the structure of national reports.

In Slovakia there are 6 Units with nuclear reactors of WWER-440 type. Four at Jaslovské Bohunice site (EBO 1-4 marked as NPP V-1 and NPP V-2) and two at the Mochovce site (SE-EMO 1-2). EBO 1 was definitely shut-down on 31 December 2006 and EBO 2 was definitely shut-down on 31 December 2008.

At the Jaslovské Bohunice site there is also the NPP A-1, which was a heavy water reactor cooled with carbon dioxide (HWGCR – 150 MW). NPP A-1 was shut-down in 1977 after an accident (INES 4) and currently it is in the second decommissioning phase. The spent nuclear fuel was exported to the Russian Federation based on a contract (the transfer was completed in 1999).

The technology for treatment of radioactive waste is at Jaslovské Bohunice and Mochovce. This is part of the so called Bohunice Treatment Center for radwaste (BSC RAO), which has been in operation since 1999 and the Final treatment of liquid radwaste (FS KRAO), which has been in operation since 2007 *at the Mochovce site*. Experimental facilities for radwaste treatment are at Jaslovské Bohunice site and currently these are in decommissioning process in the phase of safe enclosure.

The National Repository for the low and medium active radwaste (RU RAO) has been in operation since 1999 and it is located at Mochovce.

At the Jaslovské Bohunice site there is an interim spent fuel storage facility in operation since 1987, where an enhancement of seismic resistance and increase of storage capacity project was implemented.

Detailed description of technology for spent fuel and RAW management follows in later chapters of this report. The license holders for operation and decommissioning of nuclear installations are SE, a. s., JAVYS, a. s. and VUJE, a. s.

The state regulation over nuclear safety for radwaste and spent nuclear fuel management is entrusted to the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of SR (ÚJD SR). The basic law for a peaceful use of nuclear energy is by the Act No. 541/2004 Coll. I. (the Atomic Act). ÚJD SR is an independent central body of state administration, headed by a chairperson, who according to the valid legislation has substantial powers: submits materials (e.g. National Reports) to the government sessions and is also invited to discuss *other related matters*.

The state supervision over radiation protection is provided for by the Public Health Authority of SR (UVZ SR) pursuant to Act No. 355/2007 Coll. I. on protection, support and development of public

health.

The labour inspection – supervision of compliance with the legislation and other regulations to ensure occupational health and safety at the workplaces of a nuclear installation is performed by the Labour Inspectorate pursuant to Act No.125/2006 Coll. I. on labour inspection and by Act No. 82/2005 Coll. I. Verifying compliance with safety requirements of classified technical equipment and technical equipment is performed by authorized legal entities in accordance with the Act No. 124/2006 Coll. I. on occupational health and safety and on changes and amendments to certain laws as amended.

Slovakia is a party to all major international treaties and conventions in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The list of nuclear installations according to the Joint Convention is contained in Annexes M I – III.

The previous National Reports from y. 2003, 2005 and 2008 are on the website of ÚJD SR: www.ujd.gov.sk.

B Concept for Spent Nuclear Fuel Management (SNF) and Radwaste Management (RAW)

Article 32 of the Joint Convention

1. *In accordance with the provisions of Article 30 each Contracting Party shall submit a national report to each review meeting of Contracting Parties. This report shall address the measures taken to implement each of the obligations of the Convention. For each Contracting Party the report shall also address:*
 - i) *Spent fuel management policy;*
 - ii) *Spent fuel management practices;*
 - iii) *Radioactive waste management policy;*
 - iv) *Radioactive waste management practices;*
 - v) *Criteria used to define and categorize radioactive waste.*

B.1 Concept for Spent Nuclear Fuel Management (SNF)

The basic concept for SNF and RAW management is given by the Strategy for the back end of nuclear energy sector, which was approved by the Government Resolution No. 328/2008 of 21 May 2008.

Basic features of the current concept for spent nuclear fuel management in SR can be summarized as follows:

1. Nuclear reactors operated in SR apply open fuel cycle. Currently it is not possible to realize a closed fuel cycle, because the WWER-440 reactors in SR are not licensed to use *reprocessed* MOX fuel.
2. For SNF management it is not considered to export SNF for reprocessing to abroad and a subsequent return of products from reprocessing (Pu, U, VRAO) back to SR.
3. Short-term storage of SNF (3 - 7 years after being removed from the reactor) is in the pools next to the reactors (BSVP), which are located at each reactor unit.
4. Long-term storage of SNF (40 - 50 years after its utilization in the reactor) is in a separate storage facility for SNF at Bohunice site – MSVP.
5. Long-term goal in the concept for SNF management is to build an interim storage facility (40 - 50 years) for SNF produced by EMO and a deep repository for SNF and VRAW in the Slovak Republic.
6. Possibilities are verified to export SNF for permanent storage abroad, or for reprocessing SNF abroad without returning products from reprocessing back to SR.
7. Possibilities are verified for international, or regional solution for final disposal of SNF; new technology in SNF management is followed.

Interim Spent Fuel Storage at Jaslovské Bohunice (in operation since 1987) is being utilized for storage of spent fuel assemblies in the pool filled with water (wet storage). After its reconstruction based on change in the geometry of layout of stored assemblies MSVP has higher final storage capacity (14,112 of spent fuel assemblies, i.e. approx. 1,700 tons of heavy metal). Reconstruction also secured higher seismic resistance and extension of service life to 50 years. This capacity is sufficient to store all SNF produced by the WWER type power plants at Jaslovské Bohunice site.

Currently the SNF from EMO 1&2, after several years of storage in the interim storage at the storage pool next to reactors, is transported for long-term storage at MSVP Jaslovské Bohunice. For the needs of Mochovce nuclear power plants construction of a dry storage is anticipated based on a principle of using dual use transport and storage containers.

The whole production of SNF from the reactor unit of A-1 (HWGCR type reactor, in operation from 1973 until 1977) was exported to the Russian Federation until mid of 1999. Smaller portion of SNF from WWER-440 reactors (697 fuel assemblies) was exported to the Russian Federation prior to 1987.

B.2 Concept for Radioactive Waste Management (RAW)

The current radioactive waste management in SR can be characterized as follows:

1. Maximal utilization of the current technological equipment for treatment and conditioning of radioactive waste (RAW), which are built at the Jaslovské Bohunice and Mochovce sites - *TSÚ RAW and FS KRAO.*
2. Basic methods for solidification of liquid radwaste, radioactive sludge and spent ion exchange resins into a form for final disposal are the following technologies: cementation, bituminization and solidification in a matrix SIAL (geopolymer).
3. The volume of solid radwaste is minimized by compacting, incineration and preventive measures.
4. Treated liquid or solid radwaste is then poured over with active mixture, which consists of concrete and concentrates, in fibre-concrete containers, the properties of which are suitable for transport, storage, as well as for disposal.
5. For treatment of intermediate level radwaste or radwaste with high trans-uranium content (specific liquid radwaste from storage of spent fuel from NPP A-1 as sludge and chrompik) there is a vitrification technology provided for.
6. *Very low active radwaste will be disposed at the repository designed for waste of this type, which will be built at the Mochovce site.*
7. For processing and treatment of metal radwaste to use available technology (high pressure compacting, cementation, etc.). With regard to an increase in metal radwaste to build a melting unit for its treatment or to secure melting on a basis of a contract with a relevant foreign facility. The low activity metal waste shall be treated by fragmentation and decontamination with a subsequent release of decontaminated material to the environment.
8. To resolve technologically separation of materials prior to their release to the environment (in particular building materials).
9. Institutional radwaste shall be treated (conditioned) to a form that is acceptable for permanent disposal and that is using standard methods for treatment of radwaste produced from nuclear installations. *The institutional radwaste, until the time of their final treatment, conditioning and disposal, will be stored at the IRAW storage, the construction of which is being prepared for this purpose at Mochovce site.* The disused sealed sources shall be treated to a form suitable for long-term central storage, or disposal.

10. Long-term storage of radwaste possible only in specially adapted premises approved by the regulatory authorities. Radwaste designed for a long-term storage shall be stored in solid form in suitable containers.
11. Conditioned radwaste from the operation and decommissioning of NPP, as well as conditioned institutional radwaste that meet the acceptance criteria shall be disposed at the National Repository at Mochovce.
12. Waste not acceptable for the National Repository at Mochovce shall be stored long-term at the site of nuclear power plants. An integral storage shall be installed at *Jaslovské Bohunice* site for storage of radwaste that cannot be disposed at RÚ RAO.
13. Radwaste that does not meet the criteria for disposal at a near surface repository, shall be disposed at a deep geological repository that needs to be developed.
14. Transportation of radwaste shall be done only when using container and transport equipment approved for this purpose.
15. The costs of radwaste management from decommissioning of nuclear energy installations shall be covered from the funds of NJF and BIDSF. The costs of radwaste management from operation of NPPs shall be covered from operating costs of producers of radioactive waste.

B.3 Criteria Used to Define and Classify Waste

In the Slovak Republic (the Act No. 541/2004 Coll. I.) radioactive waste shall mean any unusable material in gaseous, liquid or solid form, which due to the content of radio-nuclides or due to the level of their contamination with radionuclides cannot be released into the environment.

The limit of concentrations allowing release to the environment for the individual radionuclides is stated in Annex 3 to the Government Regulation No. 345/2006 Coll. I.

Classification of radioactive waste is based on their ability to be disposed and is defined in the Decree of ÚJD SR No. 53/2006 Coll. I., *setting the details of requirements for handling nuclear materials, radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel*. According to this Decree Radwaste is divided into the following categories:

- a) **Transitional radioactive waste**, the activity of which decreases during storage below the limit value enabling their release into environment;
- b) **Low level radioactive waste and intermediate level radioactive waste**, the activity of which is higher than the limit value allowing their release into the environment and the produced residual heat of which is less than 2 kW/m³:
 1. **Short-lived** radioactive waste, which after the conditioning meet the limits and conditions of safe operation for the surface repository of radioactive waste and the average mass activity of alpha nuclides of which is less than 400 Bq/g;
 2. **Long-lived** radioactive waste, which after the conditioning do not meet the limits and conditions of safe operation for surface repository of radioactive wastes or the average mass activity of alpha nuclides of which is higher than 400 Bq/g or equals to 400 Bq/g,

- c) **High level radioactive waste**, the produced residual heat of which is higher than 2 kW/m³ or equals to 2 kW/m³ and such waste cannot be deposited in the surface repository of radioactive waste.

It has not been defined yet when the spent nuclear fuel becomes high-level radioactive waste.

C Scope of Application of the Convention

Article 3 of the Joint Convention

1. *This Convention shall apply to the safety of spent fuel management, when the spent fuel results from operation of civilian nuclear reactors. Spent fuel held at reprocessing facilities as part of a reprocessing activity is not covered in the scope of this Convention unless the Contracting Party declares reprocessing to be part of spent fuel management.*
2. *This Convention shall also apply to the safety of radioactive waste management when the radioactive waste results from civilian applications. However this Convention shall not apply to waste that contains only naturally occurring radioactive materials and that does not originate from the nuclear fuel cycle, unless it constitutes disused sealed source or it is declared as radioactive waste for the purposes of this Convention by the Contracting Party.*
3. *This Convention shall not apply to the safety of management of spent fuel or radioactive waste within military or defence programmes, unless declared as spent fuel or radioactive waste for the purposes of this Convention. However, this Convention shall apply to the safety of management of spent fuel or radioactive waste from military or defence programmes, if and when such materials are transferred permanently to and managed within exclusively civilian programmes.*
4. *This Convention shall also apply to discharges as provided for in Articles 4, 7, 11, 14, 24 and 26.*

This report provides information on the implementation of the Joint Convention for nuclear installations in the SR. The link between the chapters and the individual articles of the Joint Convention is shown in Table C.1.

Table C.1: Reference Index

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C.1 Safety of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Management and Radioactive Waste (RAW) Management

The scope of this Report covers information on the safe management of spent fuel from nuclear energy installations, including transportation and inventory of spent fuel.

The most important facilities in terms of spent fuel management are listed in Annex I.

Currently in Slovakia there are no facilities for reprocessing of spent fuel or facilities for high active waste management and for other products (plutonium, uranium) from reprocessing of spent fuel. Reprocessing of spent fuel is not yet part of the concept for spent fuel management (see B.1). Spent fuel produced at the nuclear installations of SR is currently not being reprocessed abroad either with the intention to return the products to the SR. Spent fuel from NPP A-1 and part of spent fuel produced by WWER-440 reactors, which was exported to ZSSR/RF in the past, was exported without returning high active RAW and products from reprocessing back to the SR.

D Spent Fuel Management and Radioactive Waste (RAW) Management Facilities

Article 32 of the Joint Convention

2. This report shall also include

- i) *A list of the spent fuel management facilities subject to this Convention, their location, main purpose and essential features;*
- ii) *An inventory of spent fuel that is subject to this Convention and that is being held in storage and of that which has been disposed of. This inventory shall contain a description of the material and, if available, give information on its mass and its total activity;*
- iii) *A list of the radioactive waste management facilities subject to this Convention, their location, main purpose and essential features;*
- iv) *An inventory of radioactive waste that is subject to this Convention that*
 - a) *Is being held in storage at radioactive waste management and nuclear fuel cycle facilities;*
 - b) *Has been disposed of; or*
 - c) *Has resulted from past practices;**This inventory shall contain a description of the material and other appropriate information available, such as volume or mass, activity and specific radionuclides;*
- v) *A list of nuclear facilities in the process of being decommissioned and the status of decommissioning activities at those facilities.*

D.1 List and Description of Spent Fuel Management Facilities

D.1.1 Basic characteristics of the main equipment for spent fuel management at NPPs of WWER type

The main facilities:

- Fuel charging machine (CM),
- Spent fuel pool (BSVP),
- Spent fuel pool reserve grid,
- Spent fuel pool coverage,
- Transport channel sealing plate,
- Transport container pit,
- Transport container stands,
- Spent fuel transport container suspension,
- Inspection shaft,
- Sealed capsule for damaged fuel assemblies,
- Platform over transport container shaft,
- Service platform for spent fuel transport container in RH,
- Stand under the spent fuel transport container,
- Overhead electric crane 250/32/2 t.

A detailed technical description of this equipment is found in the National Report of y. 2003.

With regard to the overall concept of modernization of units and the safety improvement programs at EBO 1 - 4 and on the basis of analysis of several significant operating events, several modifications have been implemented until y. 2002 on TTČ equipment for spent fuel handling.

The most significant include the following:

- Modernization and reconstruction of electrical parts of TV-systems and system of fuel charging machine (automatic process control with options of manual, emergency and simulation mode of fuel charging machine).
- Supply and repair of system for operative KHP in reactor core – “Sipping in-core test”.
- Supply of a special semi-automatic manipulator for removal of foreign objects from reactor pressure vessel and VČR.
- Installation of remote electric control of spent fuel transport container suspension.
- Safety modification of TK C-30 container navigation to UH.
- Supply of portable demi-water heater for TK C-30.
- Equipment and software for measurement of leakages from NPP V-1 spent fuel pool (EBO 1 and EBO 2).

The main criterion for these modifications was to limit the human factor in occurrence of operational events, safety improvement in handling spent fuel, equipment reliability, operational safety of technologies and of these units as a whole.

For NPP EMO two pieces of equipment were purchased additionally, which allow more effective performance of works on the reactor during outages:

- Sipping in core was complemented with a flow-through activity analyzer MAK-8 to locate leaking fuel assemblies during outages. The device consists of a bell, which can be used to check the entire core, except fuel cells of control rods in 66 steps. The bell moves within the reactor core using a working rod of the fuel charging machine. Fuel cells of control rod are checked in KHP casings.
- Equipment for removal of fallen objects from the core will be placed on the reactor dividing platform. From the control panel it is possible to detect a fallen object in the core by using TV system. A head with interchangeable tools can be used to capture such object and place it in a transport container.

D.1.2 Interim spent fuel storage of JAVYS, a. s. (MSVP)

MSVP is a nuclear installation intended for temporary and safe storage of spent nuclear fuel from WWER-440 reactors prior to its further processing in the reprocessing plant or final disposal. It is designed as a wet storage and was put into operation in 1986. Active operation began in 1987.

The original design of WWER-440 units presumed that after three years in the storage pond next to the reactor the spent fuel will be transported to the former ZSSR. Later on the Soviet side started to

request storage of spent fuel at the NPP sites for a period of minimum 10 years. Therefore an Interim spent fuel storage was built at Jaslovské Bohunice for the needs of SE - EBO Units.

Since 1989 the MSVP has been used to store also spent fuel from NPP Dukovany, the Czech Republic. After development of a storage facility in the Czech Republic in the period 1995 to 1997 this fuel was gradually transported back to NPP Dukovany.

The interim spent fuel storage was reconstructed in the period 1997 – 1999 for the purpose of increasing its storage capacity, life extension and enhancing the seismic resistance of the structure. The overall storage capacity of MSVP after reconstruction and seismic enhancement is nearly three times higher compared to the designed capacity (increase from the original 5,040 to the current 14,112 fuel assemblies – 1,694 t $\dot{\text{T}}\text{K}$). The capacity has gradually been increased by replacing the original T-12 containers with the KZ-48 containers (completed in 2007) and will be sufficient for storage of all spent fuel produced during operation of Units 1 and 2 of NPP V-1 and Units 3 and 4 of NPP V-2. In contrast to SE - EMO at Units of NPP V-1 and JE V-2 the *spent fuel storage pool* (BSVP) next to the reactor was not compacted and the spent fuel from these Units is transported to MSVP after 2.5 – 3 years at the pools next to the reactor.

The operating license for MSVP was renewed after the periodic safety assessment, for the next 10 years of operation, on 9 December 2010.

The goal of the seismic enhancement project on MSVP was to enhance resistance of the building and technology to the level required by international guidelines and requirements and that is in compliance with the geological and seismological surveys carried out. On the basis of “Requirements” methodology the classification of buildings, technological equipment and electric equipment and I&C - category 1 (1a, 1b, 1c) was carried out on the level of RLE (Review Level Earthquake). Evaluation of calculations performed resulted in the necessary modifications on the buildings and technology, which were subsequently implemented as part of “Seismic enhancement and increase of the storage capacity of MSVP Bohunice” Project. By implementing this project the achieved status is that even after a seismic event all safety functions of MSVP will be secured up to the level set for the Jaslovské Bohunice site (8o MSK 64) and its life was extended by minimum 50 years.

Besides changes and modifications on the original construction design and technological equipment of MSVP, which resulted from the requirements for seismic enhancement and increase of the storage capacity and were the main aim of the reconstruction, there were further changes and modifications made, which increase the technical and safety level of MSVP:

- Installation of a manipulator MAPP 400 for transferring spent fuel;
- Reinforcement of the air conditioning systems of control rooms, ventilation of entry to MSVP, modifications of air-conditioning due to layout changes in the hygienic loops, ventilation for escape routes (staircase) on the basis of requirements of fire protection;
- Enhancing filtration of pool water with a filtration unit to capture micro-organisms in the pool water, including disposal of filter cartridges;
- Modification of the decontamination system;

- Installation of detection system for fuel assemblies tightness (Sipping in Pool) and monitoring of corrosion on the pools lining;
- Modernization of the system and instrumentation for radiation control of MSVP;
- Layout modifications of the hygienic loop on the $\pm 0,00$ m floor and on $+3,60$ m floor;
- Modifications at the entrance area for the staff when entering MSVP;
- Construction work resulting from the requirements of the new technology;
- Monitoring the life of building structures and of technological systems including monitoring of the status of spent fuel.

The MSVP is a standalone building without any construction link to the other buildings within the premises of nuclear installations at Bohunice. The building is divided to container section and storage section. The storage section consists of 4 storage pools. The storage pools are interconnected with a transport channel. Individual pools can be separated from the transport channel with hydro locks. The transport channel continues as a receiving and transferring shaft, also with the possibility to separate them with hydro locks. The spent fuel is stored inside containers located in the pools under water, which at the same time is also used as shielding and removes the residual heat from the spent fuel assemblies.

In the pool section of the MSVP there are 4 **storage pools**, while one of the pools is a back up. The bottom of the pool is on the level of $\pm 0,00$ m, the pool over cover is on the level of $+7,20$ m. The level of the cooling water is permanently maintained at a level of $+6,30$ m.

The pools are equipped with double lining (carbon steel and stainless steel) with an inter-space, from which organized leaks are draught into the system of organized leaks. The pools are covered with over-cover, the clapper segments of which clearly define the route of transport of the container and precise placing of the container to a predetermined place in the storage pool. The pool over-cover can be sealed individually or by sections. Individual pools can be separated from the transport pool with hermetic closures. Each storage pool can take 98 compact KZ-48 containers (in 14 rows by 7 containers), while each container can take 48 assemblies. Transport of containers is done at a maximal elevation of 600 mm above the bottom of the transport pool and storage pools.

The MSVP has its own **cooling and purification station**. With regard to increased requirements for removing residual heat from the spent fuel (increased burnout, more spent fuel) the original system of cooling pool water was replaced with a new system. The new system consists of two panel coolers (one as a 100 % back up) and 4 pumps (one for each pool, while the pump of the backup pool is a back up for the rest of the pumps). Removal of heat from the cooling water can be secured also through a separate autonomous cooling system for the cooling water consisting of 3 cooling micro-towers and 2 circulation pumps (one as a 100 % back up). Operation of the cooling station is periodical according to the need for cooling of pool water and maintaining its temperature within the required values. The treatment station is designed to maintain the necessary quality of pool water within the required parameters, which is secured by mechanical filtration and ion exchange. Operation is periodical.

Transport container C-30 TK is designed for on-site transportation from Units of NPP V-1 and NPP V-2 to MSVP JAVYS, a. s. at the Jaslovské Bohunice site or transportation of spent fuel outside the premises. TK is transported on a special railway wagon. At MSVP and HOB transport container suspension is used for its transport.

Fuel stored in the container is transported in a container in a water environment with a nitrogen cushion (wet transport), possibly the cooling medium used is only gas - nitrogen (dry transport). The transport packaging set C-30 is transported using 130 t crane into the receiving shaft by a special transport suspension from the transportation rail corridor. After performing the necessary handling in the receiving shaft, container de-sealing and lid removal, the container with the spent fuel is transported to the respective position in the storage pool by a trap and 16 t crane.



Fig. Transport containers C-30 TK

Ventilation system secures ventilation of inner areas of the Interim Storage and a continual monitoring of radioactive aerosols in the discharges. The ventilation system output is 127,000 m³ of air per hour.

Based on the IAEA recommendations and the decision of ÚJD SR a **monitoring program** is being gradually implemented since 2001 for the purpose of monitoring the condition of buildings, technological parts and of the spent fuel, focusing on the monitoring of the condition of:

- Civil structures, such as foundations of the MSVP building, concrete structures of pools for spent fuel, supporting steel elements and structures, the MSVP building envelope;
- Pressure vessels and piping systems (cooling, purification and decontamination system);

- Corrosive damage to equipment and technology, which is in contact with the coolant of the spent fuel storage pools (construction of pools, transportation equipment);
- Rotating machines (selected pumps and fans);
- Systems and components of power supply (transformers, generators, motors and cables);
- Spent nuclear fuel.

New monitoring points were installed to monitor MSVP building subsidence, including monitoring of the groundwater level. The condition of the MSVP pools lining is monitored using samples of materials located in the pools and acoustic emission method. Detection system of fuel coating tightness (Sipping in Pool) and the inspection stand for fuel monitoring, where non-destructive inspection of fuel bars will be carried out, are used to monitor the condition of spent fuel.

BASIC TECHNICAL DATA FOR MSVP - JAVYS, a. s.	
Maximal storage capacity	14 112 fuel assemblies
Storage capacity as at 31 Dec.2010	11 568 fuel assemblies
Number of pools	3 operational + 1 backup
Ground-plan of the building	45m x 70m
Total built up area	95 000m ³
Possibility of extending it	2 - 3 pools
Method of storage	KZ 48 containers
Maximal temperature of pool water	50 °C
Capacity of purification system of pool water	25 m ³ /h
Method of transportation of spent fuel	Rail wagons, TK C-30 containers
Pool size, length x width x depth	23,4 x 8,4 x 7,2 m
Number of containers per pool	98 of KZ-48 type

D.2 List and Description of Facilities for Radioactive Waste (RAW) Management

D.2.1 Facilities for Radioactive Waste (RAW) Management within NPP

NPPs with WWER-440 are equipped with the following facilities for treatment and storage of RAW:

Facilities for treatment of solid RAW are represented by collecting equipment, sorting equipment, washers, dryers, low pressure compactor and fragmentation equipment. These are used for fragmentation of large size metal SRAW.

Facilities for treatment of liquid RAW are represented by purification (filtration) stations with ion exchange resins (ŠOV 1, 4, 5 – single block; ŠOV 2, 3, 6 - common), evaporating distillation equipment, treatment plant of contaminated oil, connecting assembly of concentrate homogenization and pumping stations.

Facilities for gaseous RAW management are represented by ventilation systems are provided with filters to capture aerosols and iodine. During 2003 - 2004 replacement of original iodine filters of Soviet

provenience with iodine filtration stations took place. As part of completion of the fragmenting workplace a new exhaustion system was installed for the workplace.

Facility for storage of solid RAW

The method of storing solid RAW depends on the type of RAW and from its packaging:

- Solid RAW for incineration and high pressure compacting is stored in 200 litres MEVA drums in storage shafts;
- Metal solid RAW is stored in box pallets (only at EBO 3 - 4 and SE - EMO);
- For example, medium and high level solid RAW from the reactor is stored in special packaging, in stainless steel cylindrical containers at a special storage facility, which is accessible directly from the reactor hall and is formed as a set of vertical metal cylindrical shafts embedded in mass concrete to shield radiation;
- Other solid RAW with higher activity in shielded drums and with these in shielded boxes;
- Air-conditioning filters in metal packages placed in storage shafts;
- Oversized solid RAW is freely stored in designated storage shafts.

Facilities for storage of liquid RAW are tanks for storage of untreated liquid RAW and concentrates. Contaminated oils are stored in jerrycans put into *MEVA drums, resp. directly in MEVA drums, to which they are pumped from the tanks.*

The concentrate is stored in stainless steel tanks with a capacity from 415 up to 550 m³.

Exhausted ion exchange resins are stored in stainless steel tanks with a capacity from 150 up to 450 m³, which are located in leak proof concrete shafts capable of capturing the entire volume of the tank in the event of failure.

D.2.2 Technology for Treatment and Conditioning of Radioactive Waste (TSÚ RAW)

Technology for treatment and conditioning of RAW includes the following technology:

- *Bohunice Treatment Centre - BSC RAW, containing new technology:*
 - Incineration plant (burning of combustible KRAO and solid RAW);
 - High pressure compacting facility (compacting of solid RAW, in particular metal waste);
 - Concentration facility (Final evaporation of concentrates on the evaporator);
 - Facility for RAW conditioning by cementation to fibre-concrete containers;
 - Sorting facility for solid RAW;
 - Storage and transportation facility;
- Bituminization lines PS 44 and PS 100 for treatment of ion resin concentrates and sorbents, *and active water purification station PS 100;*
- Wastewater treatment plant *for treatment of KRAO from NPP A-1;*
- Active water purification station PS 100 (2000);

- Cementation line KWU (1984) originally as a backup for emergency purposes, currently shutdown and to be decommissioned;
- *Fragmenting line and high capacity decontamination line for metal RAW for treatment of metal RAW;*
- *Workplace for processing air filters.*

The license to operate TSÚ RAW was renewed in compliance with the requirements of the Act No. 541/2004 Coll. I. after a periodic nuclear safety assessment, for the following 10 years of operation, on 30 Dec. 2010.

Detailed technical description of these facilities is found in the National Report from 2003.



Fig. Bohunice Conditioning Centre (BSC)

D.2.3 Facility for Final Treatment and Conditioning of Liquid Radioactive Waste (FS KRAO)

FS KRAO is designed for treatment and conditioning of KRAO (radioactive concentrates, saturated sorbents and sludge) and certain types of PRAO from the operation of EMO Units and for conditioning of processed PRAO from other NIs. The resulting product is VBK complying with the L&C for storage, transportation and disposal at RÚ RAW, where KRAO is solidified by bituminization in 200 l drums, or PRAO put into VBK directly or in drums, or as compacts covered with active mixture.

FS KRAO is located within the *EMO* premises in the immediate vicinity of *NPP EMO1,2*. It consists of the following technology for treatment and conditioning of RAW:

- Bituminization
- Thickening concentration evaporator
- Cementation

D.2.4 Facility for Institutional Radioactive Waste (IRAW) Management

The original centralized system for collection of IRAW in the SR was disrupted due to the separation of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. Establishment of a new national system was imposed by government resolution No. 610/2009, which has designated responsibility for storing the captured contaminated radioactive materials within SR to SE - VYZ, while from 1 April 2006 the commitments were transferred to Nuclear and Decommissioning Company (JAVYS, a. s.).

The Government of the Slovak Republic by its Resolution No. 610 from 2 September 2009 approved the draft procedure for institutional radioactive waste management and for captured radioactive materials and charged JAVYS, a. s., with constructing a complex facility for accepting, sorting and long-term safe storage of such materials. This facility will be developed in close vicinity of National Radwaste Repository Mochovce.

The system of disposable IRAW management in surface repository from their production until their disposal is secured from the technology point of view. For IRAW that cannot be disposed it is necessary to build – looking for the long-term – a storage for IRAW and ZRAM.

JAVYS, a. s., operates technology for complex treatment and conditioning of radioactive waste from NI, which after licensing, can be used also for similar activities with IRAW. At Jaslovské Bohunice storage capacity has been created for short-term storage of IRAW. The National Repository for permanent disposal of treated low and medium level radioactive waste, as well as the transport and handling equipment and human resources, after the relevant decisions of the regulators, may also serve for securing a system for IRAW management.

D.2.5 Facility for Radioactive Waste (RAW) Shipment

In order to ensure the concept of RAW and IRAW/ZRAM management, a transport system was established providing for shipment of:

1. Solid and liquid RAW within Jaslovské Bohunice premises;
2. Solid RAW between Jaslovské Bohunice – Mochovce sites,
3. Institutional RAW and ZRAM from the whole territory of SR to Jaslovské Bohunice.

The shipment of RAW is performed in certified transportation equipment on means of transport meeting the conditions of the European Agreement on international carriage of dangerous goods (ADR), or the Regulation concerning international carriage of dangerous goods (RID), Act No. 541/2004 Coll. I. and the Decree of ÚJD SR No. 57/2006 Coll. I.

The shipment of RAW is arranged fully by JAVYS, a. s.



Fig. Transport of fibre-concrete containers to the National Repository of RAW

D.2.6 National Repository for Radwaste (RÚ RAW)

The National Radwaste Repository is a surface type repository designed for disposal of solid and solidified low and medium level radioactive waste, produced during operation of nuclear installations. The Repository site is located about 2 km northwest from NPP Mochovce site.

The basic safety requirement for a repository is that during its operation, period of institutional control and after its completion no leakage of radionuclides to the environment shall occur that would cause radiation exposure exceeding the values set by valid legal regulations.

The repository is built in a geological formation with low permeability and high sorption capacity. Artificial layer of compacted clay represents an additional barrier against radioactivity leakage. A drainage system mouthling into monitoring shafts, which enables to control eventual water leakages from each disposal box, is built between it and the disposal boxes. Other basic engineering barriers against leakage of radionuclides to the environment include concrete structure of the repository, fibre-concrete container and solidified form of radioactive waste.



Fig. Disposal of VBK to disposal boxes of the repository in the first double row

The Repository is currently formed by a system of disposal boxes arranged into two double-rows, 40 boxes each. The capacity of one box is 90 fibre-concrete containers (VBK). The total capacity of the Repository is 7,200 containers with a total volume of 22,320 m³. The inside volume of VBK is 3.1 m³. Compacted and bituminized waste are fixed with active or non-active cement mixture.

The National Repository (the first double-row of disposal boxes) was granted authorization by ÚJD SR for permanent operation in November 2001.

Until y. 2014 the 2nd double-row of disposal boxes will be ready for operation and subsequently an application was filed with ÚJD SR for authorization – license for its operation, so that it is possible to smoothly continue in disposing VBK with RAW to this double-row.

The site of the repository enables expansion to 10 disposal double-rows, i.e. for disposal of about 36 thousand fibre-concrete containers with RAW, *however on the basis of latest data and requirements for disposal of all low and medium level RAW produced from operation and decommissioning of WWER Units and from decommissioning of NPP A-1. For this amount 7 and half double-rows according to the current concept will be sufficient.*

Building of the 2nd double-row of disposal boxes is currently under preparation for disposal of RAW produced from decommissioning of the Units 1 and 2 of NPP Bohunice. The 3rd double-row of disposal boxes shall be built within the RÚ RAO premises at Mochovce approx. by year 2018.

The Repository is protected against meteorological influence by a hall, which ensures that the disposal area is covered during the whole process of disposal until the time when it is replaced with a final over-cover.

The license for operation of RÚ RAW is valid until 31 August 2011. In connection with the preparation of operating license renewal pursuant to Act No. 541/2004 Coll. I., a periodical safety assessment of RÚ RAW was performed in 2010.

D.3 List and Description of Facilities in Decommissioning and Facilities for Radwaste (RAW) Management from Decommissioning, which are part thereof

D.3.1 NPP A-1 Bohunice – In Decommissioning

Nuclear Power Plant A-1 with heterogeneous reactor KS-150, was designed for electric output of 143 MW. Natural metal uranium was used as fuel, heavy water (D_2O) as moderator and carbon dioxide (CO_2) as coolant.

The moderator was cooled by 3 loops, each consisting of 2 coolers and one D_2O pump. The primary cooling circuit (CO_2) consisted of 6 loops, while each loop comprised of one steam generator, a turbo-compressor and two parallel pipes of hot and cold branches of CO_2 cooling. A separate part of NPP A-1 were facilities for installation of fuel elements and facilities for transport and technological part (TTČ), which served for handling of fresh and spent fuel, its post-cooling and storage. The post-cooling and storage system for spent fuel elements included 2 short-term storages, rod cutting chamber (on which fuel elements hung in technological channels in the reactor pressure vessel) and a long-term storage. The spent fuel elements were transported with the help of loading machine into the long-term storage filled with cooling water into long-term storage cases. Initially chrompik was used as a coolant in cases of long-term storage, later on an organic coolant Dowtherm was used. The main facility of the secondary circuit of the power plant were 3 turbo-generators, 50 MW of installed capacity each.

The A-1 NPP was connected to the power distribution network in December 1972. After an operational accident in January 1976 the operation was restored, after another operational accident in February 1977 technical, economical and safety analyses were conducted and on the basis of their results, in 1979 the government decided by its Resolution No. 135/79 that the operation of NPP A-1 would not be restored.

Activities aimed at decommissioning of NPP A-1 have commenced. Due to the absence of legal regulations for decommissioning of nuclear power plants at that time any partial issues were solved on a case-by-case basis and the individual activities were approved as modifications having impact on nuclear safety. The works concentrated on:

- Removal of consequences of the operational event,
- Preparation of fuel export to ZSSR/RF,
- Development and subsequent implementation of RAW management technologies.

The first integrated documentation for decommissioning of NPP A-1 was developed in 1992. The currently valid concept and the time schedule for decommissioning of NPP A-1 was passed by

the Government Resolution No. 227/92. Government Resolutions Nos. 266/93, 524/93, 877/94 and 649/95 approved this time schedule, including a comprehensive procedure. **Updated documentation for the initial stage of decommissioning** was elaborated during 1994 - 1996. Based on the Atomic Act No. 130/1998 Coll. I., after the assessment of the safety report elaborated in 1996 and after completion of fuel preparation for export to the RF in 1999 ÚJD SR issued an authorization for the **first stage of decommissioning** (until 2007), i.e. to achieve the state declared in this documentation from the current base line:

- All spent fuel is removed from the long-term storage and media representing the highest potential risk are solidified or re-stored into new tanks,
- Majority of liquid operational RAW is conditioned in a form enabling safe disposal,
- Other RAW is treated into a form enabling safe disposal or their storage,
- Essential decontamination is performed aimed at further reduction of potential sources of RA material leakage.

Since in particular the implementation works showed significant time delays, either due to deficient inputs regarding estimates of RAW amounts and capacities of technologies for RAW management during its planning, due to failed solutions or due to putting the works aside on positions with lower priority, the scope of works of the first stage, on the basis of request from SE – VYZ, was revised by the Decision of ÚJD SR No. 144/2003, which indicated that not even in the prolonged deadline until the end of 2008 the basic activities focusing on safety improvement and reducing the risk level would not be completed and will have to be preferentially performed at the beginning of the next stage of decommissioning focusing on disassembly of external objects. *In order to continue in the activities to improve safety and reduce the risks ÚJD SR Decision No. 337/2008 was issued, allowing continuation in the decommissioning activities until the time when the authorization for commencing the second stage is obtained.*

On 18 June 2009 an authorization was issued by means of ÚJD SR Decision No. 178/2009 for the second stage of decommissioning of NPP A-1 in accordance with the Plan for the Second Stage of Decommissioning of NPP A-1, which enabled to continue with a continual alternative in the process of decommissioning of NPP A-1. The period of years 2009 and 2010 focused in particular on decommissioning of external objects of the nuclear installation of NPP A-1, on the issue of handling contaminated soil and RAW management produced by the main generating Unit of NPP A-1.

The current status of NPP A-1 can be characterized as follows:

- Export of spent fuel to the Russian Federation was completed in 1999 (based on an inter-governmental treaty from 1956);
- Media for after-cooling of spent fuel were partially treated, and partially re-stored: chrompik (water solution of chromate and potassium bi-chromate) was vitrified or re-stored into new tanks, the sludge in enclosures for after-cooling of fuel elements and on the bottom of the DS pool is solidified into geo-polymers, dowtherm (organic liquid mixture of biphenyl and biphenyl-oxide) is gradually re-purified and incinerated. More than 99 % of water activity of the long-term storage pool was captured on special sorbents. *Liquids from the DS pool was processed by concentration*

on the evaporator. Bottom sediments are re-stored into a new re-storage tank of the reactor hall of NPP A-1.

- Liquid operational waste (concentrates) were bituminized, *liquid waste from decommissioning of NPP A-1* and together with other waste from Jaslovské Bohunice site are gradually conditioned and disposed at the repository;
- Storage of solid RAW, object 44/20, was reconstructed, waste removed, sorted and stored in a controlled manner. Part of this waste was conditioned and disposed.
- The original, currently not operated storage tanks, object 41, represent the highest potential risk for the environment. Waste from this object located outside of reactor building *was re-stored into tanks of object 44/10. Liquid RAW* is gradually conditioned by *concentration and cementation* for the purpose of further conditioning and disposal.

Technological facilities with induced activity or with higher level contamination will be dismantled only in the following decommissioning stages.

D.3.2 Facilities for Management of Radioactive Waste (RAW) from Decommissioning – part of NPP A-1

Currently RAW is removed, sorted and stored in a controlled manner in 200 dm³ drums. The incinerable RAW is transported to the incineration plant at BSC. The sorting facility is used for sorting solid RAW produced from operation of NPP A-1 compacted into packages *for burnable, not burnable, compactable and metal.*

Workplace for contaminated concrete (PNKB) management

The workplace consists of PNKB containment and several additional stands for short-term storage of contaminated and decontaminated concrete debris in drums, as well as contaminated and decontaminated concrete blocks. The PNKB containment is designed as an assembled shelter and is divided into two parts of equal size, where two basic technological activities will be taking place with the aim to release concrete into the environment:

- Sorting of debris of contaminated concrete on a vibrating conveyer;
- Decontamination of concrete blocks using dry methods (milling, slotting, etc.).

Vitrification Plant of Chrompik (VICHR)

Vitrification plant is for fixation of radioactive chrompik into a glass matrix of boric silicate type with the aim to achieve significant volume reduction and to enhance the storage safety of this specific radioactive liquid waste. Chrompik is pumped from the storage tanks into a measuring tank with a capacity of 128 dm³ in order to be dosed into the evaporator, where a concentrate of 3 dm³ is produced at a temperature of 130 - 140 °C. This is then discharged into a melting inductive furnace, where glass matrix is added. The concentrate is dried and the mixture is melted down in the furnace at the temperature of up to 1,150°C. The outcome is poured out into a steel patron, which is after cooling transported into the vitrification storage. Activity of condensate's steams from the evaporator is

reduced on the sorbents. Parts of the vitrification facility are cooled by an inserted cooling circuit, which creates at the same time a barrier against leakage of radioactive materials.

A reconstruction of the vitrification plant VICHK was performed during 2002 – 2004 with the aim to use the plant for vitrification of chrompik with special radioactivity 10^{11} Bq. kg⁻¹.

Manipulation chamber for handling medium level radioactive materials

Manipulation chamber was created by reconstructing the hot chamber. It is a special manipulation box furnished with a control room separated by shielding with built-in observation hole made of lead glass equipped with a system of equipments, which enable:

- cutting materials and sampling,
- clamping and machining of high level contaminated materials,
- handling samples (insertion, removal from containers),
- detailed visual inspection of objects,
- taking photos of objects.

Fragmentation workplace for long-term storage cases

It allows:

- fragmenting metal parts of PDS without inner content,
- disposing fragments into empty drums, pre-concreted drums and drums with steel insert,
- measuring the dose rate on the drum surface and overall activity in the drum,
- performing inner rinsing of scissors, knives, working chamber, filling and discharging head,
- trapping the rinsing medium in trapping tanks,
- placing the lid on the drum and putting the drum into transport container for drums.

D.3.3 Bituminization Plant and Incinerator at the Nuclear Power Plant Research Institute (VUJE), a. s.

The experimental incinerator and experimental bituminization plant have terminated their operation and since 2007 are in decommissioning.

D.3.4 Mobile Facilities for Radioactive Waste (RAW) Management

Facility for fixation of sludge (ZFK). This semi-mobile facility was commissioned in 2007 and it enables fixing RA sludge with specific beta, gamma activity of cca 10^9 Bq.kg⁻¹ into a cement matrix. *During 2009 to 2010 the workplace was relocated to object 44/10, where it currently processes bottom sediments, collected from all external tanks of NPP A-1.*

Workplace for sorting contaminated soils is an autonomous *technology*, transportable by regular means of transport; requires power supply. It comprises of 4 functional mutually linked units:

- Preparation of soils,
- Transportation of soils for monitoring,

- Monitoring and sorting of soils,
- Shipment of soils after monitoring and sorting from the workplace.

Mobile cementation facility of VUJE, a. s., which used to be part of the experimental incinerator, is used for solidification of *sludge phases from decommissioning of NPP A-1*.

For **solidification of RA sludge into geo-polymer matrix SIAL** 4 mobile fixation technological units were designed, produced and completed for supply treatment of sludge at NPP A-1 and other NPPs. Product of these plants is sludge fixed in SIAL matrix in steel drums with a capacity of 60 dm³ or 200 dm³.

For decontamination of some equipments, such as tanks, pipes and others, **decontamination circuit mobile facilities** identified as DEZA-OD were designed and manufactured. These facilities consist of several modules, which are mutually interconnected and enable to perform pre-disassembly decontamination of equipments and pipe lines in closed hydrodynamic circuit. Decontamination is performed with the help of decontamination solutions. In the present time, one of these facilities is installed at NPP A-1 and another one at NPP V-1.

D.4 Inventory of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) and Radioactive Waste (RAW)

Inventory of SNF and RAW is listed in Annexes IV and V.

E Legislation and Regulation

E.1 Legislative and Regulatory Framework

Article 18 of the Joint Convention

Implementing Measures

Each Contracting Party shall take, within the framework of its national law, the legislative, regulatory and administrative measures and other steps necessary for implementing its obligations under this Convention.

Article 19 of the Joint Convention

Legislative and Regulatory Framework

1. *Each Contracting Party shall establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory framework to govern the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management.*
2. *This legislative and regulatory framework shall provide for:*
 - i) *The establishment of applicable national safety requirements and regulations for radiation safety;*
 - ii) *A system of licensing of spent fuel and radioactive waste management activities;*
 - iii) *A system of prohibition of the operation of a spent fuel or radioactive waste management facility without a licence;*
 - iv) *A system of appropriate institutional control, regulatory inspection, documentation and reporting;*
 - v) *The enforcement of applicable regulations and of the terms of the licence;*
 - vi) *A clear allocation of responsibilities of the bodies involved in the different steps of spent fuel and radioactive waste management.*
3. *When considering whether to regulate radioactive materials as radioactive waste, Contracting Parties shall take due account of the objectives of this Convention.*

E.1.1 Structure of the Regulatory Bodies

Regulation of the peaceful use of nuclear energy is performed by the governmental bodies and organizations within the framework of their competence defined by the respective acts according to the structure described in fig E.1.1.




Fig. E.1.1 Structure of regulatory bodies

Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic (ÚJD SR)

ÚJD SR is a central state administration authority. It executes state regulatory activities in the field of nuclear safety of nuclear installations, including management of radioactive waste, spent fuel and other parts of the fuel cycle, as well as transport and management of nuclear materials including their control and record keeping system. It is responsible for the assessment of goals of nuclear energy program and of quality of the classified equipment, as well as for commitments of the Slovak Republic under international agreements and treaties in the said field.

Ministry of Health of the Slovak Republic (Public Health Authority of SR)

Ministry of Health is a central body of state administration for health care, health protection and other activities in the health service. State administration in the field of health protection is executed by the Ministry of Health and the Public Health Authority of SR. The Ministry's competences include establishing exposure limits and conditions for treatment and disposal of radioactive waste in terms of potential impacts on health. The Public Health Authority methodologically directs the health protection against ionizing radiation effects and licenses activities leading to exposure, performs state health regulation at nuclear installations and is a point of contact for the EU on health protection against ionizing radiation (radiation protection).

Ministry of Environment of the Slovak Republic (MŽP SR)

The Act No. 372/2010 Coll. I. of 7 September 2010, amending Act No. 575/2001 Coll. I. on organization of government activity and organization of the central state administration abolishes the Ministry of Agriculture, Environment and Regional Development of the Slovak Republic and again creates the

Ministry of Environment (MŽP SR).

MŽP SR is a central body of state administration of the Slovak Republic (inter alia) for the creation and protection of the environment. The following bodies report to the Ministry of Environment:

- The Slovak Environmental Inspectorate, through which MŽP SR fulfils the role of the main state regulator in environmental matters.
- The Slovak Hydro-meteorological Institute and others.

MŽP SR, besides other activities, provides for the process according to the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (ESPOO Convention). The aim of this procedure is to provide high level environmental protection including health aspects, including:

- a) Ensuring thorough consideration of environmental aspects including health aspects in preparation of policies and legislation;*
- b) Setting clear, transparent and effective procedures for strategic environmental assessment;*
- c) Ensuring participation of the public on strategic environmental assessment; and*
- d) Through this, by subsequent integration of environmental aspects, including health aspects, into measures and instruments proposed for promoting sustainable development.*

Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic (MV SR)

The Ministry of Interior is a central state administration authority for, amongst others, the conceptual management and control of fire prevention, the preparation of an integrated rescue system including civil protection of the population and property, public order and personal security. *In case of accidents at a nuclear installation it is involved in management and carrying out rescue works, organizes and provides for the operation of the notification and warning centre of the Slovak Republic, development, operation and maintenance of information systems for collection of radiation data, operation of the integrated meteorological system, etc. It provides for a 24 hours permanent service, which fulfils the role of the national point of contact of the Slovak Republic vis-à-vis the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna and a competent body of the European Commission (ECURIE) in Luxembourg.*

Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic (MH SR)

The Act No. 403/2010 Coll. I. of 13 October 2010, amending and complementing the Act No. 575/2001 Coll. I. on organization of government activity and organization of the central state administration as amended as at 1 Nov. 2010 the Ministry of Economy and Construction of the Slovak Republic is abolished and subsequently the competencies are divided. At the same time the name of the ministry was returned back to the Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic. The role of construction authority was taken over by the Ministry of Transport, Construction and Regional Development of the Slovak Republic.

The Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic is a central state administration authority for, amongst others, nuclear energy industry, including the management of nuclear fuel, storage of radioactive waste, prospecting and exploration of radioactive raw materials and their extraction, and authorization of exports of special materials and equipments as dual-use goods.

Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family of the Slovak Republic (MPSVR SR)

The Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family is a central state administration authority for, among others, safety and health protection at work and labour inspection. State administration on labour inspection is executed by state administration bodies MPSVR SR, the National Labour Inspectorate and labour inspectorates.

The Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family of SR oversees and controls the National Labour Inspectorate (NLI) and is responsible for the execution of labour inspection. The National Labour Inspectorate is a governing body for labour inspectorates, which performs (inter alia) also labour inspection in nuclear sector and regulation pursuant to special regulations.

E.1.2 Legislation***E.1.2.1 Introduction***

The legal structure for regulation of the nuclear safety consists of laws, which were reviewed in the period of Slovakia's accession to the European Union and shortly after the accession. In this period an extensive approximation of the legal order of the Slovak Republic to the law of the European Community and of the European Union took place. Some pieces of legislation are in force still from the period before the accession (for example, the construction code No. 50/1976 Coll. – currently a new building act is in the process of preparation).

The legal system of the Slovak Republic is structured as follows.

1. The supreme fundamental legal act of the state is the Constitution that is passed by the Parliament – it is generally binding in nature.
2. Legal acts stipulate the fundamental rights and obligations specifying principles in various areas; these are passed by the Parliament – they are generally binding in nature.
3. Governmental ordinances are subordinate to legal acts and are passed by the Government - they are generally binding in nature.
4. Regulations (decrees) and edicts are rules issued by the central state administration authorities (such as ministries) in order to set the particulars for implementation of legal acts and governmental regulations - they are generally binding in nature.
5. Guidelines (manuals) contain detailed requirements and recommended steps to be taken to ensure that the requirements are met. These are issued by the regulatory authorities.
6. By-laws (such as directives and orders) are internal organizational rules of a regulatory authority or a nuclear installation operator.

E.1.2.2 Acts in the field of State Regulation

Use of nuclear energy is governed by **Act No. 541/2004 Coll. I.** on peaceful use of nuclear energy (the Atomic Act). *The Act has been amended several times. It came into effect on 1 Dec. 2004 and repealed the original Act No. 130/1998 Coll. I., as well as all its implementing decrees.*

The Atomic Act lays down conditions for safe use of nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes in accordance with the international treaties concluded by the Slovak Republic. It contains also clauses that determine financial compensations in case of nuclear accident. It assumes an amount of Euro 75 million as a limit for financial liability of the operator for nuclear damage caused by nuclear event at a nuclear installation for energy purposes and an amount of Euro 50 million as a limit of financial liability of the operator for other nuclear installations and transport of radioactive materials. In accordance with the Atomic Act a nuclear installation shall mean a set of building objects and technology,

1. Part of which is a nuclear reactor or nuclear reactors;
2. For production and treatment of nuclear materials or storage of nuclear materials with a quantity that is higher than one effective kg;
3. For treatment and conditioning or storage of radioactive waste,
4. For disposal of radioactive waste from nuclear installations, institutional radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel; containers and covers, where nuclear material is used as shielding material for radioactive sources, or areas, in which such containers and covers are stored, are not considered as nuclear installations.

Amendment to the Atomic Act No. 120/2010 Coll. I. added inter alia provisions on the obligation to capture biometric data of persons entering a nuclear installation due to more intense physical protection of nuclear installations as part of a broader concept of fight against terrorism. It also took account of the changeover to Euro currency, as well as there was an increase in contributions of operators for performance of state regulation.

Act No. 145/2010 Coll. I. effective from 1 May 2010 amended the Act No. 24/2006 Coll. I. on environmental impact assessment also amended the Atomic Act in matters related to access of public to environmental information. This documentation is not disclosed according to special regulation (Act No. 211/2000 Coll. I. on free access to information).

Generally binding legal regulations implementing the Atomic Act and issued by ÚJD SR in a form of decrees are listed in Annex VI.

ÚJD SR also issues safety guides (Annex VI.).

Act No. 575/2001 Coll. on Organization of Governmental Activities and of Central State Administration as amended (so called Competence Act) defines the framework of tasks and responsibilities of central state administration authorities. The provision on ÚJD SR is in section 29 of the valid Competence Act.

Act No. 656/2004 Coll. on Energy amended, effective since the 1st January 2005, has abolished the original Act No. 70/1998 Coll. on Energy as amended. The Act on Energy as one of the basic acts governs conditions of business in nuclear energy, as well the rights and obligations of natural and legal entities who make business in this field.

Act No. 276/2001 Coll. on Regulation in Network Industries as amended provides for subject matter, scope, conditions and method of regulation in network industries. Production of electric energy is also understood as network industry. Activities in network industries are considered as regulated activities, for which an authorization from the Regulatory Office for Network Industries is required. The Act stipulates conditions of regulated activities exercise and rights and obligations of entities subject to regulation and rules of operation of the market in electricity and gas.

Act No. 24/2006 Coll. I. on environmental impact assessment and on amendments and complements to certain laws, as amended, effective from 1 February 2006 repealed and replaced the original Act No. 127/1994 Coll. I. on environmental impact assessment. *The Act was amended by Act No. 287/2009 Coll. I. of 19 June 2009 and by Act No. 145/2010 Coll. I. The Act 145/2010 also amends other laws, in particular Act No. 50/1976 Coll. on land use planning and the building code (the Building Act), as amended and Act No. 541/2004 Coll. I. on peaceful use of nuclear energy (the Atomic Act), in matters related to access of public to environmental information and public participation in the decision-making on licensing proposed activities. With the aim to strengthen and ensure high environmental protection, the Act establishes a procedure for expert and public environmental impact assessment:*

1. strategic documents prior to their approval (*for example, concept for radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel management, the national program of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel management*); and
2. proposed activities prior to the decision on their siting or prior to their approval according to special regulations (*construction of nuclear installations and relating activities*).

The Act defines activities that are obligatory subject to international assessment from the aspect of their environmental impact:

1. *nuclear power plants and other nuclear reactors (with the exception of research facilities for production and conversion of fissile and enriched materials, with maximal thermal output not exceeding 1 kW of permanent heat load),*
2. *facilities determined exclusively for production or enrichment of nuclear fuel, for spent nuclear fuel re-processing or its storage, as well as disposal and treatment of radioactive waste.*

After amendment of Act No. 24/2006 Coll. I., public participation was strengthened by means of extended to natural persons and legal person having interest in procedures of environmental decision-making. In case of natural person it shall be a person older than 18 years of age, who submits a written statement, which shows his/her interest in the decision-making and in the follow up licensing proceedings he/she has a position of a party to the proceeding. This amendment further governs the concept of civil initiative, as well as the method of proceedings, involvement in the process and

electing a representative from this circle of people. The civil initiative, the same way as civil association and NGO subject to statutory conditions, has the position of a party to proceedings according to special regulation.

The Ministry of Environment of the Slovak Republic is the competent authority to assess transboundary environmental impacts.

With the effect from 1 July 2006 a new **Act No. 238/2006 Coll. I. on the National Nuclear Fund for decommissioning of nuclear installations and for spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste management (the Act on the Nuclear Fund) and on amendments and complements to certain laws**, which repealed the original Act No. 254/1994 Coll. I. and its implementing decree No. 14/1995 Coll. I., establishing the State Fund for Decommissioning of Nuclear Energy Installations and the spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste management. The Nuclear Fund is an independent legal entity administered by the *Ministry of Economy of SR*. The Fund has its own bodies (*Board of Trustees, Supervisory Board, Director, Managers of Sub-accounts, Main Inspector*). Resources of the Nuclear Fund are various – contributions from license holders, levies collected by operators of the transmission and the distribution system in prices of supplied electricity directly from the end customers (to settle the so called “historical debt”), penalties imposed by ÚJD SR, interest on deposits, subsidies and contributions from the EU funds, from the state budget and others.

The Act No. 143/2010, amended Act No. 238/2006 Coll. I. on the National Nuclear Fund for Decommissioning of Nuclear Installations and for Spent Nuclear Fuel and Radioactive Waste Management (the Act on Nuclear Fund) specifies in more detail the possibilities how to use the funds from the Nuclear Fund to cover eligible costs spent on activities, which do not belong to the back end of nuclear fuel cycle, related to the institutional radioactive waste management. Besides that the Act proposes certain legislative and technical modifications.

Act No. 355/2007 Coll. on Protection, Support and Development of Public Health and amendments and complements to certain laws lays down requirements for public health protection, public health care authorities, their powers, basic conditions for activities leading to exposure, for activities important from the view of radiation protection and release of radioactive materials and radioactively contaminated items and materials from regulatory control and issuance of authorizations for these activities, obligations of physical and legal entities, measures for public health protection, execution of state health care regulation and sanctions for violation of obligations in the sector of public health care. Details on requirements for assurance of radiation protection in order to implement the Act are stated in the subsequent implementing decrees of MZ SR and are listed in Annex VI.

Act No. 125/2006 Coll. I. on labour inspection and **Act No. 82/2005 Coll. I. on undeclared work and on illegal employment** governs the labour inspection, through which it promotes protection of employees at work and execution of state administration in labour inspection, defines the competencies of bodies of state administration in labour inspection and their competence in executing oversight according to special regulation (**Act No. 264/1999 Coll. on technical requirements for**

products and on conformity assessment amended by Act No. 436/2001 Coll.), establishes rights and obligations of labour inspector and duties of natural and legal entities.

Act No. 124/2006 Coll. I. on occupational health and safety and on amendments and complements to certain laws lays down the general principles for prevention and the basic conditions for ensuring occupational health and safety, to exclude risks and factors underlying the emergence of industrial accidents, occupational diseases and other damage to health from work. An integral part of occupational health and safety is the safety of technical equipment. The follow up generally binding legal regulations are listed in Annex VI.

Amending the **Act No. 50/1976 Coll. on land use and the building code** (the Building Code) amending the Atomic Act No. 541/2004 Coll. I. ÚJD SR became a building authority for constructions of nuclear installations and construction related to nuclear installation located within the premises of a nuclear installation. Prior to issuing decision on siting of a structure relating to a structure, part of which is a nuclear installation, the building authority is obliged to request a binding opinion from ÚJD SR, which may condition its consent by fulfilment of conditions.

E.1.2.3 Draft Legislation

In 2011 the next amendment to the Atomic Act shall come into effect, which takes account some of WENRA requirements, the amendment shall also transpose the Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom of 25 June 2009 establishing the Community Framework for Nuclear Safety of Nuclear Installations. Works are foreseen regarding increasing the limit of liability for each nuclear installation and for each individual nuclear event causing nuclear damage.

E.2 Regulatory Authorities

Article 20 of the Joint Convention

Regulatory Body

1. *Each Contracting Party shall establish or designate a regulatory body entrusted with the implementation of the legislative and regulatory framework referred to in article 19, and provided with adequate authority, competence and financial and human resources to fulfil its assigned responsibilities.*
2. *Each Contracting Party, in accordance with its legislative and regulatory framework, shall take the appropriate steps to ensure the effective independence of the regulatory functions from other functions, where organizations are involved in both spent fuel or radioactive waste management and in their regulation.*

E.2.1 Regulation of Nuclear Safety

E.2.1.1 Role of the Regulatory Authority

The Nuclear Regulatory Authority of SR was established on 1 January 1993 and its competencies arise from the Act No. 575/2001 Coll. I. (the Competence Act) as amended. ÚJD SR is an independent state regulatory authority that reports directly to the Government and is headed by a Chairman appointed by the Government. The regulatory authority's independence from any other body or

organization engaged in development or utilization of nuclear energy is applied in all relevant fields (legislation, human and financial resources, technical support, international cooperation, enforcement instruments).

In accordance with the Act No. 575/2001 Coll. I. (the Competence Act), ÚJD SR inter alia ensures execution of state regulation of nuclear safety of nuclear installations, including regulation of radioactive waste and spent fuel management and other phases of the fuel cycle, as well as of nuclear materials, including their control and record keeping.

The key piece of legislation in the field of nuclear safety is the Act No. 541/2004 Coll. I. On the basis of this act ÚJD SR decrees and decisions are prepared and issued. Besides the generally binding legal regulations ÚJD SR issues also safety guides to assist licence holders to meet the generally binding regulations (see Annex VI.). In the authorization procedure related to nuclear installation, standards and recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency are used and applied. The same way knowledge from the OECD/NEA and the European Union is applied.

Decision can be generally characterized as an act of law application. It means that it is the application of rights and obligations laid down in a generally binding legal provision in a particular case to a particular subject. Decisions issued by administration authorities are also referred to as individual administrative acts. The obligations imposed by a decision are enforceable and the failure to perform them can be sanctioned. Decisions are in principle subject to the possibility of bringing an action to court for judicial review of the decision. However the court does not review decisions excluded from its jurisdiction by course of the Code of Civil Procedures.

ÚJD SR issues various types of decisions: on approval, on license, on authorization, on sanction or measure imposition, on determination of a new license holder, on verification of professional competency, on documentation review and other.

The competency of ÚJD SR is provided in Section 4 of the Atomic Act, which is very extensive (<http://www.ujd.gov.sk/files/legislation>).

ÚJD SR issues annual reports on the status of nuclear safety of nuclear installations and on its activities in the previous year. It presents the report once a year, always by 30 April, to the Government and subsequently to the National Council. The annual reports can be found at <http://www.ujd.gov.sk>.

E.2.1.2 Nuclear Installation Authorization Procedure

The authorization procedure for nuclear installation consists of 5 major stages: siting, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning. Before granting an authorization for operation, the regulatory authority carries out inspection under the approved schedule of particular stages of nuclear installation commissioning (testing, fuel loading, physical start up, energetic start up, trial operation). The main regulatory authorities and the authorization procedure for construction operation decommissioning are shown in picture E.2.1.2.




Fig. E.2.1.2. Authorization procedure

The basic conditions for authorization is the elaboration and submission of safety documentation listed in the annexes of the Atomic Act, necessary for issuance of particular types of decisions and for meeting the legislative requirements for nuclear safety. An essential criteria is also the fulfilment of conditions of preceding approval procedures and decisions of regulatory authority.

Regional construction authority issues decisions on siting of nuclear installation construction and its decision-making is based on the approval of ÚJD SR and on the opinion of other regulatory authorities (Public Health Authority of SR, labour inspection bodies). Authorization to construct a nuclear installation, permit for early use of a building (part of it is also authorization for commissioning of a nuclear installation), approval for temporary use of the construction (part of it is authorization for trial operation) and the decision on final approval of the building (including license for operation of a nuclear installation) issued by ÚJD SR as a building authority. ÚJD SR exercises its competence as an building authority and state administration authority for nuclear safety at the same time in one and the same proceedings, in which its decisions are based on its own partial decision (partial approval of the safety documentation), as well as based on opinions from the relevant regulatory bodies – the Public Health Authority of SR (radiation protection), the National Labour Inspectorate (labour inspection and occupational health and safety) and other bodies and organizations of state administration (fire protection, civil protection). When issuing authorizations and licenses by the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of SR, the obligations of ÚJD SR and of other affected bodies are defined by the Act No. 50/1976 Coll. (the Building Act) as amended, Act No. 541/2004 (the Atomic Act), the decree of ÚJD SR No. 50/2006 Coll. I., setting the details of requirements for nuclear safety of nuclear installations during their siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation, decommissioning and

closure of repository, as well as criteria for classification of selected equipment into safety classes, decrees of the Ministry of Environment of SR No. 453/2000 Coll. I. and No. 55/2001 Coll. I. and the Decree of MPSVR SR No. 508/2009 Coll. I. The license holder is liable for nuclear safety.

Documentation, attached to the application for issuance of certain decisions of ÚJD SR and essential for submission, is listed in the Annexes No. 1 and 2 to the Atomic Act. Details concerning the scope, content and the method of preparation of documentation are defined in the ÚJD SR Decree No. 58/2006 Coll. I.

E.2.1.3 Regulatory Methods to Verify Operator's Compliance with Authorization Conditions

Inspections

The tasks in the field of state regulation are fulfilled by ÚJD's nuclear safety inspectors. The nuclear safety inspectors during fulfilment of their tasks follow ÚJD's internal directive "Inspection Activity of ÚJD SR". The Directive sets an uniform procedure for inspections, for processing and assessment of annual inspection plans, for management of ÚJD's inspection program, for processing of documentation of inspection activities, and for analysis of ÚJD's inspection activities.

Inspection plan is a tool for continuous and systematic evaluation of inspection activities at nuclear installations and during transports and controls of nuclear materials. As a rule, such plans are developed for the period of one year *and it covers in a complex way all areas of regulation of nuclear safety.*

Inspections follow inspection procedures that are part of the ÚJD's Inspection Manual. For inspection activities with no developed inspection procedures, individual inspection procedures are conducted.

Types of Inspections

In general, inspections are planned and unplanned – as the first level of division. In the second level the planned and unplanned inspections are divided to routine, special and team inspections.

Planned Inspections:

By routine inspections, the nuclear safety inspector verifies the assurance of compliance with requirements and conditions of nuclear safety, conditions of the installation, compliance with approved limits and conditions and with selected operational provisions. Routine inspections are performed mainly by site inspectors at the corresponding installation. In case of inspection, focus of which exceeds the professional competencies of the site inspector, inspection is performed by nuclear safety inspectors from the Department of Safety Evaluation and Inspection Activities and Department of Regulatory Activities and International Relations of ÚJD SR. Routine inspections follow the procedures contained in the Inspection Manual.

Special inspections are performed by nuclear safety inspector in accordance with the basic inspection plan. Special inspections focus on specific areas, in particular on the verification of compliance with the requirements and conditions of regulation pursuant to section 31 of the Atomic Act.

Special inspections normally follow procedures contained in the Inspection Manual.

Team inspections focus on the verification of compliance with requirements and conditions of regulation pursuant to section 31 of the Atomic Act, normally within several areas in parallel. Team inspections are planned for areas selected on the base of long-term assessment of operator's results emerging from the analyses of inspection activities. Team inspection is an inspection, in which several departments participate.

Unplanned Inspections:

Unplanned inspections are performed by nuclear safety inspectors as routine, special or team inspections. These inspections respond to the conditions at the NI (for example, commissioning phases) or events at NI. ÚJD SR thus responds to the situation at NI.

Rules valid for all types of inspections:

- inspections are announced in advance. However, they can be also unannounced, if their focus and nature requires to do so,
- the corresponding site inspector is notified in advance of the inspection. Generally, the site inspector participates in the inspection,
- any inspection performed by more than a single inspector has a head of inspection team appointed.

Inspection Protocol

Every performed inspection must be documented in a form of a protocol or a record. Binding instructions to repair the detected findings are included in the protocol. They must be formulated clearly so as to impose the responsibility to eliminate detected deficiencies, and must be comprehensible with unambiguously set deadlines for their fulfilment.

Analysis of Inspection Activity

Analysis of inspection activity comprises statistical evaluation of the findings. The objective of the statistical evaluation is to determine the distribution and the frequency of inspection findings. Based on the evaluation of the trends of the inspection findings, it is possible to modify the inspection plan for the upcoming period, particularly in those areas where the most deficiencies have been identified.

Sanction

Pursuant to authorization for operation and RAW management, the requirements and conditions of nuclear safety approved and introduced by the regulatory authority are monitored. The regulatory body may impose fines to the operator, as well as to his employees, when nuclear safety is violated. In case of non-observance of requirements and violation of legal provisions, regulatory body is entitled to impose sanctions including financial fine to the authorization holder.

E.2.2 Regulation in the Field of Health Protection Against Radiation

E.2.2.1 State regulation in the field of health protection against radiation

The Ministry of Health of SR (MZ SR) is the central body of state administration for health care, health protection and other activities in the field of health services. The state administration in health protection is executed by the MZ SR and by the Public Health Authority of SR (ÚVZ SR). Competencies of the ministry include, besides other, setting the exposure limits and conditions for disposal and storage of radioactive waste from the view of their potential impact on health.

Regulation of health protection against radiation is provided by the Public Health Authority according to the provisions of Act No. 355/2007 Coll. I. on protection, support and development of the public health. The body of public health supervision at the nuclear installations is ÚVZ SR.




Fig. E.2.2.1 Structure of state regulation in the field of health protection against radiation

Authorization from ÚVZ SR for activities leading to exposure in relation to nuclear installations is not a final granting of a licence, however it is a condition for issuing the licence (e. g. for operation).

E.2.2.2 Authorization Procedure

When permitting activity leading to exposure the procedure of Act No. 71/1967 Coll. on administrative proceedings as amended, is followed. The Act No. 355/2007 Coll. I. on protection, support and development of public health sets the conditions for issuing authorization in more details.

E.2.2.3 Regulatory Methods to Verify Compliance with License Requirements by the Operator

The control system of compliance with the obligations and requirements for radiation protection assurance laid down in the legal acts and the meeting of conditions and obligations laid down in the authorization for the activity leading to exposure is especially provided by a system of targeted in situ inspections, but a very effective tool and information source is also a complex system of reports, information and announcements on nuclear installation situation, employees exposure, on extraordinary events and on radioactive waste management, which the operator shall provide continuously in writing or in electronic format to the regulatory authority within the set dates.

During in situ inspection, the following items are inspected in particular:

- Equipment state,
- Regime observance,
- Monitoring system state, monitoring plan observance and results recordkeeping,
- Documentation on operation,
- Documentation on radiation protection assurance,
- Operational procedures,
- Records of discrepancies, results of event investigations.

In situ inspections are often connected with inspection measurements of radiation situation and sampling by the regulatory employees.

Inspections are mainly focused on special area important from the viewpoint of radiation protection.

E.2.3 Regulation in the Field of Occupational Health and Safety

E.2.3.1 Role of the Regulatory Authority

State administration in the field of labour inspection is executed by:

- a) Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family of the Slovak Republic;*
- b) National Labour Inspectorate;*
- a) Regional Labour Inspectorate Nitra oversees compliance with the legal regulations and other regulations to ensure occupational health and safety at the workplaces of a nuclear installation on the whole territory of the Slovak Republic.*

Labour inspection means:

- a) Supervision of compliance (among others) with:*
 - 1. employment regulations governing labour relations;*
 - 2. legal regulations and other regulations to ensure occupational health and safety, including regulations governing factors of working environment;*
 - 3. obligations arising from collective agreements and other;*
- b) Drawing liability for breaches of regulations contained under letter a);*
- c) Providing free advice to employers, natural persons as entrepreneurs, but not employers, and to employees within the scope of basic expert information and advice on ways how to effectively comply with the regulations contained under a).*

Obligations of the operator of nuclear installations, legal entities and natural persons vis-à-vis bodies of labour inspection arise from the Act No. 124/2006 Coll. I., Act No. 125/2006 Coll. I. and the implementing regulations to the given acts.

E.2.3.2 Activity of the Labour Inspectorate Nitra

Ensures labour inspection to the extent as provided by the Act No. 125/2006 Coll. I. and oversees in particular whether the following conform to the requirements of labour protection:

- Selection, location, arrangement, use, maintenance and control of the workplace, working environment, work equipment;
- Workflows, working time, organization of labour protection and system of its management;
- Investigates the causes of serious accidents at work;
- Through its binding opinion applies requirements for ensuring occupational health and safety when permitting and at final approval of constructions and their changes;
- Withdraws authorization, certificates and licenses issued to a natural person or a legal entity for performing activity according to special regulations;
- Discusses offences, takes decisions on imposing fines for offences and on ban of activity according to special regulations.

The Labour Inspectorate is independent in performing labour inspection and executes labour inspection through labour inspectors.

Besides the classic work of labour inspection the Labour Inspectorate Nitra also performs labour inspection relating to the condition of occupational health and safety, including the safety condition of the technical equipment - pressure, lifting, electrical and gas, in accordance with the decree of the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family of the Slovak Republic No. 508/2009 Coll. I., providing for the technical equipment that is considered as classified technical equipment. It also performs labour inspection on technical equipments that are intended products after they are marketed or after they are put into operation.

According to the degree of threat the types of technical equipments are divided into group A, group B or group C. "Group A" contains technical equipments with high degree of threat, "Group B" are technical equipments with higher degree of threat and "Group C" are technical equipments with lower degree of threat. Technical equipments of Group A and technical equipments of Group B are considered as classified technical equipments.

E.2.3.3 Methods of supervision by the labour inspection body

During inspection the labour inspector is authorized to:

- *Enter freely and at any time the premises and the workplaces that are subject to labour inspection under the terms of the relevant regulations concerning workplaces of nuclear installations;*
- *Perform control, test, investigation and other acts aimed at establishing whether the regulations to ensure occupational health and safety are complied with;*
- *Request documents, information and explanations relating to application of regulations to ensure occupational health and safety;*
- *Request submission of documentation, records or other documents necessary for labour inspection purposes and to request copies thereof;*
- *Take the necessary samples of materials or substances that are used or which are being handled, for the purposes of analysis;*

- *Require proof of identity from an individual being at the workplace of an employer and to ask for explanation for the presence.*

The Labour Inspectorate Nitra is authorized to perform labour inspection at nuclear installations focusing on control of the status of occupational health and safety, the status of safety of technical equipment, the relevant documentation, accompanying technical documentation, periodical tests of classified technical equipments and other.

Based on the results of inspection the labour inspector proposes measures, imposes measures and obligations to adopt measures for removal of breaches of regulations found and their causes and an obligation to submit to the Labour Inspectorate Nitra information on fulfilment of measures to remove the breaches of regulations found and their causes.

F General Safety Provisions

The authorization holder according to Atomic Act is obliged to establish the necessary organizational structure, to define the responsibilities, professional competencies, procedures and resources to ensure quality of nuclear installations and general safety provisions. In compliance with Act 541/2004 Coll. I. the authorization holder is obliged to ensure nuclear safety, physical protection, emergency preparedness, including their verification, to comply with the documentation reviewed or approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of SR, to adhere to the limits and conditions of safe operation or limits and conditions of safe decommissioning. Further he is obliged to comply with the technical and organizational requirements provided by the generally binding legal regulations.

The authorization holder may authorize performance of work activities only to persons meeting the conditions set in Section 24 of the Atomic Act and in compliance with the Decree No. 52/2006 Coll. I. of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of SR on professional competence, shall identify all job positions, where working activities are being performed that have impact on nuclear safety, and other job positions with direct impact on nuclear safety together with a description of work activities in the documentation of the quality system.

F.1 Responsibility of the License Holder

Article 21 of the Joint Convention

Responsibility of the licence holder

- 1. Each Contracting Party shall ensure that prime responsibility for the safety of spent fuel or radioactive waste management rests with the holder of the relevant licence and shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that each such licence holder meets its responsibility.*
- 2. If there is no such licence holder or other responsible party, the responsibility rests with the Contracting Party, which has jurisdiction over the spent fuel or over the radioactive waste.*

F.1.1 Principles and Definition of Nuclear and Radiation Safety

Nuclear safety according to the Act No. 541/2004 Coll. means the status and the ability of a nuclear installation or transporting equipment and operating personnel thereof to prevent uncontrolled development of fission chain reaction or unauthorized release of radioactive substances or ionizing radiation into the working environment or the environment and to mitigate consequences of incidents and accidents at nuclear installations or consequences of events upon transport of nuclear materials.

The authorization holder shall be liable for nuclear safety.

A level of nuclear safety, reliability and health protection at work and safety of technological facilities, protection of health from ionizing radiation, psychical protection, emergency preparedness and fire protection must be achieved upon using nuclear energy so as to keep the life, health, working or environment-related hazards as low as reasonably achievable according to the available state-of-the-art knowledge; at the same time, exposure limits shall not be exceeded. Upon new significant

information being obtained about the risk and consequences of the use of nuclear energy, the above-mentioned level must be reassessed and necessary measures shall be taken to meet the conditions pursuant to the Atomic Act.

Detailed principles of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste management are stated in the chapters G and H:

F.1.2 Policy of Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection

The purpose of the safety policy of operators of nuclear installations is to set safety goals, requirements, fundamentals, principles, responsibility, measures and methods of their performance for all areas of safety, such as nuclear safety and radiation protection, environmental safety, operational safety, technical safety, construction and physical safety, occupational health and safety and fire protection, safety of integrated system and telecommunication network, classified information protection, emergency planning and civil protection, personal safety, administration safety, financial safety, protection of company's reputation and planning of activity continuity.

The policy of safety is pursued by internal acts as well as by inspection of their observance across all levels of company management.

Compliance with and fulfilment of the safety policy content by all employees is one of the main priorities and objectives; Safety is an integral part of all activities.

The following main requirements, fundamentals and principles of nuclear safety and radiation protection are set to achieve the safety goals:

- Nuclear safety and radiation protection is overriding and superior over any other interests of the company.
- Every employee is liable for nuclear safety and radiation protection in the scope of his competencies, responsibilities and duties.
- The principles of safety culture apply in all activities relating to nuclear installations.
- Principles of defense in-depth strategy: multi-level, mutually overlapping measures, focused mainly at prevention, but also at accident mitigation, are applied in nuclear installation designs and activities related to the operation of nuclear installations.
- Systems and components of relevance to safety are periodically tested with the aim to verify their functionality and serviceability.
- Safety audits of the respective safety systems are conducted on a periodical basis.
- The quality management system is developed in line with the requirements of the Slovak legal order, of regulatory authorities, of IAEA recommendations and of the requirements of ISO 9001:2001 standards.
- The latest knowledge and experience from operation of nuclear installations in the country and abroad are permanently utilized.
- International assessments and reviews are regularly used for independent assessment of nuclear safety and radiation protection level.

- An open dialogue with the public, local and regional state administration and self-governing authorities is applied.
- Currently occurring safety risks concerning nuclear safety and radiation protection are identified, analyzed, classified, and managed across all management levels. More serious hazards are submitted to the Nuclear Safety Committee, an advisory body of the top management of the operator.
- Operators invest adequate material and financial means to deliver the safety goals and meet the safety requirements, fundamentals and principles of nuclear safety and radiation protection, and to improve education and qualification of employees

The primary responsibility for nuclear safety and radiation protection lies within the Board of Directors of the operators' companies, who determine and pursue the application of the main goals, requirements, fundamentals and principles of nuclear safety and radiation protection in all activities related to the nuclear installations, from their siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation until decommissioning, including management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. The obligations following the primary responsibility are delegated to the executive management.

F.1.3 Obligations of the Authorization Holders towards Regulator

The operator is obliged to provide for sufficient financial and human resources to ensure nuclear safety, including the necessary engineering and technical support in all areas related to nuclear safety. The authorization holder shall give priority to safety aspects over all other aspects of the authorized activity.

The obligations of the operator are provided primarily by the provisions of laws listed under E.1.2.2.

Any modifications to nuclear installation affecting nuclear safety during construction, commissioning, operation, decommissioning, closure of repository or after closure of repository may be implemented only after a preceding approval or permission of relevant regulatory authorities has been obtained and in special cases after having obtained the statement (opinion) of the European Commission. Other modifications must be notified by the operator, or submitted for review.

The authorization holder shall issue operating procedures for the performance of activities at a nuclear installation, in particular service, maintenance, control and testing of classified equipment. These procedures shall be in accordance with the conditions of the authorization. The authorization holder shall update and complete these procedures according to the current state of the nuclear installation.

The operator has the obligation to report to the regulatory authorities events at nuclear installations and in case of incidents and accidents also to other organizations and to the public, to take action to prevent recurrence.

The holder of authorization has the obligation to provide information to the public on nuclear safety. This obligation does not change the responsibility of ÚJD SR to provide the public with its own independent assessment.

In practice, the operator of a nuclear installation uses other essential specialized organizations, be it in the field of maintenance, operation or research. These specialized organizations have the function of so-called supporting organizations and are involved through their activities in supporting reliable and safe operation of nuclear installations, since the works, which they carry out, cannot be provided for by the operator with his own human resources, nor in organizational, technical and knowledge terms.

F.2 Human and Financial Resources

Article 22 of the Joint Convention

Human and Financial Resources

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:

- i) Qualified staff are available as needed for safety related activities during the operating lifetime of a spent fuel and radioactive waste management facility;*
- ii) Adequate financial resources are available to support the safety of facilities for spent fuel and radioactive waste management during their operating lifetime and for decommissioning;*
- iii) Financial provision is made, which will enable the appropriate institutional controls and monitoring arrangements to be continued for the period deemed necessary following the closure of a disposal facility;*

F.2.1 Human Resources

Quality of human resources represent the principal precondition for a safe, reliable, economical and environmentally friendly operation of nuclear installations. The term “quality of human resources” is understood as a set of professional, health-related and mental capacities of the staff to perform activities at nuclear installations. From the aspect of impacts of working activities on nuclear safety, the staff of the authorization holder is classified into two basic groups:

- Employees having direct impact on nuclear safety – licensed employees, whose special competence is verified by an exam (written exam, oral exam and verification of competences on a representative full-scale simulator) and a practical test for licensed employees before an examination commission established by ÚJD SR, which issues *License of special competence*;
- Employees with impact on nuclear safety – professionally competent employees, whose Professional competence was verified by a panel established by the operator of specialized facility in a form of written and oral exam and to whom Certificate of Professional competence has been issued.

Special competence of employees according to the Act No. 541/2004 Coll. I. on peaceful use of nuclear energy means a set of expertise, practical experience, principal attitudes and knowledge of generally binding legal regulations and operating procedures issued by the authorization holder to ensure nuclear safety that is necessary for performing work activities having direct impact on nuclear safety.

Professional competence means a complex of professional knowledge, practical experience, knowledge of generally binding legal regulations and operating procedures issued by the authorization

holder, necessary to perform work activities by the employee of an authorization holder. Professional competence is acquired by successful completion of Professional training at a specialized facility.

The overall working (professional, health and mental) competency of staff to carry out working activities at nuclear installations is the responsibility of the authorization holder. The authorization holder authorizes his personnel to perform working activities. An “Authorization to Perform Working Activities” as part of the Integrated Management System (IMS) for quality assurance of a nuclear installation – an authorization holder. The Authorization to Perform Working Activities is issued for a given position and concrete nuclear installation only for those selected and professionally competent employees of the authorization holder, who have valid Licenses of Special Professional Competency or Certificates of Professional Competency. The authorization is an evidence of working competency of an employee in relation to the regulatory authorities.

Each position within the system of professional training has defined requirements for education, experience, professional training, health or mental capabilities. The direct supervisor of the employee is responsible for meeting these requirements.

The professional training system of the authorization holder staff is updated on the base of operational experience, performed organizational changes, technical solutions (modernization) on installation, requirements of regulatory authorities, audits, reviews and recommendations of IAEA. It is provided for by necessary human, financial and material resources.

The professional training of the authorization holder staff and third parties (third parties represent contractors) is being conducted in accordance with documents of quality assurance management program, which is set up and maintained in accordance with:

- Generally binding legal regulations of the Slovak Republic;
- the IAEA standards, recommendations and guides;
- STN EN ISO 9001:2001, 14001:2004 and ISO/IEC 20000-1:2008 series standards;
- Management documentation in the Quality System.

With respect to impacts on nuclear safety, employees are allocated to the relevant type and phase of professional training and divided according to the performed working activities into six categories that are further subdivided into occupational groups and subgroups, following occupational orientation:

Category 1 - the selected personnel are the employees with university education who perform working activities with direct impact on nuclear safety (permanent crew of control room, shift supervisor, supervisory physicist, shift start-up engineer and senior start-up supervisor).

Category 2 - technical and administrative professionally competent employees of operation, maintenance and technical support departments with university education or secondary education

Category 3 - operating shift and operating professionally competent staff, including employees involved in maintenance activities at technological facility with impact on nuclear safety.

Category 4 - professionally competent maintenance employees (except for engineers) – employees involved in maintenance activities at technological facility with impact on nuclear safety.

Category 5 - professionally competent employees in charge of NI decommissioning and handling RAW and spent nuclear fuel with impact on nuclear safety.

Category 6 - other employees assigned to professional training on NI.

Operator of specialized facility

Professional education and training of employees of authorization holder, as well as of employees of contractors, is carried out at the operator of a specialized facility, who is a holder of authorization for professional training issued by ÚJD SR upon written application after reviewing the technical equipment used during the training and professional competency of applicant's employees. *The practical exercise (internship and on-the-job training) is carried out within the premises of the operator on the basis of licence from ÚJD SR for professional staff training.* Professional training is carried out in compliance with the ÚJD SR decree No. 52/2006 Coll. I. on professional competence and with the approved system of professional training according to the training programs.

F.2.2 Financial Resources

One of the principles of nuclear and radiation safety of operators is the commitment to have necessary financial means to meet nuclear and radiation safety and to provide for continuous training and improvement of qualification of the staff. In order to fulfil this commitment, financial strategies of companies were developed that would enable, among the tasks mentioned, also fulfilment of the program for technological development.

Financial strategy of the operators is defined as providing for funding operation and investment needs of the company by optimal utilization of own and external resources.

Financing RAW, SNF Management and Decommissioning of Nuclear Installations

The Act No. 238/2006 Coll. on National Nuclear Fund for Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities and Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel and Radioactive Waste (Act on Nuclear Fund) sets rules for management, contributions and the scope of activity of the Fund for Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities.

The purpose of establishment and activity of the National Nuclear Fund is to collect and administer financial resources (resources of the Fund) determined for the back-end of nuclear energy and grant these resources in sufficient amount in a transparent and non-discriminatory manner to the applicants for covering of lawful expenses incurred in connection with activities related to the back-end of nuclear energy under conditions mentioned in the Act and in compliance with Slovakia's commitments resulting from the Joint Convention.

The Fund resources are funds paid as:

- a) *obligatory contributions of the authorization holders for operation of nuclear installations generating power,*
- b) *levy collected by operators of networks (transmission and distribution network),*
- c) *penalties imposed by ÚJD SR according to a specific legal provision,*

- d) *interest payments (revenues) from deposits on nuclear fund accounts,*
- e) *voluntary contributions from natural and legal entities,*
- f) *subsidies and contributions from the EU funds and other international organizations, financial institutions and funds provided to cover the expenses of back-end nuclear energy,*
- g) *subsidies from the state budget,*
- h) *revenues from financial operations,*
- i) *other resources, if required by a special regulation.*

Currently the basic (majority) resources of the Fund are the obligatory contributions from operators of nuclear installations producing electricity and through Government Ordinance No. 426/2010 from 1 Jan. 2011 also levies collected by the operators of the transmission and the distribution networks.

The Fund forms targeted sub-accounts from the obtained resources, structured in the following way:

- a) *sub-account for decommissioning of nuclear installations operated at the Jaslovské Bohunice site including the management of radioactive waste from this decommissioning, structured as analytical accounts:*
 - *Nuclear power plant A-1,*
 - *Nuclear power plant V-1,*
 - *Nuclear power plant V-2,*
- b) *sub-account for decommissioning of nuclear power plant operated at the Mochovce site including the management of radioactive waste from this decommissioning,*
- c) *sub-account for decommissioning of nuclear installations, which will be commissioned after the effectiveness of the Act on Nuclear Fund, including the management of radioactive waste from this decommissioning,*
- d) *sub-account for management of nuclear materials and radioactive waste, originator of which is unknown,*
- e) *sub-account for siting, geological research, preparation, design, construction, commissioning, operation and closure of radioactive waste or spent fuel repositories including monitoring after the closure of these repositories and including respective research and development,*
- f) *sub-account for institutional inspection of repositories,*
- g) *sub-account for storage of nuclear spent fuel at the nuclear installations themselves,*
- h) *h) sub-account for reimbursement of expenses determined for administration of the Fund and expenses related to the administration of the Fund.*

Resources of the Fund are kept on individual sub-accounts and on individual analytical accounts proportionally in relation to the amount of contributions paid by respective authorization holders for operation of nuclear installations generating power.

Financial means from the Fund are granted upon application for grant of financial means. The applicant can be authorization holder for operation, operation termination, decommissioning, for repository closure and institutional inspection, for radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel management, for nuclear materials management in the nuclear installation or outside of it or authorization holder for export of nuclear materials or for shipment of radioactive materials including transboundary movement.

Resources of the Fund can be used for reimbursement of legitimate expenses spent on activities related to the back-end of nuclear energy stated in the Act. The means of the Nuclear Fund can be granted to the applicants as targeted subsidies based on a written application with design and technical and economical justification. A precondition for granting financial resources from the Fund is that the activities related to the back-end of nuclear energy, for which the resources are requested, are in compliance with the Strategy of the back-end of nuclear energy of Slovakia and that these activities will not cause instability of the energy system or threat or deterioration of environment and of population protection. Financial resources can be granted only upon compliance with conditions defined by the Nuclear Fund and after the approval of the Board of Trustees of the Fund. After their approval, the resources from the Fund are granted upon contracts on granting financial means.

Financial means of the Nuclear Fund can be used for:

- a) shutdown of nuclear installation,*
- b) decommissioning of nuclear installations including management of radioactive waste from this decommissioning,*
- c) management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste after termination of operation of originating nuclear installation,*
- d) management of nuclear materials and radioactive waste, whose originator is unknown,*
- e) purchase of land for placing a spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste repository,*
- f) prospecting, geological survey, preparation, design, construction, commissioning, operation and closure of repositories,*
- g) administration and activities relating to Fund administration.*

Units of NPP V-1 were shutdown in 2006 and 2008. Costs for shut down and decommissioning of NPP V-1 are financed from the following resources:

- from resources of SE, a. s. and JAVYS, a. s., during shut down;*
- from the BIDSF funds. When SR acceded to the EU the Bohunice International Decommissioning Support Fund – BIDSF was established, through which the EÚ, in the budgeting period 2007 – 2013, provides financial resources in order to mitigate the economical impacts of the early shutdown of NPP V-1. The MH SR decides about the use of these funds to finance various national projects in the energy sector, besides other also preparation of decommissioning of NPP V-1 itself (modifications to the technological systems related to shutdown and decommissioning of NPP V-1, licence documentation, conditioning and disposal of RAW and decommissioning activities of NPP V-1). Currently NPP V-1 draws these funds through approx. 50 independent downstream projects, the number of which may increase further proportionally to the progressing works of the decommissioning itself;*
- from the Nuclear Fund sources in compliance with the contract on provision of funds from NJF for the relevant year, on the basis of approved applications for co-financing of selected projects BIDSF and to finance considerations for suppliers of BIDSF projects.*

F.3 Quality Management System of the Operators

Article 23 of the Joint Convention

Quality Assurance

Each Contracting Party shall take the necessary steps to ensure that appropriate quality assurance programs concerning the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management are established and implemented.

Legislative Requirements

The quality system always follows the current national and international requirements and is based on:

- Meeting the requirements of legal provisions of the Slovak Republic;
- Meeting the IAEA recommendations;
- Meeting international standards ISO 9001; ISO 14001 and OHSAS 18001, *ISO/IEC 20000-1 and ISO/IEC 27001*,
- Implementation of internal needs of the company when developing an effective management system.

Act No. 541/2004 Coll. I.

According to the Atomic Act a specific condition for issuance of authorization or permission for construction of nuclear installation, its commissioning, operation, decommissioning and other activities is the approval of the documentation of quality assurance system.

The operator is obliged to establish the necessary organizational structure, procedures and resources for quality assurance (further referred to as “quality system”).

ÚJD SR Decree No. 56/2006 Coll. in reference to the Atomic Act (No. 541/2004 Coll.), regulates requirements for quality system documentation of the operator, as well as details concerning quality requirements of nuclear installations, details concerning quality requirements for classified equipment and details concerning the scope of their approval.

In addition the STN EN ISO 9001 2009 standard (technical norm) applies for the documentation of a Quality Management System.

The requirements for quality assurance are contained in programs of quality assurance:

- Preliminary program of nuclear installation quality assurance, which includes basic requirements for quality assurance for all stages of nuclear installation,
- Stage program for quality assurance of nuclear installation, which includes requirements a given stage of nuclear installation existence (from design to decommissioning).

The requirements for quality assurance of classified equipments are determined in quality plans for these equipments.

Quality system of operators is built and implemented in through the Integrated management system (IMS). It is a management system that meets requirements on safety management and environmental quality and protection, pursuant to the recommendation of the IAEA No. GS-R-3 and IAEA No. GS-G-3.1.

Policies Declared and Implemented by Operators

Overall objectives and direction of action on quality, environment, safety and professional training of the staff are laid down in policies declared by the operators:

- Quality policy;
- Nuclear safety and radiation protection policy;
- Environmental policy;
- Policy of safety and health protection at work and of technical safety;
- Safety policy;
- Professional staff training policy;
- *IT management policy;*
- *Information security policy.*

The top management sets **Quality Goals** to accomplish the quality policies. The Quality Goals are elaborated into concrete tasks of particular divisions.

The Quality Goals are also determined in order to assure safe, reliable, effective and environment friendly operation and decommissioning of nuclear installations.

The basic instrument to meet policies and goals is the maintenance and improvement of the integrated management system - IMS.

All activities within the processes identified by IMS are managed so as to minimize negative impacts on the environment, health and safety of the population and to be in line with the legal framework.

The IMS primary principles are:

- every employee is liable for the quality of his own work,
- any quality-affecting activities are carried out in accordance with valid provisions,
- IMS is linked to good experience in the area of management system as well as the best national and international experience,
- management is responsible for elaboration, implementation, permanent monitoring, efficiency assessment and further development of IMS system including staff training,
- IMS is built as a uniform management system that contains all implemented activities and procedures significant *in respect to organization's goals achievement.*

Building an Integrated Management System on the basis of Quality Management System - IMS

The operator build IMS using the IAEA documents No. GS-R-3 and IAEA No. GS-G-3.1. Development and implementation of an integrated management system (including the quality system) follows the valid legislation of SR, the international standards ISO 9001; ISO 14001, OHSAS 18001, ISO/IEC20000-1 and ISO/IEC 27001, as well as the IAEA recommendations. The platform for building an integrated management system is the existing quality management system, which complies with the provisions of the laws of the Slovak Republic and with other regulations in accordance with the aforementioned policies. The Integrated Management Systems of operators are process oriented.

The effectiveness of the Integrated Management System, including the quality system, is verified by:

- internal audits conducted within IMS at individual operators for the fields of safety, quality, environmental protection, in a form of autonomous or combined internal audits,
- supervisory audits of external certificate companies, which have certified the environmental management system and/or the safety management system (OHSAS),
- inspections conducted by the ÚJD SR.

Any findings identified during the audits, inspections and reviews are subject to analysis at the corresponding level of the top management. Based on analyses, remedial and preventive measures are taken; their implementation is controlled.

Role of the Regulatory Authorities

Activities and roles of ÚJD SR with respect to state regulation of nuclear safety of nuclear installations in the field of quality assurance are given by Act No. 541/2004, as well as Decrees No. 50/2006 and 56/2006.

Labour inspection conducted by the Labour Inspectorate Nitra focus on Quality Assurance Systems of legal entities and natural persons performing certain activities (manufacturing, assembly, repairs, reconstructions, inspections, tests, revisions, maintenance, supply of equipments, etc.). When verifying professional competence also the physical condition – technical equipment of legal entities and natural persons is verified.

When verifying the professional competence the labour inspection controls in particular:

- *Certificate of incorporation;*
- *Organizational support for activities;*
- *Personnel support for activities;*
- *Material and technical support for activities;*
- *Other (as required by the bodies of labour inspection, e.g. certificates for activity of staff, written document on risk assessment of the activity, defined safe working practices, maintaining documentation, records and registry related to occupational health and safety).*

F.4 Radiation Protection

Article 24 of the Joint Convention

Operational Radiation Protection

1. *Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that during the operating lifetime of a spent fuel or radioactive waste management facility:*
 - i) *The radiation exposure of the workers and the public caused by the facility shall be kept as low as reasonably achievable, economic and social factors being taken into account;*
 - ii) *No individual shall be exposed, in normal situations, to radiation doses which exceed national prescriptions for dose limitation which have due regard to internationally endorsed standards on radiation protection; and*
 - iii) *Measures are taken to prevent unplanned and uncontrolled releases of radioactive materials into the environment.*
2. *Each Contracting Party shall take appropriate steps to ensure that discharges shall be limited:*
 - i) *To keep exposure to radiation as low as reasonably achievable, economic and social factors being taken into account; and*

- ii) *So that no shall be exposed, in normal situations, to radiation doses which exceed national prescriptions for does limitation which have due regard to internationally endorsed standards on radiation protection*
- 3. *Each Contracting Party shall take appropriate steps to ensure that during the operating lifetime of a regulated nuclear facility, in the event that an unplanned or uncontrolled release of radioactive materials into the environment occurs, appropriate corrective measures are implemented to control the release and mitigate its effects.*

F.4.1 Legislation in the Field of Radiation Protection and its Implementation

The issues of health protection against ionizing radiation are regulated by the Act No. 355/2007 Coll. I. on Protection, Support and Development of Public Health. The latest knowledge from the field of protection and public health care is for the first time reflected in the Act. The aim of the legal regulation is to protect the health and the environment against harmful effects not only of ionizing radiation, but also against other factors that could endanger health, in the most effective way. Along with the cited Act, the European Commission Directives were transposed in the form of governmental ordinances. *These are binding for all the ministries (Annex VI.).*

Details on ensuring the Act No. 355/2007 Coll. I. are stated in the implementing regulations, Annex VI.

F.4.2 Monitoring of Radioactivity by Operators

Pursuant to the Act No. 355/2007 Coll. I. on protection of health, support and development of public health, each natural person and each legal entity performing activities, during which harmful factors to health occur or arise, is obliged to secure their quality and quantity of detection at the workplace and in its surroundings. Regarding ionizing radiation the details of requirements for monitoring of ionizing radiation are provided for the relevant Government Ordinance and in the Decree No. 545/2007 of MZ SR.

The operator is obliged to develop a monitoring program and to ensure compliance with it. Monitoring is continual, periodical or operative. The monitoring plan according to the type of performed activity covers monitoring in standard operation, in predictable deviations from standard operation, during radiation incidents and radiation accidents. It is structured into parts governing the monitoring of:

- a) *a workplace with sources of ionizing radiation;*
- b) *surroundings of a workplace with sources of ionizing radiation;*
- c) *personnel;*
- d) *discharges of radioactive materials from the workplace with sources of ionizing radiation to the environment.*

The monitoring plan shall contain:

- a) *Variables important with respect to radiation protection, which shall be monitored, the method, range and frequency of measurements;*
- b) *Guidelines for evaluation of measurement results and the method of record keeping;*
- c) *Reference values and measures if these are exceeded;*
- d) *Specification of measurement methods;*
- e) *Specification of parameters of used types of measuring instruments and equipment.*

The monitoring plan shall facilitate management of radiation protection, compliance with exposure limits and early detection of deviations from normal operation and to demonstrate that the radiation protection is optimized. Results of monitoring must be recorded by the operator so that if needed they can be used to estimate personal doses.

Personal monitoring means to establish the personal doses. For workers of category A personal monitoring must be done systematically. If based on monitoring or calculation there is a suspicion that the exposure limits for workers with sources or ionizing radiation may be exceeded, then when establishing the personal doses conditions and circumstances of exposure are taken into account. Personal monitoring can be performed by an authorized dosimetry service according to special regulation.

Personal dosimeter must allow measurements of all types of radiation contributing to the external exposure of a worker during activities leading to exposure. If a personal dosimeter does not allow such measurements, other personal dosimeters shall be used; this does not apply, if personal dosimeter cannot be used technically. In such event the estimation of a dose is secured by means of results from monitoring of the workplace or with calculation.

At workplaces with open radioactive sources, which can lead to internal exposure of workers, also the internal exposure must be evaluated. Intakes of radionuclides and effective dose is evaluated by measuring the activity of radionuclides in the body of a worker or his excreta, by measuring concentration of radionuclides in the air, measuring contamination of a workplace and converted to radionuclide intake using relevant factors and models of the respiratory and digestive tract.

The operator is obliged to send reports on results of monitoring on a regular basis to the bodies of state administration under the terms set in the authorization and to provide them during inspections to the staff performing inspection.



Fig. Monitoring of radioactivity on the surface of fibre-concrete containers

F.4.3 Liquid and Gaseous Discharges

Liquid and gaseous discharges limits are stated in Annex II.

Pursuant to Act No. 355/2007 on protection, support and development of public health the operator is obliged to submit policies for discharges of radioactive materials into the environment for approval to the state regulator, in the program of quality assurance for radiation protection. The Act further provides for the scope of the necessary documentation for approval of application for discharging radioactive materials into the air, surface water or sewer.

The governmental Ordinance No. 345/2006 Coll. on Basic Safety Requirements for Health Protection of Workers and the Public Against Ionizing Radiation in its point I.2 of Annex No. 3 (Criteria of release of radioactive substances into environment) states:

“It is allowed to release radioactive substances from a nuclear installation into atmosphere and surface waters, when assured that the effective doses as a consequence of such release in respective critical group of population will not annually exceed 250 μ Sv. This value is considered to be the limit dose for designing and construction of nuclear installation. When there are more nuclear installations in one site, which influence the dose of population in the same critical group, this value also refers to the total exposure from all nuclear installations at the site or the region“. This means that the limit dose is the basic criterion for control of setting the currently valid limit values for discharged activities of radioactive materials stated in Annex II. (control of not exceeding the above mentioned criterion – not exceeding the effective dose – was done by a software through the relevant geographical model and conversion factors). Based on the request from the state regulatory authority new applications for authorization to discharge will now be limited by the effective dose calculated from proposed limit activities for the relevant nuclear installation.

Measurements performed with the purpose to balance or evaluate dose load of population are conducted with the help of classified measurement devices, which are verified by bodies of state metrology pursuant to metrological provisions.

Discharges of RA-materials into atmosphere are continuously monitored in ventilation chimneys of nuclear installations (radionuclides with long half-lives emitting beta, gamma radiation in aerosols) in order to control the not exceeding of the daily limits. Samples are at the same time taken in the samplers with a view to ascertain radionuclide composition and balancing. *Requirements for balancing individual radionuclides are defined in the relevant decisions of the state regulator for individual nuclear installations.*

The basic balance of annual limits of radioactive material discharges are complemented with reference values, the aim of which is to continuously monitor the operational status of the nuclear facility:

- *Investigation levels, exceeding of which initiates investigation of the current status,*
- *Intervention levels, exceeding of which activates the action to reduce the relevant discharge.*

JAVYS, a. s., discharges gaseous releases from four chimneys (the main generating Unit of NPP A-1 + bituminization plant, Bohunice Conditioning Centre, Interim Spent Fuel Storage, NPP V-1). From

these ones only the chimneys of NPP V-1 and the MSVP have their own limits for gaseous discharges and others are determined for “ventilation chimneys within the premises of NPP A-1”. Therefore based on a suggestion from ÚJD SR the following distribution of these limits was proposed: for the NPP A-1 chimneys (+ bituminization plant) – 90 % of the limit for the chimneys in the premises of NPP A-1 and for the chimney of BSC RAO obj. 808 – 10 % of the limit for the chimney in obj. 46 section A HVB of NPP A-1. The MSVP chimney has its own limit.

Investigation level for the mixture of radionuclides beta and gamma in aerosols discharged through ventilation chimneys within the premises of NPP A-1 and MSVP valid from 2006: **10 Bq.m⁻³**.

MSVP	Aerosols beta / gamma	
Year	discharge [MBq]	% of limit
1994	33,62	11,20
1995	23,90	7,97
1996	12,92	4,31
1997	20,38	6,79
1998	23,95	7,98
1999	27,12	9,04
2000	25,31	8,44
2001	12,48	4,16
2002	50,42	16,81
2003	0,65	0,22
2004	1,50	0,50
2005	3,06	1,02
2006	0,87	0,29
2007	1,26	0,42
2008	0,55	0,18
2009	0,53	0,18
2010	0,41	0,14

Table F.4.3c) Gaseous discharges from MSVP

Gaseous discharges from MSVP are shown in Table F.4.3c. It can be stated that as in year 2010, also in all the previous years the limits of discharges for radioactive materials have not been exceeded.

Liquid discharges from MSVP are accumulated, measured and released together with liquid discharges from NPP V-1.

The approach towards liquid radioactive discharges is principally the same as in the case of gaseous ones. A peculiar case is the limitation and the following monitoring of liquid discharges from the RAW repository in Mochovce (see Annex III), where are limited activities of potentially measurable radionuclides.

Liquid discharges are monitored at the source – *tank ready for discharging*. This means that the values for total volume activity and eventually for volume activity of tritium of samples taken from ponds of particular technological units are measured before they are released. Based on results of analysis and comparison with limit values, waters from the ponds are returned back into technological

procedures or to treatment station of waters for purification or are released into environment via the waste water control plant (*into the Váh river*).

Values of radioactive material discharges into atmosphere and hydrosphere from NPP A-1 and technologies of RAW treatment and conditioning between 1994 - 2010 are shown in the following tables (table F.4.3a, or table F.4.3b). It can be stated that in 2010, the same way as in all the previous years, the limits for radioactive material discharges have not been exceeded, while discharges of corrosion and fission products into atmosphere have been deep below the authorized limits.

A-1 Year	Aerosols beta / gamma		Sr 89, 90		Aerosols alpha	
	discharge	% of limit	discharge	% of limit	discharge	% of limit
1994	2,20	0,23	33,20	0,12	155,00	1,76
1995	4,11	0,44	289,00	1,03	418,00	4,75
1996	7,16	0,76	770,00	2,77	781,00	8,88
1997	10,42	1,11	680,00	2,44	1710,00	19,43
1998	16,87	1,79	1180,00	4,20	730,00	8,30
1999	21,50	2,29	540,00	1,93	809,00	9,19
2000	21,62	2,30	158,10	0,56	973,57	11,06
2001	20,70	2,20	207,51	0,74	997,12	11,33
2002	75,75	8,05	1683,21	6,01	78,32	0,89
2003	25,38	2,7	921,42	3,29	24,84	0,83
2004	15,47	1,65	409,87	1,46	28,41	0,32
2005	25,24	2,68	355,44	1,27	20,03	0,22
2006	10,46	1,09	443,13	1,58	41,99	0,48
2007	4,05	0,42	151,92	0,54	9,81	0,11
2008	18,56	1,97	81,70	0,29	6,11	0,07
2009	3,92	0,42	149,00	0,53	16,84	0,19
2010	3,37	0,36	292,26	1,04	20,33	0,23

Table F. 4.3a) Gaseous discharges from NPP A-1 and conditioning technology of TSÚ RAO

Váh river Year	Tritium		Corrosion and fission	
	discharge	% of limit	discharge	% of limit
Recipient Vah river				
1994	840	1,92	24,47	0,064
1995	1958,48	3,1	50,631	0,13
1996	505,08	1,16	33,8	0,09
1997	11850	27,12	29,665	0,08
1998	249,87	0,57178	130,7	0,34395
1999	1120	2,56293	169,3	0,44553
2000	740,8	1,69519	87,68	0,23074
2001	3023	6,91762	67,874	0,17862
2002	589,009	1,34785	90,566	0,23833
2003	2258,26	5,16763	86,867	0,2286
2004	2411,095	5,5174	85,296	0,22446
2005	2141,8	4,90114	70,511	0,18556
2006	1000,4	8,93	76,01	0,48
2007	237,827	2,59	89,21	0,74
2008	212,30	2,12	135,10	1,13
2009	186,64	1,87	114,85	0,96
2010	225,72	2,26	116,81	0,97
Recipient Dudvák river				
1994	211,2	48,33	36	9,5
1995	0,213	0,05	3,905	1,03
1996	0,13	0,03	1,69	0,44
1997	0,048	0,01	0,495	0,13
1998	0,004	0,00092	1,016	0,27
1999	0,002	0,00048	0,532	0,14

2000	0,00027	0,000063	0,223	0,06
2001	0,00021	0,000047	0,046	0,01211
2002	0,0014	0,00032	0,463	0,12184
2003	0,0005	0,00011	0,013	0,00342
2004	0	0	0	0
2005	0	0	0	0
2006	0	0	0	0
2007	20,38	55,08	13,17	10,98
2008	0	0	0	0
2009	0	0	0	0
2010	0	0	0	0

Table F. 4.3b) Liquid discharges from NPP A-1 and the conditioning technology of TSÚ RAO

Since 2007 waters have not been discharged into the recipient of Dudvák river (Manivier), which has a separate limit for water discharges.

Gaseous and liquid discharges from the nuclear equipments for RAW and SNF management placed at the NPP in operation are not monitored separately, but together with the rest of discharges from these nuclear power plants (identical input into environment). They form a smaller part of the total discharges. These limits have not been exceeded in all years of operation; released activities have been deep below the authorized limits.

Table F.4.3d compares the contribution of nuclear power plants and RAW management technology to the total discharges from the premises of Jaslovské Bohunice in 2010, when it was the highest value of the total discharged activity from RAW management technology.

Type of discharge	Whole premises GBq	NPPV-1+V-2 GBq	A-1+ TSÚ RAO GBq
Noble gases	10710	10710	0
Iodine isotopes	0,001	0,001	0
Aerosols	0,016	0,013	0,003
Tritium	10626	10400	226
KP+ŠP	0,16	0,043	0,117
TOTAL	21336	21110	226

Table F.4.3d) Comparison of discharges from NPP and the RAW management technology at the premises of Jaslovské Bohunice in 2010.

In the liquid discharges from RÚ RAO during the whole period of operation no such activity has been identified, which would exceed the normal levels of rain and surface water. Evaluation of yearly liquid discharges for the period 2004 - 2010 is shown in table F.4.3e. (Activities only from rain and surface water).

Year	Volume of discharged water - m ³	Yearly discharged activity kBq (fulfilment of L&C -%)			
		H 3	Cs 137	Co 60	Sr 90
2004	4140	3870 (0,02)	301 (1,31)	275 (1,22)	186 (0,07)
2005	6774	6430 (0,03)	142 (0,62)	135 (0,60)	149 (0,06)
2006	5821	5610 (0,03)	931 (0,41)	105 (0,47)	64 (0,03)
2007	3272	3300 (0,02)	58.9 (0,26)	58.9 (0,26)	7,8 (0,003)
2008	6098	6120 (0,03)	128 (0,56)	189 (0,84)	792 (0,32)
2009	5969	8687 (0,046)	111 (0,48)	154 (0,69)	179 (0,07)
2010	11126	20474 (0,11)	350 (1,53)	393 (1,75)	160 (0,06)

Table F.4.3e) Yearly liquid discharges – water from the runoff RÚ RAO

F.4.4 Dose and Exposure Limits of Personnel

Dose and exposure limits of personnel and of particular groups of employees are determined by the act in line with recommendations of ALARA commission in an annual period, while the determined own intervention limits, of which the cause of excess is evaluated and which are justified, are lower than the values determined by legislation.

Basic principles of radiation protection, especially the ALARA principle and principle of limitation of dose rates and risks, are considered during all works.

Graphical representation of an average collective effective dose at NPP A-1 and the RAW treatment and conditioning technology for the period from 1998 to 2010 is shown in table F 4.3f. The development of values show an apparent trend of gradual reduction of the KED size when *compared to the period 1998 - 1999*. Achieved KED values in the period from 2000 to 2010 are a reflection of activities performed at NPP A-1 and on the treatment plants.

During 1998 and 1999 there was an intense preparation for transport and transports of non-manipulatable fuel to RF. During the period 2001 to 2004 intense works took place on decontamination of the reactor hall, of the heavy water management system, of technological circuits of the main generating Unit and partial or complete decommissioning works on some technologies of the main generating Unit of A-1. *In the period of 2007 to 2010 the doses increased due to an increased activity.*

KED is permanently on the lower average level, what proves a very good level of management by the application of the ALARA system, optimization of planned individual and collective dose rates. During the mentioned period no radiation limits were exceeded by an employee of JAVYS, a. s. (A-1, RAW treatment and conditioning technology) or contractor of Works, or directed ALARA limits.




Table F. 4.3f) Collective effective dose at NPP A-1 and treatment technology and MSVP

F.4.5 Monitoring of Impacts of the *Nuclear Installation* on the Environment

Impact of nuclear installations at the Bohunice site is evaluated in two ways:

1. *By monitoring of radiation quantities directly in the environment and by laboratory evaluation of environmental samples. Yearly there are about 2,000 environmental samples being evaluated from the surroundings of the nuclear installations at Bohunice site, which are evaluated at the Laboratory of Radiation Control of the surroundings of SE-EBO. The following values are monitored:*
 - a) *The volume activity of aerosols in continuous abstractions of air;*
 - b) *atmospheric deposition of radioactivity;*
 - c) *volume activity of milk;*
 - d) *volume activity of drinking surface waters;*
 - e) *volume activity of ground waters;*
 - f) *radioactivity of agricultural products (clover, barley, wheat, ...);*
 - g) *radioactivity of soil;*
 - h) *continuous measurement of dose rates and gamma spectrometric measurements in the field;*
 - i) *measurements of doses in the surroundings of NI.*
2. *Using analytical method – yearly values of discharged radioactive materials are entered as input values for the calculation program. The program, to which more data are entered (continuous annual meteorological situation, demographical statistical data, conversion factors defined by the relevant international institutions), is designed to calculate the impact of a nuclear installation on the surroundings. The Program is approved by the state regulator – ÚVZ SR.*

*Results of measurements and calculations are published in information reports on a quarterly and annual basis in a printed form and are submitted to the bodies of state regulation and bodies of public administration. The same applies also for the area of NI at Mochovce – RÚ RAO. **Based on the conclusions from the above mentioned annual reports for 2008 – 2010 the radiological impact of the NI to its surroundings is negligible.***

The annual IED for three most loaded groups of population calculated from the monitoring data are depicted in the Sheet F.4.5. These IED are considerable lower than IED received by the population from the natural background. The individual dose equivalent from the natural background in the surrounding of NPP Bohunice and NPP Mochovce is 100 to 10 000 times higher than the IED values presented in the table, despite the fact that IED calculations are considerably conservative.



Fig. Monitoring equipment at the National Repository of RAW

Year	IDE [Sv]		
	Infants	7-12 years	Adults
1998	1,64 E-7	1,11 E-7	6,61 E-8
1999	6,63 E-8	8,67 E-8	8,29 E-8
2000	1,49 E-7	2,05 E-7	1,92 E-7
2001	1,79 E-7	2,31 E-7	2,28 E-7
2002	1,96 E-7	2,25 E-7	2,21 E-7
2003	7,59 E-8	9,33 E-8	8,96 E-8
2004	1,32 E-7	1,49 E-7	1,46 E-7
2005	1,18 E-7	1,6 E-7	1,51 E-7
2006	1,09 E-7	1,44 E-7	1,37 E-7
2007	1,91 E-7	2,24 E-7	2,19 E-7
2008	1,37 E-7	2,16 E-7	2,12 E-7
2009	1,20 E-7	2,07 E-7	2,02 E-7
2010	7,97 E-8	1,56 E-7	1,51 E-7

Table F.4.5 Calculated yearly IED for the groups of population in the vicinity of NPP Bohunice

F.5 Emergency Preparedness

Article 25 of the Joint Convention

Emergency Preparedness

1. Each Contracting Party shall ensure that before and during operation of a spent fuel or radioactive waste management facility there are appropriate on-site and, if necessary, off-site emergency plans. Such emergency plans should be tested at an appropriate frequency.

2. *Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps for the preparation and testing of emergency plans for its territory insofar as it is likely to be affected in the event of radiological emergency at a spent fuel or radioactive waste management facility in the vicinity of its territory.*

F.5.1 Legislation in the Field of Emergency Preparedness

In the legislation of SR the emergency preparedness, planning and emergency plans are governed by several pieces of legislation listed in Annex VI.

These basic legislative acts are complemented by other laws, which cover the field of crisis management and partially emergency planning.

- the Constitutional Act No. 227/2002 Coll. on State Safety at the Time of War, War Status, State of Crisis and State of Emergency, which is inter alia concerned with management of situations related to terrorist and violent criminal acts
- Act of NC SR No. 42/1944 Coll. I. on civil protection of the population, as amended.
- Act of NC SR No. 387/2002 Coll. I. on governance of state in crisis situations outside the time of war and warfare, as amended.
- Act of NC SR No. 129/2002 Coll. I. on integrated rescue system, as amended.
- Act of NC SR No. 261/2002 Coll. I. on prevention of major industrial accidents, as amended.

All above mentioned documents in the field of emergency preparedness respect the relevant EU directives and the IAEA recommendations.

F.5.2 Implementation of Legislation in the Field of Emergency Preparedness

F.5.2.1 National Organization of Emergency Preparedness

The supreme body of crisis management in the SR, in accordance with the Act No. 387/2002 Coll. I. is the Government of SR. The Central Crisis Headquarters (hereinafter only as CCH) *within its competence* serves as an executive body for the Government of SR. In CCH all the departmental ministries and other central bodies of state administration are represented. CCH coordinates the activity of state administration, self-government and other components during handling a crisis situation, that is – in connection to ÚJD SR also during management of incident or accident of nuclear installation or during transport. The system of crisis management itself, part of which is CCH, consists of – besides the Government of SR, the ministries and other central bodies of state administration – local bodies of state administration and self-government.

In order to provide for the necessary measures to cope with the emergency status of the nuclear installation and measures to protect and public and the economy in case of an accident having impact on the surroundings, the national organization of emergency preparedness (fig. F.5.1) is structured in three levels:

1. The first level consists of emergency committees of nuclear installations, the main functions of which are managing works and measures on the territory of nuclear installations so that they allow establishing the status of technological equipment and to manage measures for coping with the emergency situation and to limit the consequences on the personnel, equipment and consequences on the environment and the public. Another function at this level is an information function for the activities of bodies of state administration on the level of local government, which secures information about the status of equipment and the possible impacts on the surroundings.
2. The second level is organized on the level of region and it consists of crisis staff of local government and self-government, the territory of which falls within the area of risk, where there can be danger to life, health or property and where there are measures planned to protect the population. This area is defined as a circle of 11 km around NI V-1 Jaslovské Bohunice, 21 km around the NI V-2 Jaslovské Bohunice and 20 km around NI Mochovce.
3. The third level, on the national level, consists of CCH with its technical support elements (e.g.: Emergency Response Centre ÚJD SR – CHO and the Slovak Centre of Radiation Monitoring Network - SÚRMS). Its role is to deal with an extraordinary situation, if the extent of such extraordinary event exceeds the territory of the region.

Integral part of this level are failure committees of the licensees, which closely cooperate with CHO ÚJD SR, but also with the local government and the self-government. The main role of the failure committee is first of all to organize and coordinate rapid liquidation of the consequences of serious and extraordinary incidents on the relevant production or distribution equipment.

F.5.2.2 Professional and Technical Resources of CCH

The Emergency Response Centre of ÚJD SR (hereinafter only as “CHO”) is an independent technical support means of ÚJD SR to monitor operation of NI and for evaluation of a technical condition and the radiation situation in case of a nuclear or radiological accident and projecting the development of the accident and its consequences pursuant to Act No. 541/2004 Coll. I. At the same time it serves as a technical support resource for CCH.

The Slovak Centre of Radiation Monitoring Network (hereinafter only as “SÚRMS”) is a technical support body ensuring effective system of monitoring bringing together monitoring systems of individual sectors.




Fig. F.5.1 National organization of emergency response

Emergency Response Centre (CHO)

In compliance with the valid legislation ÚJD SR created an Emergency Response Centre (CHO) as a means for evaluation of the course and consequences of incidents and accidents at NI that are significant from the view of their potential impact on the surroundings, preparation of proposed measures or recommendations for further procedure. CHO is included in the system of emergency preparedness of SR and it cooperates in preparation of recommendations with the CCH. CCH may invite experts from various ministries to solve the incident. The relationship between individual entities involved in managing measures to protect the general public in case of incident or accident with an impact of radioactive materials on the environment is illustrated in fig. F.5.1.

For the work of CHO the ÚJD SR established from its staff - specialists and other staff an emergency headquarters of the Office. The main functions of the emergency headquarters are:

- To analyze the status of nuclear installation in case of an event;
- To develop projections for development of event – accidents or accidents and radiological impacts on the general public and on the environment;
- To propose recommendations for measures to protect the general public and to refer them to the CCH, the relevant district offices at the seat of the region and other affected bodies;

- To prepare supporting documentation and recommendations for the Chairperson of the Office, who is a member of CCH and the Security Council of SR;
- To supervise activities of the authorization holder for operation of NI during emergency;
- to inform the EC, the IAEA and the neighbouring countries according to the obligations of SR, for which the Office is the coordinator (multilateral and bilateral treaties), to inform the media and the public.

Emergency headquarters is sufficiently staffed with experts and can work in three series to ensure continuity of work also during real events, which may last longer than 8 hours. Each series has its own management consisting of the chairman, an assistant and heads of expert groups.

The groups are as follows:

- Reactor safety group;
- Subgroup of site inspectors;
- Radiation protection group;
- Subgroup of mobile dosimeter;
- Information and PR group;
- Logistical support group.

The Slovak Centre of Radiation Monitoring Network (SÚRMS)

The basis of the monitoring system in a normal situation are permanent monitoring elements within selected offices of public health care, the Slovak Hydrometeorological Institute, systems of civil protection, the Armed Forces of the SR, the National Veterinary and Food Institute in Nitra, Laboratories of radiation control of the vicinity of nuclear installations, specialized workplaces of universities, research institutes, some other organizations, possibly accredited private establishments.

In the event of an accident, besides the permanent components also other mobile and laboratory components would be involved into operative monitoring, to perform monitoring based on the instructions from the Centre of Radiation Monitoring Network.

The whole territory of the Slovak Republic has continuous monitoring of radiation situation by means of stationary systems:

- Teledosimetric system of the holder of authorization for operation of NI at the EBO and EMO sites in the distance within 30 km (resp. 20 km),
- Stationary monitoring systems – *SIZS and KM* MV SR, the Armed Forces of the SR, MZ SR, MŽP SR (SHMÚ).

Data from monitoring are provided in real time also to the EURDEP network administered by the European Commission, the data of which are available to all member states through a protected web site.

F.5.2.3 Emergency Documentation

To cope with emergency at nuclear installations and their consequences on the environment, an emergency documentation has been developed defining the procedure and organization of work during individual levels of emergency at various levels of the national emergency preparedness, described in chapter F.5.2.1.

The holder of authorization for operation of nuclear installations has developed internal emergency plans, laying down the organization of emergency response and its implementation relating to coping with emergency and protection of personnel, including protection of health of staff in the plan of health measures.

In addition, there are operating procedures allowing to recognize and to classify an emergency based on international recommendations.

At regional level there are public protection plans in the area under threat, containing measures to protect the public, health, property and environment, as well as the linkage to the internal emergency plan.

At the national level there is a National Emergency Plan, involving all procedures and measures in individual sectors. In addition, at the national level there are emergency procedures and activity plans of CHO ÚJD SR. In all the above mentioned plans the provisions of the national legislation, as well as the IAEA recommendations and the directives of the European Union are fully applied, as shown under F.5.1.

F.5.2.3.1 On site Emergency Plans

On site emergency plans and the related documents are developed so as to ensure protection and preparation of staff for the case of occurrence of a significant leakage of radioactive materials into the working environment or the surroundings, and measures have to be taken to protect the health of persons at the nuclear installation or of the population in the surrounding areas.

The purpose of the on site emergency plan is to ensure preparedness of NI staff for implementation of planned measures in case of occurrence of an event at NI, with the emphasis on securing the basic objectives:

- To reduce the risk or to mitigate consequences of event at NI directly at the source affecting the equipment, staff and the general public in the surroundings of NI;
- To prevent severe health damage (e.g. death or severe injury);
- To reduce the risk of probability of occurrence of stochastic effects on health (e.g. cancer and serious inheritable phenomena).

The aim of the on site emergency plan is to provide for activity of Emergency Response Organization (hereinafter only as “ERO”), i.e. planning and preparation of organizational, personnel and material and technical means and measures to successfully cope with crisis and emergency according to the classified event. ERO at the holders of authorizations consists of the following units:

- Emergency Management Centre (HRS),
- Technical Support Centre (TPS),
- Operating Support Centre (PPS),
- External Evaluation Centre (VVS),
- Information Centre (IC).

Information during emergency covers besides the management of the operator also the regulatory bodies (ÚJD SR, MV SR, ÚVZ SR), SÚRMS and crisis headquarters on the level of local governments.

F.5.2.3.2 Public Protection Plan (off site emergency plans)

Protective measures are part of the public protection plans, which are developed by territorially competent state authorities and municipalities located in the area of threat of nuclear installation defined by a distance within 11 km in case of NPP V-1 Bohunice, 21 km in case of NPP V-2 Bohunice and 20 km in case of NPP Mochovce (Note: the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic according to the provisions of section 4 par. 2 letter a) point 12 and section 28 par. 5 of the Act No. 541/2004 Coll. I. on peaceful use of nuclear energy in 2010 approved for JAVYS, a. s., the size of the area threatened by a nuclear installation of NPP V-1 as a circle with a radius of 11 km from the original 25 km). These Public Protection Plans are linked to the internal emergency plan of the holder of authorization, which is obliged to submit to the bodies developing public protection plans supporting documentation concerning public protection in the area under threat.

The Public Protection Plans developed for the territory of a region are subject to review process by the ÚJD SR and approval by the MV SR. They contain a detailed description of method for implementation of measures, while selected measures include activity depending on the severity and the time sequence of an incident or accident, including available and usable power and resources for rescue works and securing implementation of measures to protect the public. Part of the documentation is also the methodology of activities, databases and requisites necessary for effective and correct decisions.

When there is an extraordinary event having a nature of a radiological event at NI, the bodies of local government are providing for measures resulting from the public protection plans. This activity is secured by the relevant crisis headquarters, which cooperate with CCH as needed. In order to make sure that in fulfilment of tasks relating to protection of public there is no danger resulting from delay, the relevant committees are part of the Emergency Response Organization within SR (hereinafter only as ERO).

In compliance with the internal emergency plan, the public protection plan and on the basis of evaluation of the situation with the technology, identification of the source, measured values from the teledosimetric system, the initial measurements of radiological situation in the vicinity of NI and of the meteorological situation, the holder of authorization in case of occurrence of the 2nd level event shall notify the relevant authorities and organizations in the area under threat and in case of occurrence of the 3rd level event warning the public without any delay. Then the bodies of state administration, local government and municipalities ensure other immediate and follow-up measures resting mainly in

iodine prophylaxis, sheltering, or evacuation, etc. These measures are taken on the territory affected by the consequences of radiological event, including areas, where according to the projection the consequences of an extraordinary event may spread.

In case of incident or accident at a nuclear installation with release of radioactive materials, in compliance with the Act No. 42/1994 Coll. I. on civil protection of the public as amended, the competent authority designated to handle crisis situations, managing the rescue works within its territorial competence, securing lower levels regarding material and technical requisites and preparing proposals for measures to handle crisis situation and supporting documentation for adopting decisions for effective handling of a situation in the endangered area:

- The municipality and the mayor, if the event does not exceed the territory of the municipality;
- The District Office and the manager of the district office, if the event exceeds the territory of a municipality, but does not exceed the territory of a district;
- The District office at the seat of a region and the manager of the district office at the seat of a region, if the event exceeds the territory of a district, but does not exceed the territory of a region;
- The Government of SR and the Prime Minister, if the event exceeds the territory of a region.

F.5.2.3.3 Emergency Transport Rules

For shipment and transportation of fresh and spent nuclear fuel, nuclear materials and radioactive waste, the holder of authorization for transport develops, according to Act of NC SR No. 541/2004 Coll. I. and the ÚJD SR Decree No. 55/2006 Coll. I., an emergency transport rules (hereinafter only as “ETR”). The aim of these ETR is to ensure preventive and protective measures for the case of incident or accident during transport. The holder of license for operation of NI shall develop ETR for transport of above mentioned materials on the roads and railways, which fall under its administration. After ETR is reviewed by ÚJD SR and by other involved bodies, these Rules are approved by the Ministry of Transport Posts and Telecommunications of SR.

F.5.2.4 Warning and Notification Systems for the Public and for the Personnel

Warning of the public and notification of bodies, organizations and personnel is realized in compliance with Act No. 42/1994 Coll. I. on civil protection as amended. Technically the warning of the public and notification of bodies, organizations and *personnel* at the sites is as follows:

a) Bohunice within a radius of 25km for the public:

1. An outdoor warning system in the area under threat is made of a system of mass remote control on the power distribution system (HDO). The control receivers HERKUL-S are used for warning of the public – used to control the rotating sirens. The sirens can be controlled by sectors. Any additional information for the public after a warning siren sound will be transmitted by electronic mass-communication media.

2. The outdoor notification system for the public uses HADOS receivers. These receivers are part of the equipment for the mayors of municipalities and cities, large companies *and* other institutions. Notification of authorities and organizations, in addition to HDO, is provided through the public telephone networks.

In order to accelerate and automate the notification, computer device of automatic phone notification to persons ZUZANA V-1, V-2 for the personnel is used:

1. Internal warning system consisting of 3 transmitters, 105 small electronic sirens, 7 electric sirens and 103 beacons;
2. Internal notification system for personnel, utilizing the in-house radio, radio network and notification device ZU 1619 APC ZUZANA. To notify the members of emergency committee there is a Multitone paging system.

The shift engineer of the crashed Unit decides about initiating the warning of the public and notification of authorities, organizations and personnel. Regular test of notification by HADOS receivers are performed 4 times a year. Acoustic tests of warning sirens are performed once a month.

The warning system at Bohunice site covers a territory with a radius of 25 km. Currently a modernization and reconstruction of the system is taking place so that it complies with the requirements arising from the MV SR Decree No. 388/2006 Coll. I. concerning details of ensuring technical and operating conditions for information system for civil protection as amended, and so that at the same time it respects the current size of the area under threat for nuclear installation V-2 – 21km. The planned date of launching the new system into permanent operation is November 2011. Until the date of permanent operation of the new system also the old system will be operated in parallel, covering an area within 25 km. After launching the new system into permanent operation the system will provide for warning at Bohunice site within 21 km for all nuclear installations at this site.

b) Mochovce within a radius of 20 km

1. System of warning, built on a basis of radio-controlled electronic sirens. The system is capable of operating 72 hours without feeding from the power distribution network, allows selective control of sirens, transmission of voice information and continuous control of the condition and state a operability of individual sirens.
2. Notification system on the basis of paging radio network. Members of OHO - EMO on a standby, mayors of municipalities and cities and members of emergency commissions and headquarters are equipped with receivers. Both systems at NI Mochovce, are controlled from the VYR-VAR control centre or from the back-up VYR-VAR control centre. Their start up is decided by the shift engineer or the head of HRS. Systems are regularly tested and maintained continuously operable condition.

F.5.2.5 Systems for Maintaining Emergency Preparedness

At Bohunice and Mochovce sites the personnel are classified in 4 categories based on the scope of emergency training:

- Category 1 - personnel with a short-term stay at NI (such as visitors, field trips, etc.);
- Category 2 - personnel permanently working at NI;
- Category 3 - personnel assigned to OHO;
- Category 4 - mayors of municipalities and cities in the area of emergency planning.

The training consists of two parts:

- theoretical training,
- practical exercises.

Emergency training of power plant personnel are carried out by individual assignments in a form of lectures, explanations, group seminars, practical demonstrations and practical exercises. There is a separate part on emergency training of shift personnel. At both sites for both authorization holders (SE, a. s. and JAVYS, a. s.) the shift exercises are twice a year, an area-wide exercises once a year, covering all employees of nuclear installations at the site, and interoperability emergency exercise, which is held in conjunction with the bodies of local government and self-government, CHO ÚJD SR, or other components of OHO (fire brigades, health services, armed forces, etc.) once every 3 years. The last interoperability exercise attended by CHO ÚJD SR, bodies of local government was held in 25 km area under threat of Bohunice site in October 2009 and in 20 km area under threat of Mochovce site in March 2009.

Each exercise is attended by observers and a jury, which after completion of the exercise evaluate them and on the basis of their conclusions measures are adopted to improve the activity of individual components of OHO. These measures are subsequently controlled and the plant management and the inspectors from the Office deal with their fulfilment.

F.5.2.6 Facilities and means of emergency preparedness

These are formed by the units referred to in F.5.2.3.1. and complemented with the following facilities:

- Backup emergency centre serves as an alternative workplace for the emergency committee for the case of extremely adverse radiological situation. It is located at the premises of laboratories for radiation monitoring of the surrounding area of Bohunice site (Trnava) and Mochovce site (Levice).
- CP shelters are utilized for initial sheltering of shift personnel and the intervention personnel and are used to obtain individual protection equipment and specialized gear for the intervention units.
- CP assembly points serve for gathering staff and other persons present on the territory of NI. These are equipped so that they create conditions for a short-term stay of staff using at the same time the individual protection equipment.
- In-house medical centre (IMC) intended for the basic medical support, providing pre-medical and medical assistance and preparation for transfer of affected persons to specialized medical centres. Part of the IMC is a decontamination node and workplaces for measuring internal contamination of persons.
- Communication means and equipment installed within the territory of NI:
 - a) public telephone network of the Slovak Telecom;
 - b) energy sector telephone network;

- c) mobile telephones;
- d) special purpose radio network Motorola,
- e) Multitone paging network;
- f) in-house radio and operating (Unit) radios.

F.5.3 International Treaties and Cooperation

F.5.3.1 Information System of the European Union ECURIE (European Community Urgent Radiological Information Exchange)

After the accession of the SR to the European Union, SR also became part of ECURIE system. ÚJD SR is a point of contact in this system and a competent body with a 24-hours permanent service. The point of contact for ECURIE system is identical with the point of contact for the IAEA Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident. The point of contact for ECURIE system has a backup point of contact at MV SR. There is a national coordinator and its deputy appointed for the ECURIE system. In 2009 the quality of involvement of the Slovak Republic into ECURIE system has improved by introducing secured software for sending and receiving CoDecS messages (until then the information exchange was only through facsimiles).

F.5.3.2 Conventions in the Deposit of the International Atomic Energy Agency

The Slovak Republic is a signatory to international conventions on early notification of nuclear accident and on mutual assistance in case of nuclear accident, thereby ensuring international cooperation in minimizing the potential consequences of a nuclear accident. Conventions relate primarily to the technical and organizational aspects of measures aimed at reducing the impacts of radiation on humans and on the environment as a consequence of accidents at nuclear installations.

Convention on Early Notification of Nuclear Accident and Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency

The Slovak Republic notified its succession to both Conventions on 10 February 1993 with the date of effect from 1 January 1993. The technical coordinator for meeting the provisions of the Convention is ÚJD SR, which is also the point of contact of SR for early notification of a nuclear accident. Through ÚJD SR the Slovak Republic regularly attends international exercises. Since the Conventions are in force, no accident occurred on the territory of the Slovak Republic, which would require meeting the provisions of the Conventions.

F.5.3.3 Agreements and cooperation with neighbouring countries

In connection with Article 9 of the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident the Slovak Republic succeeded to or concluded bilateral agreements in the field of early notification of a nuclear accident, information exchange and cooperation with all neighbouring countries but also with other states in Europe. The agreements lay down the form, method and the scope of information provided to

the contracting parties in case of an accident relating to nuclear installations or nuclear activities, and designate the coordinators of points of contact. The purpose of these agreements is to contribute to minimizing the risk and consequences of nuclear accidents, as well as to create a framework for bilateral cooperation and information exchange in areas of mutual interest in connection with peaceful use of nuclear energy and protection from radiation.

F.5.3.4 Slovakia's participation in international exercises

CONVEX series of exercises

In July 2008 an international exercise ConvEx-3 took place. The exercise simulated a nuclear facility accident in Mexico. The Office emergency staff were called based on the development of situation subject of the exercise. The exercise verified communication with the warning point (the Ministry of Interior of SR), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of SR and the Slovak Hydro-meteorological Institute. Due to the nature and the location of the event that was exercised, the information of the Embassies of the Slovak Republic in Mexico and in the neighbouring countries was verified through the diplomatic service of MZV SR.

The CONVEX exercises are organized under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. Their objective is to verify the warning and notification system of the member states of the IAEA Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident) and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or a Radiological Emergency. As required by these Conventions, the Office is a point of contact and at the same time is a competent body representing the Slovak Republic. The Ministry of Interior of SR provides for a 24-hours service of the national warning point for the needs of the point of contact of SR (ÚJD SR).

In 2009 ConvEx-2d exercise took place. The scenario of this exercise was a radiation incident in an unknown country outside of Europe, in which aid was requested to provide experts in radiation sickness and teams, who can assist in measuring contamination in contaminated areas and assistance in the investigation of the event. The exercise showed that the Slovak Republic has the resources (in particular sending specialists, who could provide for monitoring), which could be used in such a situation, however operation of such services (especially with respect to insurance for the teams that are deployed and liability for damage caused on the territory of the receiving country) is not adequately covered by the national or international law. However, the exercise showed absence of a specialized medical staff and medical centres in the Slovak Republic, which would be able to diagnose and treat diseases from radiation on a massive scale.

In 2008 and 2009 besides ConvEx-3 and ConvEx-2d exercises, also regular exercises of level ConvEx-1 took place, the aim of which is to practice communication in various forms (facsimile, SMS, electronic form,...). In 2010 other regular exercises of ConvEx-1 are expected and in November 2010 ConvEx-2c exercise.

OECD/NEA exercises

The INEX 4 exercise took place in January 2011 focusing on management of consequences of radiation crisis and transition to recovery with the aim to verify or to identify elements for improvement of measures regarding response to a radiological contamination of the environment in the city as a consequence of radiation accident (crisis situations) when using “dirty bomb”. *A specific feature of this exercise was an emphasis on the intermediate and mainly the late phase of the accident, that means deciding on problems and needs relating to all aspects of human life in the affected territory and its surroundings, however only after implementing the primary response of rescue services.*

For being closer to a real crisis situation the participants modelled a scenario of a terrorist attack on the arena in Bratislava during the Ice Hockey World Championship 2011. In a scenario of a terrorist attack the explosion scattered radioactive materials into the environment. The exercise was attended by a broad spectrum of services from the state administration and from the self-government, which is demonstrated by close to 80 participants. During a controlled discussion the participating services focused on coping with the exercise scenario, in particular with respect to the phase of consequences management and transition to recovery.

ECURIE exercises

Besides the exercises managed by the IAEA, every year there is at least one major international exercise to verify the functionality of the early warning system for the case of a nuclear and radiation accident of the European Union, ECURIE.

In 2009 there was a simulated radiation incident on the Greek island of Corfu, after which the ECURIE system was activated and at the same time also the system of Europe-wide monitoring of radiation levels, EURDEP. The Office partially activated the emergency staff with the aim to test the operation of CoDecS software used for sending messages in the ECURIE system and using the EURDEP software, in cooperation with the Slovak Hydrometeorological Institute. In 2010 such exercise was organized in cooperation with the German nuclear power plant Brockhausen.

Besides these major exercises at least twice a year readiness of the contact points in the member states is tested, checking the connection and an early response. During the last three years there was a 100 % success rate of early responses during these exercises.

F.6 Decommissioning

Article 26 of the Joint Convention

Decommissioning

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure the safety of decommissioning of a nuclear facility.

Such steps shall ensure that

- i) Qualified staff and adequate financial resources are available;*

- ii) *The provisions of article 24 with respect to operational radiation protection, discharges and unplanned and uncontrolled releases are applied;*
- iii) *The provisions of article 25 with respect to emergency preparedness are applied; and*
- iv) *Records of information important to decommissioning are kept.*

A qualified personnel is required during the whole decommissioning process since 1998 according to the Atomic Act (currently in the wording of Act No. 541/2004 Coll. I.) and when applying for decommissioning authorization the operator submits the documentation on the system of professional training of staff, training programs for selected and professionally qualified staff and documents on meeting the qualification requirements for selected staff and for professionally qualified staff to the ÚJD SR for review.

All works are done by personnel, which is specially instructed together with practical exercises on models prior to implementation (according to work schedule) of technically demanding work operations.

Financial resources. Since 1995 the operator of a NI (currently in the wording of the Atomic Act No. 541/2004 Coll. I. and the Act on the National Nuclear Fund No. 238/2006 Coll. I. *as amended*) is obliged to secure during operation of a NI earmarked funds to cover the costs of decommissioning. These funds form part of revenues of the National Nuclear Fund for decommissioning of NI and for the spent fuel and RAW management (hereinafter only as the Fund). Creation and the use of moneys from the Fund are described in detail under F.2.2. *Another source of the Fund in accordance with the Government Ordinance No. 426/2010 from 1 January 2011 shall be the levies collected by the operators of the transmission and the distribution networks and are intended to cover the “historical debt”, which was generated during the period 1972 – 1994, when there was no statutory obligation for the operators to pay contributions for decommissioning of NI and for the spent fuel and RAW management. Drawing of funds collected according to the above mentioned Government Ordinance will be possible only after its positive assessment by the European Commission.* Until year 1995 the government paid for all costs of decommissioning of NPP A-1, since 1995 the decommissioning of this NPP is covered from the Fund. Certain activities after 1995, such as export of spent fuel to the RF, was paid by the state through the Fund.

Application of radiation protection measures is ensured in the present time in line with the requirements of the Atomic Act and the Act on Public Health. Continuity of radiation protection procedures and requirements applied during operation of installation (see F.4.) is maintained in accordance with the safety documentation submitted by the operator *to the state regulator body* when applying for decommissioning authorization. This documentation includes decommissioning plan characterizing radiation sources in the given premises and assurance of radiation protection of personnel and surrounding during the decommissioning process. It also analyses possible emergency conditions with description of mitigation procedures and appraisal of the consequences (dose loads of personnel).

Routine activities during decommissioning are performed according to operational procedures. Non-standard activities are performed according to approved work schedules. Detailed procedure of works

is described for every performed activity enabling to achieve pre-set success criteria. Scope and time of performed works is specified, dose loads of personnel when using specific protective devices is evaluated.

The hot issues of exposure regulation are regularly analyzed during the meetings of the "ALARA" commission prior to approval of work schedules. Dose loads are regularly evaluated by the Nuclear Safety Committee. The evaluation of personnel dose load is periodically discussed with UVZ SR representative with an emphasis on the most exposed works.

Limits for gaseous and liquid discharges are set by the Chief Hygienist and are a part of a documentation submitted to ÚJD SR for approval. Gaseous discharges reach ones to tens of MBq, representing ones % of annual limit. Liquid discharges reach values (except for tritium) of tenths to ones of MBq, representing tenths to ones % of annual limit. Tritium activity in liquid discharges represents tenths to ones % of annual limit.

Application of emergency measures is currently ensured in compliance with the requirements of Act No. 541/2004 Coll. I. (see F.5).

Documentation for authorization of the decommissioning stage contains, in compliance with the requirements of Act No. 541/2004 Coll. I and the ÚJD SR decree No. 58/2006 Coll. I.:

- Limits and conditions of safe decommissioning;
- Quality system documentation and requirements for quality decommissioning;
- On-site emergency plan;
- Plan of decommissioning stage;
- Concept of decommissioning for the period after the authorized decommissioning stage;
- Plan of physical protection, including a contract with the Police Corps, as well as description of the method of implementation of aviation activities at the premises or near NI;
- Radioactive waste management and shipment plan and plan for conventional waste management from decommissioning;
- Document providing evidence on financial coverage of liability for nuclear damage;
- Program of inspections of selected equipments;
- Operational procedures determined by ÚJD SR;
- Professional training system for employees;
- Training programs for licensed employees;
- Training programs for professionally competent staff;
- Documents on meeting the qualification requirements for licensed staff and professionally competent staff;
- Public protection plan for regions in the area at risk;
- Modifications to boundaries of the nuclear installation;
- Modifications to the size of the area endangered by nuclear installation;
- Categorization of classified equipment into safety classes.

Decommissioning stage plan describes the initial and the final state of a nuclear installation and planned activities in the given stage, including their impact on the personnel of the nuclear installation and surrounding of the nuclear installation; it contains a statement that financial means necessary for implementation of the described activities will be provided and that the capacity of facilities for spent fuel and radioactive waste management will be in accordance with the decommissioning strategy and schedule. The decommissioning plan or decommissioning stage plan includes also an analysis of potential emergency situations and their consequences. In addition it should contain results of radiation situation control after the nuclear installation shutdown or after the preceding decommissioning stage and proposal of a program for radiation situation control after completion of the decommissioning or the decommissioning stage.

Records of information essential for decommissioning are kept in accordance with approved quality assurance programs for operation and decommissioning. Their list is presented in the decommissioning conception plan submitted prior to the nuclear installation commissioning.

Final decommissioning documentation includes:

- final description of the site of the decommissioned nuclear installation and of all works performed during decommissioning,
- summary data about amount and activity of disposed or long-term stored radioactive waste and about amount of other waste and materials released into environment,
- list of data to be kept after the decommissioning completion with storage period identification,
- results of the final independent radiation situation control supported by an independent verification including a statement of the regulatory authority for radiation protection.

The final documentation on decommissioning presents criteria for release of the site for unlimited utilization and contains data to what extent they were met. In case the criteria were not fully met, it presents limitations in the land use and measures taken to ensure control of the land.

G Safety of Spent Fuel Management

G.1 General Safety Requirements

Article 4 of the Joint Convention

General Safety Requirements

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that at all stages of spent fuel management, individuals, society and the environment are adequately protected against radiological hazards.

In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to

- i) Ensure that criticality and removal of residual heat generated during spent fuel management are adequately addressed;*
- ii) Ensure that the generation of radioactive waste associated with spent fuel management is kept to the minimum practicable, consistent with the type of fuel cycle policy adopted;*
- iii) Take into account interdependencies among the different steps of in spent fuel management;*
- iv) Provide for effective protection of individuals, society and the environment by applying at the national level suitable protective methods as approved by the regulatory body, in the framework of its national legislation, which has due regard to internationally endorsed criteria and standards;*
- v) Take into account the biological, chemical and other hazards that may be associated with spent fuel management;*
- vi) Strive to avoid actions that impose reasonably predictable impact on future generations greater than those permitted for the current generation;*
- vii) Aim to avoid imposing undue burdens on future generations.*

General safety aspects of spent fuel management are described in Chapter F.

Nuclear safety during siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning is subject to fulfilment of general safety requirements for nuclear installations and subject to, special requirements for nuclear installations with nuclear reactor and special requirements for nuclear installations for treatment, conditioning or storage of SNF. Fulfilment of safety requirements is required by legislation and controlled through regulatory body inspections. The requirements for nuclear safety of nuclear installations must be complied with at the stages of their siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning and their fulfilment is manifested in the documentation prescribed by legislation, assessment or approval of which is a condition for issuance of relevant license.

Fulfilment of the following conditions of safe SNF management is required by legislation since 1976 (safety documentation and its assessment by regulatory authorities) with detailed safety analyses for particular stages of nuclear installation since 1978-9:

- Maintain sub-criticality,
- Ensure after-heat removal,
- Minimise the effects of ionising radiation on operating personnel, the public and the environment,
- Have regard for the properties affecting nuclear safety such as toxicity, flammability, explosiveness and other dangerous properties.

Fulfilment of the condition for minimization of radioactive waste occurring in relevance with SNF is explicitly required by the legislation since 1987.

Assessment of the impact on future generations is part of impact assessment of activities on the environment (valid in full since 1994) and is a part of the National Strategy for Spent Fuel Management (or RAW). Future generations are entitled to the same level of protection as the current one. This results in a requirement to assess (the Act No. 24/2006 Coll. I.) and manifest (Act No. 541/2004 Coll. I. and No. 355/2007 Coll. I., Government Ordinance 345/2006 Coll. I., Decree 545/2007 Coll. I.), that the waste disposed into the repository will never cause radiation load of population higher than it is admissible in the present time.

The operator proves the fulfilment of these requirements in the terms of a preliminary safety report and in safety reports submitted prior to the construction and commissioning of the nuclear installation. Periodic verifications are carried out during operation in order to ensure that the physical state and operation of the nuclear installation is constantly in line with the design and applicable safety requirements. Operators have a quality assurance system in place covering all activities relevant to safety. Following safety analyses, tests, reviews and operating experience, operators have defined limits and conditions, observance of which is strictly controlled during operation. Written procedures are developed to handle or mitigate the consequences of predictable events and accidents. The application of the “defence in-depth” principle also contributes to the prevention of incidents and accidents.

G.1.1 Review and Inspection of Existing Facilities

Article 5 of the Joint Convention

Existing Facilities

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to review the safety of any spent fuel management facility existing at the time the Convention enters into force for that Contracting Party, and to ensure that, if necessary, all reasonably practicable improvements are made to upgrade the safety of such facility.

The list and the description of facilities for spent fuel management is in point D.1.

Safety assessment of spent fuel management facilities is under section G.4.

In case some safety aspects were not assessed for existing facilities in the respective time of their siting, construction and operation, being not required by the previous legislation, it has been performed later in accordance with the altering legislation in the respective stage of the nuclear facility life cycle (see G.1). Since 1998, ÚJD SR can bind authorization (license) on fulfilment of conditions (this means: the regulatory body could ask for additional safety assessment and it has applied this possibility in case of NPP A-1 and NPP V-1) and since 2004 the duty of periodical safety assessment with periodicity of 10 years is explicitly established.

Based on the recommendations from regular inspections of the facilities by regulatory authorities and from international missions (IAEA), measures to increase safety of nuclear installations are required.

G.2 Siting of Facilities

Article 6 of the Joint Convention

Siting of Proposed Facilities

1. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that procedures are established and implemented for a proposed spent fuel management facility
 - i) To evaluate all relevant site-related factors likely to affect the safety of such facility during its operating lifetime;
 - ii) To evaluate the likely safety impact of such facility on individuals, society and the environment;
 - iii) To make information on the safety of such a facility available to members of the public;
 - iv) To consult Contracting Parties in the vicinity of such a facility, insofar as they are likely to be affected by that facility, and provide them, upon their request, with general data relating to the facility to enable them to evaluate the likely safety impact of the facility upon their territory.
2. In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that such facilities shall not have unacceptable effects on other Contracting Parties by being sited in accordance with the general safety requirements of Article 4.

G.2.1 Legislation in the Field of Siting

The siting of a nuclear installation is subject to ÚJD SR's approval under the Atomic Act. Assessment of all factors concerning the site, which could influence the safety of the nuclear installation and its safety-related impacts on individuals, society and environment, is required by legislation since 1979 and in full scale for the environment since 1994. Informing the public on safety of installation prior to its siting and consultations with stakeholders in vicinity of installation are legislatively regulated since 1976, in full scale since 1994. The obligation of the operator to continuously inform the public on nuclear safety is included in the legislation of SR since 1998.

ÚJD SR decides on the issuance of approval for siting of the nuclear installation construction upon a written application supported by pre-set documentation and on the base of the European Commission's statement according to the following provisions:

- Article 37 of the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,
- Council Regulation (Euroatom) No. 2587/1999 of 2 December 1999,
- Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1209/2000 of 8 June 2000.

ÚJD SR issues a position for the purpose of assessing the environmental impact of the nuclear installation as well as potential impacts of the surrounding environment on the nuclear installation on the basis of an application in accordance with the Act on Environmental Impact Assessment No. 24/2006 Coll. I.

Special conditions for approval of siting of a nuclear installation *is the following documentation*:

1. Assessment of impact of a nuclear installation on the environment, as well as evaluating the potential impact of the surroundings on the nuclear installation;
2. Quality requirements for a nuclear installation;
3. Proposal of nuclear installation boundaries.
4. Proposed size of an area endangered with nuclear installation;

5. *Reference safety report.*
6. *Reference report on the decommissioning method.*
7. *Project proposal for physical – technical solution at nuclear installation on the level of reference project.*
8. *Reference report on the method of RAW and spent fuel management.*

G.2.2 Siting of Facilities for Spent Fuel Management

The siting of facilities for SNF management has not taken place in full scope according to the requirements of the ESPOO Convention only for the nuclear installation NPP A-1 (siting at the end of 50-ties) and NPP V-1 (siting at the beginning of 70-ties). Transport of SNF from A-1 into RF has been completed in 1999. Since that time treatment of RAW has taken place within the decommissioning of the A-1 NPP. Safety assessment of the facility and its safety-related environmental impacts has been performed according to the valid legislation at the end of the 90-ties.

Requirements for nuclear safety of the nuclear installation during the stage of its siting are characterized by the territory features. Features, which exclude the nuclear installation siting on such territory, are stated in the Annex No. 2. of the Decree No. 50/2006 Coll.:

- a) under operating conditions or in the event of an operational occurrence, it is not possible to ensure that the set doses of population exposure are not exceeded on the territory,
- b) the maximum calculated earthquake intensity value on the territory reaches or achieves 8 degrees on the international earthquake intensity scale - MSK,
- c) the territory is threatened by the consequences of mining, irruptions of mine water or powerful tremors resulting from mining activities, extraction of gas or oil or there are reserves of tailwater on it,
- d) the territory is subject to geodynamic and karst phenomena threatening the stability of the rock mass on the land, such as caving, motional and seismically active faults, fluidification of the ground, tectonic activity or other phenomena, which may alter the inclination of the surface of the environs beyond the established technological requirements,
- e) the territory contains a protected area for natural medicinal sources, underground and surface sources of drinking water,
- f) the territory contains notified mining areas for the extraction of raw materials,
- g) the territory extends into a protected area for industrial or other economic facilities with which there may be undesirable operational clashes.

With regard of SNF management at NPP V-1, NPP V-2, the following aspects of siting of NPP V-1, V-2 are important:

- Transports of SNF are performed exclusively on the railway communications of (on a railway siding on the site of SE - EBO and JAVYS, a. s.),
- When siting, principle of 3 km exclusion zone for permanent settlement is applied,

- Interim spent fuel facility was constructed and commissioned on 1987 in the site of the NPP SE – EBO.

Seismic load of the locality Jaslovské Bohunice (within the scope of safety improvement designs of NPP V-1, V-2 and MSVP) was re-assessed and measures for improve seismic resistance of NPP V-1 and Interim spent fuel storage were implemented.

The original design of NPP Mochovce was elaborated based on the knowledge of seismic risk in the locality from the period of preparation and designing of NPP Mochovce in the 80ies.

Since that time the seismicity of the Mochovce site was several time reevaluated based on new information gained from geological survey.

G.3 Design and Construction

Article 7 of the Joint Convention

Design and Construction

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that

- i) *The design and construction of a spent fuel management facility provide for suitable measures to limit possible radiological impacts on individuals, society and the environment, including those from discharges or uncontrolled releases;*
- ii) *At the design stage, conceptual plans and, as necessary, technical provisions for the decommissioning of a spent fuel management facility are taken into account;*
- iii) *The technologies incorporated in the design and construction of a spent fuel management facility are supported by experience, testing or analysis.*

Legislative requirements for provision of suitable measures to restrain radiation impacts of facilities for SNF management including impacts from discharges or leakages are valid since the end of 70-ties. Evidence on their fulfilment is submitted in the documentation to be attached to the application for approval of nuclear installation construction. Documents on fulfilment of safety requirements including requirements on quality of technologies have been later complemented for NPP A-1 and NPP V-1 (see G.2.2).

Documents of conceptual plans for future decommissioning of nuclear installations already during design stage are legally required since 1998. Preliminary conceptual plans are submitted with the documentation to be approved according to the Atomic Act. For those nuclear installations, which did not have elaborated Conceptual Decommissioning Plans during design and construction, these documents have been additionally finalized until 2000. Preliminary proposal for the method of repository closure, especially stabilization, covering and building of drainage covering systems, is included in the preliminary safety report.

The construction proceeding of nuclear installation constructions is covered by sections 43 to 85 of the Act No. 50/1976 Coll. and the Atomic Act (No. 541/2004 Coll.). The construction of nuclear installation can be performed only by a holder of a valid building permission. The construction proceeding is covered also by the Decree of MŽP SR No. 532/2002 Coll. on Requirements of Construction. ÚJD SR

decides upon issuance of building permission for construction in line with § 66 of the Act No. 50/1976 Coll.

The required documentation necessary for nuclear installation construction includes:

- Preliminary safety report providing evidence of meeting the legal requirements on nuclear safety based on the data considered in the design,
- Project documentation needed for building permission proceedings,
- Preliminary plan of management of radioactive waste, spent nuclear fuel including their transport,
- Preliminary conceptual plan for decommissioning,
- Classification of classified equipment into the safety classes,
- Preliminary plan for physical protection,
- Quality system documentation and nuclear installation quality requirements and evaluation thereof,
- Preliminary on-site emergency plan,
- Preliminary limits and conditions for safe operation,
- Preliminary inspection program of nuclear installation prior to its operation,
- Preliminary outline of the boundaries of the nuclear installation,
- Preliminary definition of the size of the area at risk by nuclear installation,
- Other documentation required according to the Construction Act.

Constructions of nuclear installations involving special interventions into the earth crust, such as underground repositories, are governed by the Act No. 44/1988 Coll. on Protection and Utilization of Mineral Resources.

Design and construction of spent nuclear fuel storage must enable the following:

- a) Securing sub-criticality at 5 % min. during all operational conditions, 2 % during operational events, either by suitable set-up of spent nuclear fuel or by placing a solid neutron absorbent into the storage space; efficiency of the solid absorbent use is proved by calculation or experiment,
- b) Permanent removal of residual heat produced by spent nuclear fuel from the premises of its storage; heat removal is secured by natural or compulsory streaming of cooler so the temperature of spent nuclear fuel would not exceed the limit value,
- c) Its full or partial decontamination,
- d) Safe handling of spent nuclear fuel,
- e) Record keeping and control of stored spent nuclear fuel,
- f) Ensuring adequate physical protection of storage area,
- g) Prevention of heavy objects falling into the area of spent fuel storage,
- h) Effective purification, re-fill and capture of cooling media leakages in wet storage of spent fuel.

Building structures, technological systems and components important to nuclear safety of the nuclear installation shall be designed, manufactured, assembled, and tested so as to ensure their reliable function. The manufacturers and suppliers of the classified equipments (equipments important in terms of nuclear safety), their materials and accessories are obliged to present results of selected quality

production inspections and tests of properties of components, equipments, base material, welded joints and weld deposits, material properties and composition as well as findings and removed deficiencies identified by inspection in the documentation. In cases when special technological procedures may influence resulting properties of used materials and products, performance of additional tests must be ensured in advance (e. g. keeping evidence samples). Control systems must enable monitoring, measurement, registration, and management of values and systems important in terms of nuclear safety. Devices and controls shall be designed and arranged so as to allow that maintenance has constantly enough information on operation of the nuclear installation. The control room shall enable safe and reliable control of the operation.

The concept of safety of *RAW and spent fuel management facilities* the principles of “defence in depth” strategy are applied accordingly, which are generally used worldwide for design and operation of nuclear power plants. When assessing the safety of NI, ÚJD SR assesses the ability of the facilities to fulfil the safety functions in accordance with the design in order to ensure the required level of defence in depth.

G.4 Assessment of Safety of Facilities

Article 8 of the Joint Convention

Assessment of Safety of Facilities

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that

- i) Before construction of a spent fuel management facility, a systematic safety assessment and an environmental assessment appropriate to the hazard presented by the facility and covering its operating lifetime shall be carried out;*
- ii) Before the operation of a spent fuel management facility, updated and detailed versions of the safety assessment and of the environmental assessment shall be prepared when deemed necessary to complement the assessment referred to in paragraph i).*

G.4.1 General Principles of Safety Assessment

Basic requirements for nuclear safety and safety assessment are determined by the Atomic Act (No. 541/2004 Coll.).

The legislation has laid down during 1970 - 80s the obligation of the operator to submit a safety report prior to every issuance of authorization for a nuclear installation life stage (siting, construction, operation), with assessment of radiation risks for the installation itself and its surrounding. Since 1994 the legislation requires a systematic complex safety and environmental assessment of impacts of the nuclear installation prior to its siting. The increase of requirements for safety is continuously reflected in the legislation.

Similar requirements are valid for Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and RAW repository, including the assessment of risks resulting from their existence for periods after their closure.

During the operation or during decommissioning of a nuclear installation the holder of authorization is obliged to perform periodical, complex and systematic assessment of nuclear safety taking into

account the latest knowledge in the field of nuclear safety assessment and to adopt measures to eliminate the deficiencies found. The authorization holder is obliged to perform periodical safety assessment since 2004 based on the requirements of the Atomic Act No. 541/2004 within the intervals and the extent laid down by a binding legal regulation issued by ÚJD SR in 2006.

Safety of spent fuel and RAW management facilities, in particular those, which are part of the nuclear power plants, is assessed by international missions (mainly the IAEA).

On overview of issued safety reports and their assessment by the regulators and an overview of international safety missions at the spent nuclear fuel and RAW management facilities is in *Annex VII*.

G.4.2 Operational Safety Assessment of Spent Fuel Management Facilities and Systems

Safety assessment of transport systems and of spent fuel management is part of the overall safety assessment of SE - EBO, SE – EMO Units and JAVYS, a. s. and is conducted as follows:

- By the operator in regular reports and evaluations of nuclear safety, radiation safety, OH&S, technical safety of equipment and operation and in evaluations of spent fuel handling, or shipments, sent to ÚJD SR and also in overall annual assessments of the nuclear fuel cycle within the quality system at the individual *NPPs in operation*.
- By an independent science, research and design engineering organizations with the relevant licenses from ÚJD SR (VUJE, a. s. and other) in operational safety reports and analyses.
- Routine inspections by ÚJD SR and the IAEA within the agreed or set time schedules at SE - EBO, SE – EMO Units and at JAVYS, a. s. and protocols from the inspections.

G.5 Operation of Facilities

Article 9 of the Joint Convention

Operation of Facilities

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that

- i) *The licence to operate a spent fuel management facility is based upon appropriate assessments as specified in Article 8 and is conditional on the completion of a commissioning program demonstrating that the facility, as constructed, is consistent with design and safety requirements;*
- ii) *operational limits and conditions derived from tests, operational experience and the assessments, as specified in Article 8, are defined and revised as necessary;*
- iii) *operation, maintenance, monitoring, inspection and testing of a spent fuel management facility are conducted in accordance with established procedures;*
- iv) *engineering and technical support in all safety-related fields are available throughout the operating lifetime of a spent fuel management facility;*
- v) *incidents significant to safety are reported in a timely manner by the holder of licence to the regulatory body;*
- vi) *programs to collect and analyze relevant operating experience are established and that the results are acted upon, where appropriate;*

- vii) *decommissioning plans for a spent fuel management facility are prepared and updated, as necessary, using information obtained during the operating lifetime of that facility, and are reviewed by the regulatory body.*

G.5.1 Commissioning

Conditions for issuance of authorization for operation after successfully performed commissioning, separated into stages, are regulated by legislation since 1984.

As part of commissioning of Units of NPP V-1, V-2 according to the programs of non-active and active tests the TTČ was tested in connection with the reactor and units auxiliary system tests. Based on the results of tests the operational procedures for TTČ, reactor and Units were specified.

The TTČ equipment and systems for spent fuel management were tested under non-active and active conditions of the Units.

After completion of pre-complex testing and complex testing, each TTČ system had an “Assessment of pre-complex testing, complex testing” prepared, which documented the development and meeting of the set goals.

Based on the negative experience with tightness of simple linings at most of WWER-440 units, the construction of pool lining at NPP V-2 was modified by EGP and GDt SKODA project from the original simple stainless-steel lining to a double lining with leak outlet between the linings.

All other nuclear installations have been commissioned according to standard programs approved by regulatory bodies in line with the legislation, based on the IAEA recommendations and since 1998 stipulates in detail requirements for course and documentation of commissioning so as to verify safety functions of the nuclear installation.

G.5.2 Legislative Requirements for Commissioning and Operation

Article 19 of the Atomic Act (No. 541/2004 Coll.) defines requirements for commissioning and operation of nuclear installation. Article 21 of the Act lays down requirements for spent nuclear fuel management. It further sets requirements on nuclear safety, professional competency, quality assurance, physical protection, notification and assessment of operational events and emergency preparedness. Relevant resolutions of ÚJD SR define further detailed requirements (see Annex VI.).

ÚJD SR shall issue the licence for commissioning and for operation after submission of written application, with the following documentation being attached (e.g.):

- Limits and conditions of safe operation,
- List of classified equipment as classified into safety classes,
- Nuclear installation commissioning program, split up into stages,
- Quality system documentation and requirements on the quality of the nuclear installation, and their evaluation,
- Operational procedures,
- On-site emergency plan,

- Preliminary safety report,
- Radioactive waste and spent fuel management plan, including their transport,
- Conceptual plan of decommissioning of the nuclear installation,
- Professional training systems for employees,
- Off-site emergency plan for regions within the area at risk.

The operator's activities are governed by the IAEA safety standards, such as SC 50-C-O "Nuclear power plant operational safety", SC 50-C-QA "Quality assurance at nuclear power plants", SS No. 111-F "The principles of Radioactive Waste Management", SS 11-S-2 "Establishing a National system for Radioactive Waste Management", SS 111-G1.1 "Classification of Radioactive Waste".

The operating licence of a nuclear installation can be issued repeatedly, while all general and specific conditions for issuance of the operating licence must be complied with, as well as obligations on the side of the licence holder in connection with periodical assessment of nuclear safety and updating of relevant safety documentation in line with its results.

G.5.3 Limits and Conditions (L&C) for Spent Nuclear Fuel Management

Limits and Conditions of safe operation is the basic legislative document *containing permissible values of parameters of nuclear installation facilities*. The document is developed on the basis of legislative requirements (currently the Act No. 541/2004 Coll. I., ÚJD SR Decree No. 58/2006 Coll. I) , with regard to which the operator shall:

- Submit the *approved preliminary* L&C before issuing an authorization for construction of NI by ÚJD SR;
- *Submit the approved* L&C *before issuing an authorization for commissioning of NI and operation of NI* by ÚJD SR;
- Any subsequent changes to L&C *shall be submitted to ÚJD SR for approval*, supported by their safety justification;
- Comply with the L&C, while ÚJD SR ensures control of compliance.

The document for spent fuel management facilities contains the basic limits and conditions: for BSVP:

- *Water level in the ponds for storage and refuelling (assurance of sufficient water layer to protect personnel against radiation from fuel).*
- *H₃BO₃ concentration in the storage pond (assurance of sub-criticality in the fuel pond).*
- *Cooling of storage pond water (assurance of residual heat removal) for transport means and others.*

G.5.4 Management and Operational Documentation for Operation, Maintenance and Taking Care of Equipment for Spent Nuclear Fuel Management

SNF management at NPP units is a part of nuclear fuel cycle, for which the following relevant management QA - documentation and its subsequent operational documentation has been developed:

a) Procedural documentation:

- “Operation of Nuclear Power Plants” directive;
- Record keeping and control of nuclear materials;
- Handling, shipment and storage of spent nuclear fuel;
- Handling, storage and transport of spent fuel to NPP V-1.

b) Technological operational procedures:

- Transport of spent fuel from the main generating units to MSVP
- Storage and transport of spent fuel, VRAO handling;
- Charging machine;
- Checking hermetical fuel cladding.

Reviews, revisions, maintenance, tests, and complex care of equipments for SNF management are performed according to instructions developed for the entire transport and technological part, as well as for particular systems and equipments. Obligations, responsibilities and competencies of the personnel are defined in descriptions of their work positions.

For Interim spent fuel storage the above-mentioned documentation is supplemented by a procedure Maintenance of wagon-container C-30 during transport of spent nuclear fuel.

The holder of authorization shall make records and keep data on operation of a nuclear installation that is important for decommissioning, contained in the conceptual plan for decommissioning. At the same time it is obliged to provide for special purpose funds to cover the decommissioning costs (contributions to the Nuclear Fund).

G.5.5 Technical Support for Operation

Organizational units of operator include departments of technical support and safety, the main goal of which is inter alia the following:

- Supervision over compliance with the nuclear safety rules during operation and assessment of any design modifications and modes of operation with respect to nuclear safety;
- Organization of off-site and on-site radiation inspection, personal dosimetry inspection and surveillance of observance of rules of radiation safety, organization of measures for health protection of employees and citizens in the surrounding of NPP against ionizing radiation by application of ALARA principle;
- Seismic activity monitoring;
- Improvement of safety, reliability and operational effectiveness;
- Development of operational procedures for normal and accident operation and other operational documentation and its permanent updating;
- Event analysis, elaboration of their analysis and the whole organization of feedback of own and foreign nuclear installations;

- Recordkeeping of nuclear materials, calculation of fuel loads and strategy of fuel cycle, supervision over nuclear safety during fuel exchange and physical start-up.

In ensuring the above listed tasks the operator cooperates with external support organizations.

G.5.6 Analysis of Operational Events

Article 27 of the Act No. 541/2004 Coll. defines operational event categories (failures, incidents, accidents), notification obligations of the operator toward regulators, requirements for identification of causes of operational events and requirements for public information. Also the IAEA and the WANO expectations in the field of feedback from events are elaborated in the internal documentation in addition to the legal requirements.

Every operational event is recorded and systematically assessed. The whole process involving analysis of operational events, their notification and archiving is carried out and co-ordinated by selected employees of the Division of Engineering Support of the Department of Nuclear Safety.

At the meetings of commissions for operational events management (Failure Commission, Extraordinary Failure Commission), members of which are leading employees of departments of safety operation, administration and maintenance, the relevant commission approves the analysis and takes corrective measures to eliminate root causes of events so they are not recur.

Within the proactive approach aimed at prevention of operational events occurrence, the operators have elaborated a system of dealing with near miss events and events without consequences (UBN). In 2004, SE - EMO and SE - EBO started a project in co-operation with the Comenius University called "Improvement of safe operation and safety culture by applying the near miss event concept (NSP/03-S10)". This project has been completed in 2005 and its output brought further improvement of dealing with near-events UBN in the mentioned power plants.

Another proactive approach is to utilize experience from operational events of other nuclear power plants, especially from the WANO and the IAEA databases. Operators have developed various procedures and criteria, under which they assess the applicability of knowledge from events at other nuclear power plants. Result of this assessment is approval of preventive measures to avoid occurrence of similar events.

Employees, who manage operational events and events without consequences, are regularly trained on methodologies of investigation of root causes (e.g. the IAEA and WANO workshops) and are also regular participants of international review groups (IAEA - OSART, WANO - Peer Review), which also contributes to the consistency in procedures applied by the power plants as feedback with regard to international standards and procedures.

The effectiveness of operational events management is annually assessed in the annual reports on operational events and reports on nuclear safety and reliability. Result of these assessments is the implementation of measures of organizational character aimed at continuous improvement of the processes of operational events feedback.

G.6 Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel

Article 10 of the Joint Convention

Disposal of Spent Fuel

If, pursuant to its own legislative and regulatory framework, a Contracting Party has designated spent fuel for disposal, the disposal of such spent fuel shall be in accordance with the obligations of Chapter 3 relating to the disposal of radioactive waste.

Records are kept on spent nuclear fuel management, which are preserved for future disposal and contain the following:

- a) identification data on spent nuclear fuel,
- b) history of irradiation in nuclear reactor,
- c) isotopic composition of spent nuclear fuel after its removal from nuclear reactor,
- d) placement of spent nuclear fuel,
- e) data on tightness of spent nuclear fuel coating,
- f) data listed in the approved limits and conditions of safe operation.

Systematic development of a deep geological repository (HÚ) in SR for permanent disposal of SNF and high level RAW started in 1996. The following tasks were dealt with during the development:

- Design and implementation activities,
- Source term, near and far interactions,
- Siting,
- Safety analyses,
- Public involvement.

There were 5 candidate sites selected in the process of the step-by-step assessment during the period, where the basic field research was performed. In addition to that, partial reports summarised international experience in the deep geological repository development, directions and plans in all areas were set, expert teams for solution of individual issues were established, and co-operation started with organizations dealing with deep geological disposal in Belgium, Switzerland, the Czech Republic and Hungary.

The “Strategy for the back end of nuclear energy in SR“ *from 2008* in principle considers three realistic alternatives for dealing with the final stage of spent fuel and VRAO management:

- Disposal in deep repository in geological environment of suitable characteristics;
- International solution (export of fuel to RF, international repository);
- Zero alternative, i.e. safe storage of fuel for a further not specified period of time (“wait and see“ approach).

In terms of the above mentioned alternatives, it is presumed that the overall national project will be in the future implemented in three periods as follows:

1. Acquiring information for possible placement of repository in geological environment,
2. Cooperation with international organizations with the possibility of development, construction and operation of international repository,
3. International activities, which would solve the export of fuel abroad without the return of high-level active waste after their re-processing.

After the interruption of the works in 2001 currently the continuation of the “Development of a deep repository for spent fuel and high-level RAW in SR” project is being revived , with the aim to obtain sufficient information, necessary for the decision on the strategy for spent fuel and VRAO management.

H Safety of Radioactive Waste (RAW) Management

This part relates to similar requirements of the Convention as part G, which deals with the requirements of the Convention regarding spent fuel management. Since the requirements for safety, procedures and legislation regarding spent fuel and RAW management are often identical, where appropriate, references are made to the relevant chapters in Part G.

H.1 General Safety Requirements

Article 11 of the Joint Convention

General Safety Requirements

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that at all stages of radioactive waste management individuals, society and the environment are adequately protected against radiological and other hazards.

In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to:

- i) ensure that criticality and removal of residual heat generated during radioactive waste management are adequately addressed;*
- ii) ensure that the generation of radioactive waste is kept to the minimum practicable;*
- iii) take into account interdependencies among the different steps in radioactive waste management;*
- iv) provide for effective protection of individuals, society and environment, by applying at the national level suitable protective methods as approved by the regulatory body, in the framework of its national legislation, which has due regard to internationally endorsed criteria and standards;*
- v) take into account the biological, chemical and other hazards that may be associated with radioactive waste management;*
- vi) strive to avoid actions that impose reasonably predictable impacts on future generations greater than those permitted for the current generation;*
- vii) aim to avoid imposing undue burdens on future generations.*

General safety requirements of RAW management are similar as by SNF and are described in the chapter G.1.

The originator of radioactive waste is liable for safe radioactive waste management prior to its placement to the repository.

Radioactive waste shall be managed so as to:

- a) maintain sub-criticality,
- b) secure residual heat removal,
- c) minimize effects of ionizing radiation on maintenance, population and environment,
- d) take into account the properties that influence nuclear safety, such as toxicity, flammability, explosiveness and other hazardous properties.

Radioactive waste generation and radioactive waste management shall follow technical organizational measures so that their amounts and activity are kept as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA).

The conditioning of radioactive waste consists of activities leading to production of a form suitable for its transport and disposal or for its storage.

All activities during radioactive waste management shall be directed to its safe disposal.

For RAW inventory see Annex V.

H.1.1 Radioactive Waste (RAW) Generation Minimization Program

The requirement for minimization of RAW generation is laid down in the Atomic Act (No. 541/2004 Coll.). The minimization system is elaborated at every nuclear installation in line with legislative requirements. Fulfilment of programs for RAW generation minimization is controlled annually in the "Report on RAW Management". This report proposes new measures to minimize RAW generation for the next period and evaluates their fulfilment.

The "Draft procedure for measurement of low-contaminated materials from NPP V-1, V-2 operation and their release into environment" and "Methodology for release of low-contaminated waste into environment from NPP V-1, V-2 operation" were implemented for radioactive materials containing radioactive nuclides underneath the level enabling their release into environment. Authorization for release of RA-materials into environment was issued in 2003 by the Public HealthCare Office of SR for the locality of Jaslovské Bohunice and in 2004 for Mochovce site.

H.1.2 Connection Between Stages of Radioactive Waste (RAW) Management

A "Generic catalogue of radioactive waste for its treatment and conditioning" has been issued in 2003. This document provides basic information for correct labelling and categorization of RAW by its packaging and devolving or acceptance for the purpose of treatment in treatment facilities. The document also defines principles and conditions for RAW acceptance to be treated and conditioned so as to meet the requirements for creating a product during the treatment and conditioning of these RAW, which would comply with criteria for permanent disposal in RÚ RAW Mochovce and would not endanger safety during any further manipulations of RAW including transports. The criteria of acceptance are included in limits and conditions of relevant installation.

A part of the document "Plan of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel management including their transport", which is submitted by the operator and reviewed by ÚJD prior to construction and operation of RAW management facilities, are also descriptions and analyses of RAW streams containing the following activities:

- Storage of untreated RAW;
- RAW treatment,
- Storage of intermediate products,
- Shipment between individual steps,
- RAW conditioning.

Prior to starting the RAW management itself, it is necessary to characterize the physical and chemical and radiochemical properties of a specific type of RAW, stated on the accompanying sheet of RAW in the packaging (required by the ÚJD SR Decree No. 53/2006.). The accompanying sheet is handed

over together with RAW at individual stages of activities relating to RAW management.

Safety requirements on particular activities are listed in the ÚJD Decree No. 53/2006 Coll.

Before commissioning and during operation, operational procedures, which take into account relations between individual steps of RAW management, are elaborated and improved. The devolving of RAW within JAVYS, a. s. between the producer of RAW and JAVYS, a. s. is subject to by operational procedures and is contractually covered.

H.1.3 Assurance of Effective Protection of Individuals, Society and the Environment

For description see G.1.

H.1.4 Biological, Chemical and Other Hazards

For description see G.1.

H.1.5 Limiting Impact on Future Generations and their inadequate load

For description see G.1.

H.2 Existing Facilities and Past Practices, Revision of Safety Assessments

Article 12 of the Joint Convention

Existing Facilities and Past Practices

Each Contracting Party shall in due course take the appropriate steps to review

- i) The safety of any radioactive waste management facility existing at the time the Convention enters into force for that Contracting Party and to ensure that, if necessary, all reasonably practicable improvements are made to upgrade the safety of such a facility;*
- ii) The results of past practices in order to determine whether any intervention is needed for reasons of radiation protection, bearing in mind that the reduction in detriment resulting from the reduction in dose should be sufficient to justify the harm and the costs, including the social costs, of the intervention.*

For description see G.1.1.

The RAW management facilities when commissioned complied with the safety requirements laid down in the valid legislation. They were gradually harmonized with the increased requirements according to the legislative conditions (see Annex VII., table G.1). The ČSKAE Decree No. 67/1987 Coll., which laid down safety requirements for RAW storage, has allowed their implementation within five years. The ÚJD SR Decree No. 190/2000 Coll. has required an accompanying sheet of RAW and consistent recordkeeping of RAW. The records in electronic form for RAW occurred before 2000 has been

gradually completed based on partial written background documents, or in case of “the historical waste”, they were removed, sorted and categorized according to the requirements on the accompanying sheet of RAW. *ÚJD SR Decree No. 53/2006 Coll. is valid today for the area of RAW and SNF management.*

H.3 Siting of Proposed Facilities

Article 13 of the Joint Convention

Siting of Proposed Facilities

1. *Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that procedures are established and implemented for a proposed radioactive waste management facility;*
 - i) *To evaluate all relevant site-related factors likely to affect the safety of such a facility during its operating lifetime as well as that of a disposal facility after closure;*
 - ii) *To evaluate the likely safety impact of such a facility on individuals, society and the environment, taking into account possible evolution of the site conditions of disposal facilities after closure;*
 - iii) *To make information on the safety of such a facility available to members of the public;*
 - iv) *To consult the Contracting Parties in the vicinity of such facility, insofar as they are likely to be affected by that facility, and provide them, upon their request, with general data relating to the facility to enable them to evaluate the likely safety impact of the facility upon their territory.*
2. *In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that such facilities shall not have unacceptable effects on other Contracting Parties by being sited in accordance with the general safety requirements of Article 11.*

H.3.1 Legislative Requirements

For description see G.2.1.

H.3.2 Siting of Particular NI

Siting of facilities for RAW management has not taken place in the past fully in compliance with the current requirements of the ESPOO Convention only for installations included in the original design of NPP A-1 and NPP V-1. The performance of additional analyses is described in G.2.2 and in Annex VII, table G.1.

Siting in a locality suitable for building of a repository has taken place during 1975 – 1978. Criteria for siting were specified based on the actually valid legislation and the IAEA safety guidelines.

Attention was devoted first of all to requirements on suitable geological and hydro-geological conditions of the selected site, because the safety analyses of the repositories operated in the world have clearly shown, that the critical way of population exposure is the transport of radioactive materials by ground waters. 34 sites were selected in Slovakia, from which 12 were chosen for further observation. The site Mochove has been selected out of these based on the siting criteria.

No new nuclear installation for RAW management was sited after year 2006. *Documentation was developed and reviewed in the extent of a preliminary report and assessment of the impact of NI on the environment (EIA) for an integral storage (see Annex VII, table G.1). Due to the change in siting the construction there is a new legislative process going on in connection with elaboration of a Report for*

environmental impact assessment in accordance with Act No. 24/2006. According to the current assumptions the planned start of construction of the integral storage would be in 2014.

H.4 Design and Construction of Facilities

Article 14 of the Joint Convention

Design and Construction of Facilities

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that

- i) The design and construction of a radioactive waste management facility provide for suitable measures to limit possible radiological impact on individuals, society and the environment, including those from discharges or uncontrolled releases;*
- ii) At the design stage, conceptual plans, and if necessary, technical provisions for the decommissioning of a radioactive waste management facility other than disposal facility are taken into account;*
- iii) At the design stage, technical provisions for the closure of a disposal facility are prepared;*
- iv) The technologies incorporated in the design and construction of a radioactive waste management facility are supported by experience, testing or analysis.*

Legislative requirements and procedures for design and construction of facility for RAW management are common with the ones for design and construction of facilities for SNF management *and are described in the ÚJD Decrees No. 50/2006 Coll. I. and No. 53/2006 Coll. I. (see G.3).* The proceeding for construction permit takes place as described in the part E.2. in line with the requirements of the Act on Land Use Planning (No. 50/1976 Coll.) and the Atomic Act (No. 541/2004 Coll.). The Authority shall decide on the issuance of construction permit for construction of a nuclear installation based on written application of the applicant supported by a documentation according to the Building Act (see G.3).

Safety assessment of the RAW repository after its closure is a part of the analysis of long-term safety of repository, which frames the principle part of safety reports. Initial (1981) and Preliminary (1984) safety report have assessed the long-term safety of repository for disposal of operational waste from NPPs of WWER type. The safety assessment of disposal of waste from NPP A-1 was included in later safety analyses.

H.5 Safety Assessment of Facilities

Article 15 of the Joint Convention

Safety Assessment of Facilities

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that

- i) Before construction of a radioactive waste management facility, a systematic safety assessment and an environmental assessment appropriate to the hazard presented by the facility and covering its operating lifetime shall be carried out;*
- ii) In addition, before construction of a disposal facility, a systematic safety assessment and an environmental assessment for the period following the closure shall be carried out and the results evaluated against the criteria established by the regulatory body;*
- iii) Before the operation of a radioactive waste management facility, updated and detailed versions of the safety assessment and an environmental assessment shall be prepared when deemed necessary to complement the assessment referred to in paragraph i).*

See G.4.

H.6 Operation of Facilities

Article 16 of the Joint Convention

Operation of Facilities

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that

- i) The licence to operate a radioactive waste management facility is based upon appropriate assessments, as specified in Article 15, and is conditional on the completion of a commissioning program demonstrating that the facility, as constructed, is consistent with design and safety requirements;*
- ii) operational limits and conditions, derived from tests, operational experience and the assessments as specified in Article 15, are defined and revised as necessary;*
- iii) operation, maintenance, monitoring, inspection and testing of a radioactive waste management facility are conducted in accordance with established procedures. For a disposal facility the results thus obtained shall be used to verify and to review the validity of assumptions made and to update the assessments as specified in Article 15, for the period after closure;*
- iv) engineering and technical support in all safety-related fields are available throughout the operating lifetime of a radioactive waste management facility;*
- v) procedures for characterization and segregation of radioactive waste are applied;*
- vi) incidents significant to safety are reported in a timely manner by the holder of the licence to the regulatory body;*
- vii) programs to collect and analyse relevant operating experience are established and that the results are acted upon, where appropriate;*
- viii) decommissioning plans for a radioactive waste management facility other than a disposal facility are prepared and updated, as necessary, using information obtained during the operating lifetime of that facility and are reviewed by the regulatory body;*
- ix) plans for the closure of a disposal facility are prepared and updated, as necessary, using information obtained during the operating lifetime of that facility and are reviewed by the regulatory body.*

H.6.1 Commissioning and Operation of Facilities

Authorization for commissioning of nuclear installation and operation of nuclear installation is issued by ÚJD SR in compliance with the Act No. 541/2004 Coll. I. – see G.5.1, G.5.2.

Under the wording of the Atomic Act (No. 541/2004 Coll.), the operation of the nuclear installation is structured into trial operation and operation. After assessment of the report on evaluation of the preceding stage of nuclear installation commissioning, ÚJD SR issues an approval for the next stage of commissioning based on the application of the authorization holder.

The Authority issues the approval for trial operation after submission of written application with attached report on evaluation of nuclear installation commissioning. This approval constitutes a part of the approval for early use of construction for trial operation according to a special provision. After positive evaluation of the trial operation, the Authority will commence upon the proposal of the authorization holder the construction approval proceeding.

The issuance of approval for operation is subject to submission of a report on evaluation of the nuclear installation commissioning stage and of a record of preparedness of the nuclear installation and the employees for permanent operation.

All RAW management facilities have a valid approval of ÚJD SR for their operation issued under the above mentioned conditions.

H.6.2 Limits and Conditions for RAW Management

L&C exist in SR for all nuclear installations; their format and contents follow IAEA and US NRC guides. The following is stated by each limit condition:

- aim of the limit condition,
- text of the limit condition,
- validity of the limit condition (to which regime of JZ it applies),
- activity of operational personnel in case the limit condition is not met,
- requirements on inspection – they determine frequency, type and scope of inspections and tests of systems and equipments.

The fulfilment of limits and conditions is continuously monitored by the maintenance staff and by technical support personnel.

An amendment to the provision with relevant justification is drafted in case of necessity for L&C modification and this modification comes into force after its approval by the regulatory body.

Regulatory Departments of nuclear safety of the operator elaborate periodically quarterly and annually a report on nuclear safety, which is submitted to the management. The report includes also evaluation of the whole area of L&C. The number of changes of L&C, the period of unavailability of safety systems and eventual violation of L&C serve as indicators.

H.6.3 Working Procedures

The system of RAW management is elaborated in detail in the procedural and operational documentation in order to ensure fulfilment of requirements of the ÚJD SR Decrees No. 53/2006 Coll. and No. 57/2006 Coll.

Procedures, principles and instructions for operational documentation processing is described in detail in relevant directives and guidelines of the QA system. Every operational document passes through annotation and approval process in particular concerned departments and at the end, it is approved by the top management of the organization. The same procedure also governs the process of changes and amendments of individual documents of the used documentation:

- Operational documentation
- Documentation of inspections and testing of equipment
- Technological and working procedures for maintenance

Results obtained during activities are reflected into modifications of such procedures as well as to modifications in limits and conditions.

H.6.4 Engineering and Technical Support

For description see G.5.5.

H.6.5 Procedures for Waste Characterization and Sorting

In 2003, "Generic catalogue of radioactive waste for their treatment" was issued. This document provides basic information for correct labelling and categorization of RAW by its packaging and devolving/acceptance for the purpose of treatment in particular treatment centres (see H.1.2).

H.6.6 Reporting of Events to the Regulatory Body

The system of reporting events to the regulatory body is the same for all nuclear installations (see G.5.6).

H.6.7 Conceptual Decommissioning Plans

Conceptual decommissioning plans are included in the documentation submitted prior to the commissioning of a nuclear installation and they specify preliminary conceptual decommissioning plans (see G.3, H 4.1). Conceptual decommissioning plans document the presumed conditions after operation termination and contain goals and procedure of decommissioning including financial demands estimation, description of presumed radiation situation and amounts and activities of radioactive waste; they state requirements on capacity of installations for radioactive waste management and requirements on gathering and record keeping of data important for planning of decommissioning.

Conceptual decommissioning plans are updated every ten years within the periodical safety assessment of the nuclear installation.

H.7 Institutional Measures after Repository Closure

Article 17 of the Joint Convention

Institutional Measures after Closure

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that after closure of a disposal facility:

- i) Records of the location, design and inventory of that facility required by the regulatory body are preserved;*
- ii) Active or passive institutional controls, such as monitoring or access restrictions are carried out, if required; and*
- iii) if, during any period of active institutional control, an unplanned release of radioactive materials into the environment is detected, intervention measures are implemented, if necessary.*

H.7.1 Record Keeping

All information on disposed radioactive waste including the placement of containers, amount and activity of radioactive waste, their property specifications, composition of particular package forms is during operation kept in compliance with operator's procedures. The scope of records kept after repository closure is specified by ÚJD SR in the conditions for license for repository closure.

After the repository closure, the operator shall ensure transmission of information about disposed waste containers to be archived in that institution, which will be appointed by the state to perform institutional control. A plan of repository closure and institutional control as one of the basic documents required for the issuance of ÚJD SR authorization for repository closure contains besides others also a method of long-term keeping and transmission of information with identification of used media, as well as data important for implementation of corrective actions or for reassessment of safety of repository in the future and a method of keeping records about results of inspections, measurements and monitoring during institutional control.

H.7.2 Institutional Control

Institutional control means all activities that are performed after the end of disposal of RAW and final closure of a repository. Necessary maintenance of the repository structures will be ensured, and the system of physical protection of repository will be in operation during active period of institutional control. Monitoring systems will be in operation, providing information about possible water penetration into disposal vaults and its further migration.

The exact scope of institutional control shall be determined based on safety analyses conducted before repository closure.

On the basis of results of safety analysis and in accordance with recommendation of international mission WATRP, the 300 years duration of institutional control is assumed for the Mochovce repository and for intruder scenarios is considered, that system of final repository cover will prevent the access close to disposed RAW for a period of 500 years.

Also part of the repository closure and institutional control plan is the plan for maintenance and repair of the respective components of the repository over the period of active part of institutional control as well as establishing the scope of activities to be carried out within passive part of institutional control of the repository.

The current safety report documents that during operation as well as during the period of institutional control individuals, society and the environment are protected from radiation events. PoSAR guarantees that the criteria set out for the repository by MoH will not be exceeded as long as the limits set forth therein are complied with:

1. Effective dose to a member of the public due to the evolution scenario (scenarios with a probability that will approach 1 over time) shall not exceed 0.1 mSv/y in any year following the completion of institutional control of the repository;

2. Effective dose to a member of the public due to a intrusion activity (scenarios where a probability will substantially be less than 1) shall not exceed 1 mSv/y in any year following the completion of institutional control of the repository.

The documentation contains the following sections dealing with safety assessment for periods subsequent to the repository closure:

- a) Repository closure and institutional control plan (at the level of design study)
 - Stabilisation of the site
 - Completion of repository operation
 - Post-operation monitoring
- b) Safety analyses
 - Characteristics of disposed waste
 - Safety aspects of repository operation
 - Long-term stability
 - Long-term repository safety analyses
 - Waste acceptance criteria for disposal resulting safety analyses

The Mochovce NRR's long-term safety analyses envisaged two groups of scenarios - evolution and intrusion.

H.7.3 Intervention Measures

It is assumed that intervention measures will be performed in the case of detection of unplanned release of radioactive materials in drainage system of the repository or in some part of the environment in the vicinity of the repository, if any. Pursuant to the Atomic Act, the holder of the authorization for repository closure and institutional control will provide the performance of such corrective intervention. The scope of corrective action is not established precisely as yet, depending on the results of controls and measurements carried out during the institutional control, on the results of the program for monitoring the state of repository barriers and the radiological monitoring plan. Afore-mentioned controls, measurements, monitoring programs are designed so as to cover all potential pathways for leakage and spread of radionuclides from the repository into the environment.

I Transboundary Movement of Spent Nuclear Fuel and Radioactive Waste

Article 27 of the Joint Convention

Transboundary Movements

1. Each Contracting Party involved in transboundary movement shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that such movement is undertaken in a manner consistent with the provisions of this Convention and relevant international binding instruments.

In so doing:

- i) A Contracting Party, which is a State of origin, shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that transboundary movement is authorized and takes place only with the prior notification and consent of the State of destination;
 - ii) Transboundary movement through States of transit shall be subject to those international obligations which are relevant to the particular modes of transport utilized;
 - iii) A Contracting Party, which is a State of destination, shall consent to a transboundary movement only if it has the administrative and technical capacity as well as the regulatory structure, needed to manage the spent fuel or the radioactive waste in a manner consistent with this Convention;
 - iv) A Contracting Party, which is a State of origin, shall authorize a transboundary movement only if it can satisfy itself in accordance with the consent of the State of destination that the requirements of subparagraph iii) are met prior to transboundary movement;
 - v) A Contracting Party, which is a State of origin, shall take the appropriate steps to permit re-entry into its territory, if a transboundary movement is not or cannot be completed in conformity with this Article, unless an alternative safe arrangement can be made.
2. A Contracting Party shall not licence the shipment of its spent fuel or radioactive waste to a destination south of latitude 60 degrees South for storage or disposal.
 3. Nothing in this Convention prejudices or affects
 - i) The exercise, by ships and aircraft of all States, or maritime, river and air navigation, rights and freedoms as provided for in international law;
 - ii) Rights of a Contracting Party, to which radioactive waste is exported for processing to return or provide for the return of, the radioactive waste and other products after treatment to the State of origin;
 - iii) The right of a Contracting Party to export its spent fuel for reprocessing;
 - iv) Rights of a Contracting Party, to which spent fuel is exported for reprocessing to return, or provide for the return of, radioactive waste and other products resulting from reprocessing operations to the State of origin.

I.1 General Requirements for Safety at Borders

In SR the transboundary movement of spent fuel and RAW, imports, exports are governed by Act No. 541/2004 Coll. I. as amended and by the ÚJD SR Decree No. 57/2006 Coll. I., *transposing the Council Directive 2006/117/Euratom on the supervision and control of shipments of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel*, which is based on the IAEA recommendations formulated in the documents of TS-R-1 series. Approval of the type of transportation equipment is issued at the most for five years. Authorization for SNF shipment can be issued for up to one year and in case of RAW shipment for up to three years.

The Act No. 541/2004 Coll. I. allows for import of RAW, which resulted from treatment and conditioning of RAW exported for this purpose and their re-entry was approved in advance by ÚJD SR and also

allows import of RAW for the purpose of its treatment and conditioning on the territory of SR if export of RAW with proportional activity was contractually agreed and approved by ÚJD SR. Any other import of RAW to SR is prohibited. The Atomic Act specifies exactly, in section 3 par. 8, which are those states to which it is prohibited to transport RAW.

The amended Atomic Act (No. 541/2004 Coll. I.) transposed the Council Directive 2006/117/Euratom on the supervision and control of shipments of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel and at the same time through a reference to the Commission Decision 2008/312/Euratom model standard documents for the supervision and control of shipments of RAW and spent fuel were taken over.

I.1.1 Basic Requirements for Safety Documentation

The safety documentation shall contain a set of measures for efficient protection of persons, property and environment against the consequences of irradiation during shipment of radioactive materials. This protection is assured by separation of radioactive contents and environment, by control of dose rates during shipment, by prevention of criticality achievement and by prevention of shipment damage due to released and absorbed heat.

These measures must apply to all activities and conditions associated with the movement of radioactive materials; they include design, maintenance and repair of transportation equipments, preparation, expedition, loading, transfer including storage during transport, unloading and acceptance of consignment at the point of shipment destination.

I.1.2 Issuance of Shipment Authorization

Shipment of radioactive materials

Radioactive materials (nuclear material, radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel) may only be transported based on shipment authorization issued by the ÚJD to consignor and by means of transportation equipment, which was approved by the ÚJD SR.

Authorization for shipment of radioactive materials shall not be required for shipment of:

- a) products from non-irradiated natural and depleted uranium and non-irradiated thorium,
- b) nuclear materials which total amount transported within period of 12 consecutive calendar months not exceed:
 - 1. 500 kg of natural non-irradiated uranium or
 - 2. 1000 kg of non-irradiated depleted uranium and non-irradiated thorium.

Application for the authorization for shipment of radioactive waste to the EU Member States or other countries shall be submitted by the applicant using a standard document. The document contains statement confirming that the radioactive waste will be taken back and if it is not possible to assure its shipment to the consignee or should the shipment become impossible under conditions imposed by the competent authorities of other countries.

Authorization for shipment is issued for each shipment separately. Where the same type of radioactive materials is concerned, with the same type of shipment by the same consignor, ÚJD may issue the authorization for shipment of radioactive materials or spent nuclear fuel for a repeated shipment for a period of one year, and in case of radioactive waste for a three years period at maximum.

The Authority issues the authorization for shipment of radioactive waste and approval of transportation equipment type in a form a decision.

The Authority shall specify the following (besides the regular terms) in the decision, in which it issues the authorization for shipment of radioactive materials:

- a) the type of the authorization,
- b) the identification label assigned by the Authority,
- c) the date of issue and validity period,
- d) the list of relevant Slovak and international legal provisions, including the International Atomic Energy Agency's Regulations for the Safe Shipment of Radioactive Materials, under which the shipment is authorized,
- e) any restrictions on the shipment mode, the type of the transportation equipment, the shipping container, and eventual possible instructions on the transport route,
- f) the following statement:
- g) "This permit shall not relieve the consignor from the obligation to comply with the requirements under legal rules of the states to or through which the shipment is to be effected.",
- h) a detailed list of additional operational inspections necessary during preparation, loading, transport, disposal, unloading and handling of the consignment, including eventual special provisions concerning disposal in terms of safe heat dispersion and sub-criticality assurance,
- i) the reference to information provided by the applicant related to any special activities to be carried out prior to the shipment,
- j) the reference to the relevant approval of the transportation equipment type or the consignment project,
- k) the specification of the real radioactive content which may not be obvious from the nature of the package file; this shall include the physical and chemical form, the relevant total activity (or activities of various radioisotopes), the amount of possible fission material in grams, and the statement as to whether the material to be transported is not a low dispersed radioactive material,
- l) the specification of the relevant quality assurance program.

The Regulatory Authority may bind the authorization by conditions, which it considers necessary.

The Authority may issue authorization for transportation of radioactive materials also under special conditions, which shall contain besides the essentials mentioned above also:

- scope of temperatures of surrounding environment, for which the approval for transport under special conditions was issued,
- detailed list of additional operational controls required during shipment, loading, transport, stowage, unloading and handling with the consignment, including possible special provisions on stowage with respect to safe heat dispersion,

- reasons for transport under special conditions (if appropriate/necessary),
- description of compensation measures to be used, if the transport is taking place under special conditions,
- reference to information provided by the applicant relating to used consignments or specific acts to be performed prior to shipment.

I.1.3 Approval of Transportation Equipment Type

The Authority shall state the following (besides the regular terms) in the decision, in which it approves the type of transportation equipment:

- a) The type of approval license (certificate),
- b) The identification label assigned by the Authority,
- c) The date of issue and validity period,
- d) Possible restrictions on the shipment mode,
- e) The list of relevant Slovak and international legal provisions, including the International Atomic Energy Agency's Regulations for the Safe Shipment of Radioactive Materials, based on which the type of transportation equipment/consignment project was approved,
- f) The following statement: "This permit shall not relieve the consignor from the obligation to comply with the requirements under legal rules of the states to or through which the shipment is to be made".
- g) The reference to approval of alternative radioactive content, to validate approvals of other relevant bodies or additional technical data and information according to the requirements of the Authority,
- h) The declaration of transportation authorization, if the decision combines approval of consignment project with shipment authorization,
- i) Identification of package set,
- j) The description of package set in the form of reference to drawings or project specification. If appropriate, also reproducible illustration not larger than 21 x 30 cm, illustrating the consignment together with a brief description, including the used material, total weight, total outside parameters and the appearance,
- k) Specification of consignment project with reference to drawings,
- l) Specification of authorized radioactive content, including possible restrictions of radioactive content, which may not be obvious from the nature of package set; this shall include the physical and the chemical form, the relevant activity level (or activities of various radioisotopes), the amount of possible fission material in grams, and a statement as to whether the material to be transported is not a low dispersion radioactive material,
- m) Additional for consignments of fission material:
 - 1. Detailed description of authorized radioactive content,
 - 2. Sub-criticality (CSI) index value,
 - 3. Reference to documentation, which proves the sub-criticality content,

4. Other special circumstances, from which absence of water is assumed in certain free areas when assessing sub-criticality,
 5. Any assumptions, based on which decrease of neutron multiplication is expected, as a result of real course of irradiation when assessing sub-criticality,
 6. Temperature range of the surrounding environment, for which the type of transportation equipment was approved,
- n) For consignments of B(M) type explanatory information, which may be useful for other relevant authorities,
 - o) Detailed list of additional operational controls required in preparation, loading, stowage, unloading and handling with the consignment, including potential special provisions on stowage with respect to safe heat dispersion,
 - p) Reference to information provided by the applicant relating to used consignments or specific actions to be performed prior to shipment,
 - q) Declaration concerning surrounding conditions used in the consignment project,
 - r) Specification of a relevant quality assurance program,
 - s) Reference to consignor identity, if necessary.

The Authority may bind the approval on conditions considered to be necessary.

I.2 Experience with Transboundary Shipment of Spent Nuclear Fuel and Radioactive Waste (RAW)

The process of transboundary shipment of RAW is governed by *section 16 of Act No. 541/2004 Coll. I., which implements the Council Directive 2006/117/Euratom of 20 November 2006 on supervision and control during shipment of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel.*

ÚJD SR issued authorization for shipment of spent nuclear fuel from a research reactor in the Czech Republic to the Russian Federation within the US initiative - Global Threat Reduction Initiative. All transboundary shipments of spent nuclear fuel were made on the basis of consents and authorizations from the relevant regulatory and administrative authorities of the State of Origin after notification to the State of destination and with its consent.

In 2009 ÚJD SR issued authorization for shipment of metal radioactive waste from the Slovak Republic to the Russian Federation for the purpose of its processing (melting) and subsequent import of the melting products back to the Slovak Republic. The shipment has not been realized until now due to not meeting all the conditions imposed on the applicant. The communication process between the authorities of the affected countries took place in compliance with the amended Atomic Act (No. 541/2004 Coll. I.) and the relevant standard documents were used.

J Disused Sealed Sources

Article 28 of the Joint Convention

Disused Sealed Sources

1. *Each Contracting Party shall, in the framework of its national law, take the appropriate steps to ensure that the possession, remanufacturing or disposal of disused sealed sources takes place in a safe manner.*
2. *A Contracting Party shall allow for re-entry into its territory of disused sealed sources if, in the framework of its national law, it has accepted that they be returned to a manufacturer qualified to receive and possess the disused sealed sources.*

For the safety of institutional radioactive waste management, including disused sealed sources, in principle the same, principles apply as for management of sources themselves:

- *It is necessary to ensure that the exposure of staff and the public is as low as reasonably achievable,*
- *It is necessary to ensure that unauthorized handling of sources or waste is prevented.*

Currently there are approx. 150 legal entities and natural persons in the Slovak Republic, which have authorization for use of sealed and open radioactive sources, during operation of which institutional radioactive waste can be produced. These are entities operating in different sectors of the economy, in health care, schools, research, etc. The workplaces, where radioactive sources are used, fall under the competence of different sectors – the Ministry of Economy of SR, the Ministry of Health of SR, the Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sports of SR, the Ministry of Transport, Posts and Telecommunications of SR, the Ministry of Interior of SR, as well as the Ministry of Defence of SR.

The Council Directive 2003/122/Euratom on the control of high activity sealed radioactive sources and orphan sources requires from the member states, inter alia, to ensure “adequate handling of sealed sources, including agreements regarding the transfer of disused sources from suppliers, from other authorized organization or facility”.

The original centralized system for collection of radioactive waste and disused radioactive sources ended due to the split of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. The basis for the new national system was laid by the Government Resolution No. 537/1997, designating responsibility for storage of contaminated radioactive materials in SR to Slovenské elektrárne, a. s. – Decommissioning of nuclear energy installations, radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel management (SE – VYZ), while from 1 April 2008 the obligations were transferred to the current shareholding company, JAVYS.

There are no sealed sources produced in the Slovakia. All sealed radioactive sources are imported mainly from Germany, UK, Russian Federation, Poland and the Czech Republic. After the split of the Czecho-Slovak Republic all entities having authorization for import and distribution of radioactive sources in SR have the obligation imposed on them through a decision, to contractually secure taking back of disused radioactive sources and their return to the foreign producer or supplier. Thus all sealed radioactive sources, after expiration of the recommended period of use, must be returned back to the foreign producer or supplier.

Currently the database of radioactive sources contains approx. 850 sealed radioactive sources. This number does not include radioactive sources, for the use of which it is not necessary to have an authorization from the relevant public health authority: calibration radioactive sources, low activity radioactive sources used as part of various laboratory measuring and analytical instruments, sources used in fire detectors, etc. The number of sealed radioactive sources, which are currently not being used and are stored by individual users, is minimal. Disused sources were gradually disposed of in the past years. In case of high activity radioactive sources the operator is obliged to secure their disposal not later than 12 months after the end of their use. Captured radioactive sources of unknown origin are stored at the storage facility of JAVYS, a. s., authorized by the regulatory bodies for this purpose. Continuing problem remains to be disposal of disused radio needles, as the decision of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of SR ruled out their disposal at the regional repository of radioactive and nuclear waste at Mochovce.

The basic legislative requirements for use of sealed radioactive sources are set by the Act No. 355/2007 Coll. I., setting the basic conditions and requirements for their use (notification and authorization of activities, for which radioactive sources are used), defines the basic duties of the users of radioactive sources and establishes the central register of sources of ionizing radiation.

On Ordinance of the Government No. 348/2006 Coll. I. concerning requirements for securing control of high activity sources and orphan sources governs the conditions for management of these sources in compliance with the EU legislation. Currently an amendment to this Government Ordinance is being prepared. This ordinance specifies the requirements for optimizing radiation protection, ensuring radiation protection in use of sealed radioactive sources, sets the exposure limits for the workers and for the public, establishes requirements for storage, transport and use of sealed sources, sets the requirements and procedures for carrying out acceptance tests, leakage tests, long-term stability test and operational stability of sealed sources, certification of sealed sources and also conditions for releasing radioactive materials into the environment.

More detailed requirements for institutional radioactive waste management are established by Decree No. 545/2007 Coll. I., stipulating the details of requirements for securing radiation protection in activities leading to exposure and activities important with respect to radiation protection.

The Government of the Slovak Republic by its Resolution No. 610 of 2 September 2009 approved the draft procedure for institutional radioactive waste management and captured radioactive materials and charged JAVYS, a. s., to build a complex facility for grading, sorting and long-term safe storage of such materials. This facility shall be built in the vicinity of RÚ RAO Mochovce.

As regards the possibility to dispose IRAW, including disused sealed sources at RÚ RAO, all previous studies analyzing this issue arrived at a consistent conclusion that:

- Practically all IRAW originating from use of open sources can be disposed in a suitable manner at RÚ RAW,
- Practically all disused sealed sources can be disposed, with the exception of:
 - Sources ¹³⁷Cs with higher activity (2pcs),

- Disused sealed sources, which are alpha-sources, specifically ^{226}Ra , ^{238}Pu itself, or as Pu/Be neutron source, ^{239}Pu , ^{241}Am (approx. 430) itself or as Am/Be neutron sources.

The sources that cannot be disposed at the RÚ RAO after centralized collection shall be stored for the period until a suitable way of their disposal is found. And that would be disposal together with the other waste from nuclear installations that cannot be disposed at RÚ RAO, or the spent fuel in a deep repository or disposal separately, in a special well in a stable geological formation.

Management of captured nuclear and radioactive materials (of unknown origin)

After the development in recent years basically a routine practice has been established in capturing nuclear and/or radioactive materials, which is based on internationally endorsed approach. However, there are still reserves in coordination of activities of individual involved sectors and institutions. The ILTRAM information system was developed, which is currently operated by HUMA-LAB APEKO in Košice.

For the period of the last approx. 13 years in Slovakia there were dozens of capture events. For example, the following was captured: ^{60}Co (sealed sources, contaminated steel strips, or other parts), ^{90}Sr (sealed sources), ^{137}Cs (sealed sources), ^{226}Ra (metal part, metal objects contaminated evaporator-crust from natural waters, components of military equipment). Recently the number of cases to be solved has a decreasing trend and there are less than 10 captures per calendar year.

K Planned Measures to Improve Safety

K.1 Planned Measures to Improve Safety

The following measures are planned for implementation in the near future:

- *For the nuclear installation Technologies of treatment and conditioning of RAW to improve the system for utilization of feedback from operating experiences, including utilization of results from the research;*
- *To commission a facility for treatment of used inserts of air filters;*
- *To launch construction of a facility for centralized collection, sorting and storage of institutional RAW and captured radioactive materials;*
- *With the aim to minimize production of radioactive sorbents to implement design modification in the systems of water purification at EMO Units 1&2, which would allow sampling of sorbents to optimize their removal;*
- To introduce measures related to final shut down of NPP V-1:
 - Update of safety documentation – Safety Report, Limits & Conditions, operating procedures,
 - Implementation of projects as part of completion of operation of NPP V-1 - ensuring safe and reliable operation of the remaining nuclear facilities at Bohunice site,
 - Retraining of personnel within completion of operation of NPP V-1,
 - *Ensuring safe and continuous operation of systems (facilities) that remain in operation,*
 - *Safe gradual reduction in the number of operating systems (facilities) NPP V-1 with the aim to put the power plant in a condition allowing start of decommissioning works.*



L Communication with the Public

In the Slovak Republic the right to information is guaranteed by the Constitution and by other documents on human rights since the beginning of 90-ties. The Act of NC SR No. 211/2000 Coll. I. (Act on Free Access to Information, as amended) provides to the public a legal way to obtain the necessary information. This Act together with the Act No. 541/2004 Coll. I. (the Atomic Act) and Act No. 24/2006 (Act on Environmental Impact Assessment and on amendments and complements to certain laws as amended) form the legislative framework for communication with the public in the field of nuclear energy. Pursuant to the Act of NC SR No. 541/2004 Coll. I. (section 27, par. 4) the operator is obliged to inform ÚJD SR on events in the operated nuclear installations and in case of incident or accident in accordance with section 28 par. 3 of the law, he must also inform the public. Among the obligations of the holder of authorization, according to the Atomic Act (Section 10, par 1, letter m), is to inform the public also about assessment of nuclear safety at the nuclear installations operated by the holder of authorization.

The operation, safety improvements at NIs at Bohunice V-2 and Mochovce, as well as construction of Units 3&4 in Mochovce, influenced the life in those regions significantly, which has required necessary intensification in the communication with the regions in the vicinity of NIs, as well as on a national level. Transparent information on all aspects of construction, operation and decommissioning NI and disclosure of publicly available information channels has become an integral part of an open policy of operators and regulators in the field of information and participation of stakeholders on the decision-making processes. Among the most significant communication channels are:

- *Information Centres at Mochovce and Bohunice + field trips directly in the nuclear installations. Every year Bohunice and Mochovce plants are visited by 12 to 15 thousand visitors from across the SR and from abroad + external lectures for schools,*
- *Monthly magazine “atóm.sk” distributed free of charge in the regions of Mochovce and Bohunice and other printed materials (information brochures and leaflets at the Info-centres and on the web sites of operators), where information is made accessible in a comprehensible form,*
- *Web sites of the operators – www.seas.sk, www.javys.sk,*
- *Civil Information Commissions (hereafter only as CIC) Mochovce and Bohunice, consisting of elected and other representatives of the regional public. Members of CIC hold regular meetings with the management of operators and thus they are getting qualified firsthand information,*
- *Regional associations of towns and municipalities, which also communicate and solve their problems in conjunction with the NI operators in the given region,*
- *Programs of local sponsorship of operators assisting in areas, which need it the most and which bring win-win benefits (education, medical services and charity, culture, sports, environment),*
- *Open Plant for the staff and the public organized every year at both NIs,*

- Other: seminars for journalists, mayors and representatives of self-government; press conferences and briefings at significant events, press releases for the media, active participation at national and foreign exhibitions, conferences, etc.



ÚJD SR provides information upon request and at the same time is active in disclosing information on the condition of nuclear installations in SR and on its activity as a regulatory body, by which it allows to the public and the mass-media to check the data and information on nuclear installations, as well as on ÚJD SR. The web site of the authority (www.ujd.gov.sk) besides the above mentioned information discloses also the initiated, ongoing and completed administrative proceedings according to the Act No. 71/1967 Coll. on administrative proceedings as amended, as well as decisions issued by ÚJD SR in full together with the rationale.

ÚJD SR has competencies in the field of public information regarding nuclear safety and monitors other media sources with the aim to obtain the necessary overview on the information policy of the given entity. ÚJD is a regulatory body, which independently from operators of nuclear installations provides information on nuclear safety of nuclear installations including information on the safety of radioactive waste, spent nuclear fuel management, nuclear materials, their control and record keeping, as well as information on other stages of fuel cycle.

Every year, in accordance with the Atomic Act, ÚJD SR prepares an Activity Report on the results of activities of ÚJD SR and on safety of nuclear installations for the past year, which is submitted to the Government and to the National Council. In addition an Annual Report is published in Slovak-English version, which is distributed to libraries, to the ministries, to other bodies of state administration, to state organizations, to the embassies of foreign countries in Slovakia, the embassies of SR abroad, foreign regulatory bodies, international and other organizations and schools.

ÚJD SR places extraordinary emphasis on communication with the public in the region with nuclear installations, striving for continuous improvements in a form of cooperation with CIC, the representatives of municipalities, as well as by distribution of information materials, such as annual reports, leaflets and by making contributions to the regional press and TV.

Every year ÚJD SR sends contributions on its domestic and foreign activities to the press agencies

of SR, to the daily papers and to electronic media and organizes press conferences for the journalists. ÚJD SR together with the State Authority for Nuclear Safety of the Czech Republic (SÚJB) is a publisher of a "Safety of Nuclear Energy Sector" journal focusing on presenting the latest knowledge in the field of nuclear safety in SR and in CR.

Pursuant to the Act No. 42/1994 Coll. I. on civil protection of the public, the district offices and the municipalities publish information for the public on the web site or on a public information board, while there is a 30 days period, during which the affected public may file comments. Justified comments are adequately taken into account when developing a public protection plan. Information are reviewed and updated as needed; they are published in the updated form at least once in three years. Information for the public include in particular information on the source of threat, information on the possible extent of an extraordinary event and consequences on the affected area and on the environment, hazardous properties and identification of substances and preparations that may cause an incident, information about the method of warning the public and on rescue works, tasks and measures after an extraordinary event, details on where to obtain further information relating to the public protection plan. Bodies of state administration and of self-government publish manuals for the public containing advice for the public, the aim of which is to provide as much information as possible on how to proceed and how to behave in case of natural disasters, accidents or disasters. Since 1999 the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic has been publishing a non – fiction periodical, *Civil protection*, a review for the civil protection of the public. It is addressed to all those, who are actively involved in fulfilment of tasks resulting from Act No. 42/1994 Coll. I., but also to all readers, who are interested in the issues of civil protection. In the individual categories the review brings up-to-date information, publishes methodological inserts dedicated to practical fulfilment of tasks of civil protection, etc. Separate room is given also to the self-government.



Fig. Open Day at Mochovce NPP

M Annexes

- I. List of Nuclear Facilities for Spent Fuel and RAW Management
- II. Limits of Radioactive Material Discharges into Atmosphere and Hydrosphere
- III. List of Nuclear Installations in Decommissioning
- IV. Inventory of Stored Spent Nuclear Fuel (t_{TK})
- V. Inventory of Stored RAW
- VI. List of National Laws, Decrees and Guidelines
- VII. List of International Expert Reports (including Safety Reports)
- VIII. List of Authors

Annex I. List of Nuclear Facilities for spent nuclear fuel and Radioactive Waste (RAW) Management

Slovenské elektrárne, a. s. operates:

- Nuclear Power Plants Bohunice, SE – EBO plant NPP V-2 - Units 3&4
- Nuclear Power Plants Mochovce, SE- EMO plant Units 1&2

Jadrová a vyrad'ovacia spoločnosť, a. s., operates:

- Interim Spent Fuel storage *at Jaslovské Bohunice*
- Technologies for RAW treatment and conditioning at Jaslovské Bohunice
- National RAW Repository Mochovce
- Final treatment of liquid RAW Mochovce

Annex II. Limits of Radioactive Material Discharges into Atmosphere and Hydrosphere

Prior to commissioning of NIs at both sites in SR common limits of discharges were set for each site. After establishment of two entities at Jaslovské Bohunice site in 2006 (JAVYS, a. s. and SE, a. s.) initiated the division of limits for discharges sharing it almost equally between SE, a. s. (i.e. NPP V-2) and JAVYS, a. s. (i.e. NPP V-1, NPP A-1, technology for RAW treatment and conditioning – TSÚRAO and MSVP). The permanent shutdown of Unit 1 of NPP V-1 on 31 Dec. 2006 and the fact that discharges from the facilities for RAW and spent fuel treatment are significantly lower than the discharges from the NPP operation, were taken into account. Limits of discharges for individual NIs, for which the holder of authorization is JAVYS, a. s., in total make this limit for JAVYS, a. s. and are part of the approved L&C for individual facilities.

Gaseous discharges				
Annual discharge limit for group of NIs	Noble gases (any mixture)	Iodines (gaseous and aerosol phase)	Aerosols – mixture of long-lived radionuclides	Sr 89, 90
	Bq/year	Bq/year	Bq/year	Bq/year
Jaslovské Bohunice site before 2007				
All NIs	$4 \cdot 10^{15}$	$1,3 \cdot 10^{11}$	$1,6 \cdot 10^{11}$	$3 \cdot 10^8$
Jaslovské Bohunice site after 2007				
JAVYS, a. s. (incl. NPP V-1)	$2 \cdot 10^{15}$	$6,5 \cdot 10^{10}$	$8,1 \cdot 10^{10}$	$1,6 \cdot 10^8$
SE, a. s. JE V-2	$2 \cdot 10^{15}$	$6,5 \cdot 10^{10}$	$8 \cdot 10^{10}$	$1,4 \cdot 10^8$
Mochovce site				
Mochovce 1&2	$4,1 \cdot 10^{15}$	$6,7 \cdot 10^{10}$	$1,7 \cdot 10^{11}$	unlimited
Liquid discharges				
Annual discharge limit for group of NIs	Tritium Bq/year		Other corrosive and fission products Bq/year	
	recipient Váh	recipient Dudváh	recipient Váh	recipient Dudváh
Jaslovské Bohunice site before 2007				
All NIs	$4,37 \cdot 10^{13}$	$4,37 \cdot 10^{11}$	$3,8 \cdot 10^{10}$	$3,8 \cdot 10^8$
Jaslovské Bohunice site after 2007				
JAVYS, a. s. (incl. NPP V-1)	$3 \cdot 10^{13}$	$2,3 \cdot 10^{11}$	$2,5 \cdot 10^{10}$	$2,5 \cdot 10^8$
SE, a. s. JE V-2	$2 \cdot 10^{13}$	$2 \cdot 10^{11}$	$1,3 \cdot 10^{10}$	$1,3 \cdot 10^8$
Mochovce site				
Mochovce 1,2	$1,2 \cdot 10^{13}$		$1,1 \cdot 10^9$	

Annual limit of liquid discharges from the National Repository of Radioactive Waste RÚ RAO)

Nuclide	Annual activity limit [Bq]/year
H – 3	$1,88 \cdot 10^{10}$
Cs – 137	$2,28 \cdot 10^7$
Sr – 90	$2,44 \cdot 10^8$
Co – 60	$2,24 \cdot 10^7$
Pu – 239	$5,56 \cdot 10^5$

Annex III. List of Nuclear Installations in Decommissioning

Jadrová a vyrad'ovacia spoločnosť, a. s.:

- Nuclear Power Plant A-1 (incl. Technology for RAW management from this NPP installed within its premises),
- *Nuclear Power Plant V-1 - Units 1 and 2.*

VUJE, a. s.:

- Experimental incinerator,
- Experimental bituminization plant.

Annex IV. Inventory of Stored Spent Nuclear Fuel (in tons of HM) (as at 31 Dec. 2010)

The design capacity of MSVP was 600 t of heavy metal, i.e. 5,040 fuel assemblies. After the reconstruction the storage capacity of MSVP will be increased to 14,112 fuel assemblies.

Current capacity MSVP	Number of stored FA in T-12 container		Number of stored FA in KZ-48 container		Number of stored FA in T-13 container		Number of stored FA from V-1		Number of stored FA from V-2		Number of stored FA from EMO		Total number of stored FA
	Cont	FA	cont	FA	cont	FA	Unit1	Unit 2	Unit 1	Unit 2	Unit 1	Unit 2	
11 568	4	120	209	9 819	2	20	2 519	2 611	2 153	1 956	432	288	9 959

Total storage capacity for spent fuel in SR, as at 31 Dec. 2010 were used up to 70.57 %.

Annex V. Inventory of Stored RAW

V.1. Inventory of Stored Radioactive Waste (RAW) at NPP V-1 (as at 31 Dec. 2010)

Utilization of storage premises for storage of solid RAW

Storage	Total capacity /m ³ /	Utilized capacity /m ³ /	Available capacity /m ³ /
Total	820	10	810

Storage of air filters

Storage	Capacity /m ³ /	Utilized capacity /m ³ /	Available area /m ³ /
Total	600	12	588

Storage of RA-concentrate

Tank	Capacity [m ³]	Utilized capacity [m ³]	Volume converted to total salinity 190g/l [m ³]	Available volume [m ³]
Total	4 215	324	Not measurable – the tanks have more than 50% sludge	3 891

Storage of low level active and medium level active sorbents

Tank	Capacity [m ³]	Utilized capacity [m ³]	Available volume [m ³]
Total:	1 584	438,61	1 145,39

V.2 Inventory of stored radioactive waste (RAW) at NPP V-2 as at 31 Dec. 2010

Storage of solid RAW on pallets

Storage	Total capacity /pallets/	Utilization /pallets/	Available /pallets/	Note
Total	1 920	1 421	499	

Utilization trend calculated from 2000 - 2001 is: 15 pallets/year.

Reserve of available volume (if not exported): 17 years.

Storage of solid RAW at storage facilities without internal structure

Storage	Total capacity /drums/	Utilization /drums /	Available /drums/	Note
Total	11 490	677	10 813	

Utilization trend calculated from 2001 – 2007 je: 360 drums per year.

Reserve of available area (if not exported): 26 years.

Storage of air filters at the storage 108/12

Cell No.	Capacity [pcs]	Utilization [pcs]	Available area [pcs]
Total	912	608	304

Utilization trend of storage 108/12: Average production per year 35 pcs.

Free area reserve (if not exported): 15 years.

Storage of solid RAW with high level activity (Mogilník)

Total capacity of storage facility: 529 cells.

Utilized: 213 cells.

Empty: 316 cells.

The storage facility for high level active RAW is filled up to approx. 40 % of the total design capacity.

Storage of RA-concentrate

Pond	Capacity [m ³]	Utilization [m ³]	Available volume [m ³]
Total	4 860	1 839,2	3 020,8

Utilization trend of ponds during 2001 to 2007: 68 m³ per year

Reserve of free volume (if not exported for conditioning): 37 years.

Storage of ion exchange resins

Pond	Capacity [m ³]	Utilization [m ³]	Available volume [m ³]
Total	1 380	133,9	1 246,1

Utilization trend of ponds:

Low level active sorbents: Average production per year: 0.8 m³.

Reserve of available area (if not exported): 521 years.

Medium level active sorbents: average production per year: 3.6 m³.

Reserve of available area (if not exported): 233 years.

Storage of RA-oils and oil sludge

RA-oils are disposed in 12 MEVA drums at the storage of contaminated petroleum products at obj. 800, room No. A0058:

2400 litres of oil from PO equipment repairs.

V.3 Inventory of stored radioactive waste (RAW) at SE EMO (as at 31 Dec. 2010)Storage of solid RAW in bags on pallets

Storage	Capacity / pallets/	Utilization /pallets/	Available volume /pallets/
Total	672	190	482

* Volume of one pallet is 0.5 m³

Storage of solid RAW in drums on pallets

Storage	Capacity (pallets/pcs drums)	Utilization (pallets/pcs drums)	Available volume (pallets/pcs drums)
<i>Total</i>	660/2 640	337/1 348	323/1 292

* Volume of drum is 0.2 m³

Storage of solid RAW in storage without internal structure

Storage	Capacity (m³)	Utilization (m³)	Available volume (m³)
<i>Total</i>	1 782	0	1 782

Storage of RA-concentrate

	Capacity (m³)	Real utilization (m³)	Summary beta activity (kBq/l)	Available volume (m³)
<i>Total</i>	2 660	1 595,22	495	1 064,78

* Analysis of concentrate samples from 7 Dec.2007

Storage of ion exchange resins

Pond	Capacity	Utilization	Available volume
<i>Total</i>	920	114,35	807,65

V. 4 Inventory of stored radioactive waste (RAW) at JAVYS, a. s. as at 31 Dec. 2010RAW stored at the facilities of JAVYS, a. s.

Secondary RAW occurs in the current time in connection with decontamination, disassembly and demolition works in nuclear installations, which are in decommissioning (NPP A-1).

Due to historical reasons, RAW from NPP A-1 Bohunice represents a special problem, since it was not either consistently sorted nor registered during operation of this installation. A large amount of liquid operational RAW was already been treated and conditioned for disposal, or the activity of these waste was decreased. Continuously occurring concentrates (approx. 40 m³ per year) are every year treated by bituminization. By the end of year 2010 the summary inventory of liquid (including not concentrated) RAW represented 1,003.77 m³.

Aggregate amounts of solid RAW at NPP A-1 in 2010 reached approx. 784.4 m³ of non-metal RAW, 825 t of metal RAW. The total volume of stored contaminated soil and debris reached in 2010 the value 18,405 m³. Products of cementation and bituminization plants, which prior to conditioning are also stored at the storage facilities of NPP A-1 Bohunice represent nearly 64 m³.

Utilization of storage facilities at JAVYS, a. s. for storage of solid RAW

Storage	Total capacity (m³)	Utilization (m³)	Available capacity (m³)
<i>Total</i>	2 022,8	1 610,4	412,4

Storage areas for storage of solid RAW are filled with 200 l MEVA drums

(1 m³ = 5 drums)

As at 31 Dec. 2010 the certified storage facilities of JAVYS, a. s., contained 8,052 drums with solid RAW in total – of which:

- 20 drums with solid burnable RAW
- 344 drums with compactible RAW
- 1,157 drums with RAW intended for sorting
- 4,124 drums with metal RAW
- 320 drums with solid RAW determined for VBK without treatment (drums with bitumen and cement product)
- 1,439 drums - clay, concrete, gravel and non-fixed RAW
- 642 of air filters

Inventory of solid RAW JAVYS, a. s. placed in objects of NPP A-1 and TSÚRAO

No.	RAW type	Volume (m ³)	Weight (t)
	Total	2 0278	2 2915

Inventory of liquid RAW JAVYS, a. s. in total: 1,003.77 m³

V.5 Amounts of radioactive waste (RAW) treated or conditioned at TSÚ RAO at Jaslovské Bohunice and FS KRAO at Mochovce during 2008 - 2010

NI TSÚ RAO + NI FS KRAO	Conditioned (treated)	In 2008	In 2009	In 2010
Filled VBK		309 pcs	360 pcs	294 pcs
Transported to RÚ RAO		263 pcs	382 pcs	296 pcs
NI TSÚ RAO	Type of waste	Amount	Amount	Amount
Operational set (PS) - BSC RAO PS 04 – Cementation	- washing liquid, sludge, ion exchange resins	41,51 m ³	22,59 m ³	21,03 m ³
	- bitumen product	179,46 m ³	151,39 m ³	63,41 m ³
	- mouldings, ashes	137,52 m ³	172,13 m ³	179,28 m ³
	- other matrix	125,8 m ³	47,77 m ³	23,04 m ³
PS 06 - Incinerator	Solid RAW (total)	107,30 T	102,029 T	89,37 T
	NPP A-1	57,92 t	58,349 t	53,6 t
	NPP V-1	22,9 t	23,6 t	10,78 t
	NPP V-2	12,67 t	6,31 t	7,88 t
	NPP EMO1,2	13,81 t	13,77 t	17,11 t
	Liquid RAW (total)	13,68 m ³	17,537 m ³	8,83
	NPP A-1-dowtherm, oil	13,38 m ³	17,137 m ³	8,83 m ³
	NPP V-1 - oil	0,30 m ³	0,4 m ³	0
PS 08 - Compactor	Total	184,83 T	261,05 T	233,95 T
	NPP A-1	67,62 t	147,65 t	160,62 t
	NPP V-1	89,61 t	84,26 t	45,71 t
	NPP V-2	14,74 t	15,04 t	15,86 t
	NPP EMO1,2	12,86 t	14,1 t	11,77 t
	IRAO	0	0	0

PS 03 – Concentration	Total Concentrate NPP V-1 Concentrate NPP V-2	558,9 m ³ (345,31 m ³) * 429,3 m ³ (264,35 m ³) * 129,6 m ³ (80,96 m ³) *	601,5 m ³ (377,55 m ³) * 423,3 m ³ (250,11 m ³) * 178,2 m ³ (127,44 m ³) *	362,35 m ³ (242,37 m ³) * 162,55 m ³ (99,9 m ³) * 199,8 m ³ (142,38 m ³) *
PS 05 - Sorting	Solid RAW	65,66 t	104,66 t	81,37 t
Operating set - 809 Concentration KCV at PS 44, PS 100	KCV NPP A-1 NPP V-1 NPP V-2	26,36 m ³ 283,5 m ³ (175,7 m ³) * 94,5 m ³ (51,29 m ³) *	44,9 m ³ 10,8 m ³ (5,2 m ³) * 21,6m ³ (14,9 m ³) *	54,84 m ³ 0 0
DBL	Sorbents	0,6 m ³	2,93 m ³	0,37 m ³
Operating set – obj.41	RA - water	1710 m ³	1476,7 m ³	1497,05 m ³
Operating set – Plant for treatment of metal RAW	Metal RAW (total) NPP A-1 NPP V-1 NPP V-2	290,82 t 181,82 t 75 t 34 t	229,25 t 127,147 t 90,1 t 12 t	244,82 t 190,47 t 49,43 t 4,92 t
Operating set – Treatment of air filters – PS 009	VZT – filters (total) NPP A-1 NPP V-1	16,07 t 6,63 t 9,44 t	25,25 t 5,39 t 19,86 t	11,66 t 4,8 t 6,86 t
JZ FS KRAO	Type of waste	Amount	Amount	Amount
Concentration KCV	Concentrate EMO 1,2	130 m ³ *	141,13 m ³ *	139,67 m ³ *
Cementation of RAW	Cementation bit. prod. from KCV bit. prod. from DBL other matrix	24 m ³ 0,87 m ³ 0 m ³	0 0 122,431 m ³	15,91 m ³ 0 150,28 m ³
DBL – FS KRAO	sorbents	1 m ³	0,5 m ³	0

* Concentrate calculated to 120 g/kg H₃BO₃

RAW disposed at the national repository at Mochovce

By the end of 2010 there were 2,471 of VBK disposed in total, representing cca 7,413 m³ solidified RAW from NPP A-1, NPP V-1 and NPP V-2 and EMO1,2. Substantial part of this waste was formed by concentrates in a form of bituminisation product or cement mix for VBK and solid waste treated before pouring into VBK by high pressure compacting.

Annex VI. List of Selected National Laws, Decrees and Guidelines

- *Act No. 71/1967 Coll. I. on Administrative Procedure – the latest amendment as Act No. 445/2008 Coll. I.*
- *Act of NC SR No. 50/1976 Coll. on land use planning and the building code (the Building Act) – the latest amendment as Act No. 145/2010 Coll. I.*
- *Act of NC SR No. 42/1994 Coll. I. on civil protection of the population – the latest amendment as Act No. 445/2008 Coll. I.*
- *Act of NC SR No. 90/1998 Coll. I. on construction products – the latest amendment as Act No. 173/2008 Coll. I.*
- *Act of NC SR No. 264/1999 Coll. I. on technical requirements for products and on conformity assessment and on amendments and complements to certain laws – the latest amendment as Act No. 505/2009 Coll. I.*
- *Act of NC SR No. 276/2001 Coll. I. on regulation in network industries and on amendments to certain laws – the latest amendment as Act No. 142/2010 Z. z.*
- *Act of NC SR No. 575/2001 Coll. I. on organization of government activities and on organization of the central state administration – the latest amendment as Act No. 37/2010 Z. z.*
- *Act No. 215/2004 Coll. I. on protection of classified information and on amendments to certain laws – the latest amendment as Act No. 400/2009.*
- *Act No. 220/2004 Coll. I. on protection and utilization of agricultural land and on amendment to Act No. 245/2003 Coll. I. on integrated prevention and on environmental pollution control and on amendments to certain laws as amended.*
- *Act of NC SR No. 541/2004 Coll. I. on peaceful use of nuclear energy (the Atomic Act) and on amendments and complements to certain laws – the latest amendment as Act No. 145/2010 Coll. I.*
- *Act of NC SR No. 656/2004 Coll. I. on energy sector and on amendments to certain laws – the latest amendment as Act No. 142/2010 Coll. I.*
- *Act of NC SR No. 24/2006 Coll. I. on environmental impact assessment and on amendments to certain laws as amended – the latest amendment as Act No. 145/2010 Coll. I.*
- *Act of NC SR No. 124/2006 Coll. I. on occupational health and safety and on amendments to certain laws – the latest amendment as Act No. 140/2008 Coll. I.*
- *Act of NC SR No. 125/2006 Coll. I. on labour inspection and on amendment to Act No. 82/2005 Coll. I. on undeclared work and illegal employment and on amendments to certain laws – the latest amendment as Act No. 67/2010 Coll. I.*
- *Act of NC SR No. 126/2006 Coll. I. on public health service and on amendments to certain laws.*

- Act of NC SR No. 238/2006 Coll. I. on the National Nuclear Fund for decommissioning of nuclear installations and on spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste management (Act on Nuclear Fund) and on amendments to certain laws – the latest amendment as Act No. 143/2010 Coll. I.
- *Act of NC SR No. 355/2007 Coll. I. on protection, support and development of public health and on amendments to certain laws – the latest amendment as Act No. 67/2010 Coll. I.*
- *Act No. 309/2009 on promotion of renewable sources of energy and high efficiency cogeneration and on amendments to certain laws.*
- Government Ordinance No. 29/2001 laying down the details of technical requirements and conformity assessment procedures for personal protective equipment in the wording of Government Ordinance No. 323/2002;
- Government Ordinance No. 117/2001 laying down the details of technical requirements and conformity assessment procedures for equipment and protective systems intended for use in potentially explosive environment, in the wording of Government Ordinance No. 296/2002;
- Government Ordinance No. 513/2001 laying down the details of technical requirements and conformity assessment procedures for simple pressure vessels, in the wording of Government Ordinance No. 328/2003;
- Government Ordinance No. 576/2002 laying down the details of technical requirements and conformity assessment procedures for pressure equipment, in the wording of Government Ordinance No. 329/2003;
- Government Ordinance No. 176/2003 laying down the details of technical requirements and conformity assessment procedures for transportable pressure equipment;
- Government Ordinance No. 308/2004 laying down the details of technical requirements and conformity assessment procedures for electric equipment used within a certain voltage range, in the wording of Government Ordinance No. 449/2007;
- Government Ordinance No. 310/2004 laying down the details of technical requirements and conformity assessment procedures for machinery;
- Government Ordinance No. 194/2005 on electromagnetic compatibility *in the wording of Government Ordinance No. 318/2007;*
- Government Ordinance No. 276/2006 on minimal safety and health requirements for work with display units;
- *Government Ordinance No. 340/2006 Coll. I. on requirements for health protection of individuals against the dangers of ionizing radiation in relation to medical exposure, transposing the Council Directive 97/43/Euratom of 30 June 1997;*
- *Government Ordinance No. 345/2006 Coll. I. on the basic safety standards for the protection of health of workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionizing radiation, transposing the Council Directive 96/29/Euratom of 13 May 1996;*
- *Government Ordinance No. 346/2006 Coll. I. on the operational protection of outside workers exposed to the risk of ionizing radiation during their activities in controlled area, transposing the Council Directive 90/641/Euratom of 4 December 1990;*

- *Government Ordinance No. 348/2006 Coll. I. on requirements for the control of high activity sealed sources and orphan sources, transposing Council Directive 2003/122/Euratom of 22 December 2003.*
- Government Ordinance No. 387/2006 on requirements for ensuring safety and health signs at work.
- Government Ordinance No. 391/2006 on minimal safety and health requirements for a workplace.
- Government Ordinance No. 392/2006 on minimal safety and health requirements when using work equipment.
- Government Ordinance No. 393/2006 on minimal requirements for safety and health at work in potentially explosive environment.
- Government Ordinance No. 395/2006 on minimal requirements for provision and use of personal protective equipment.
- Government Ordinance No. 396/2006 on minimal safety and health requirements for a construction site.
- *Government Ordinance No. 312/2007 laying down the details on the method of collection and payments of mandatory contribution to the National Nuclear Fund for decommissioning of nuclear installations and for spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste management.*
- *Government Ordinance No. 35/2008 laying down the details of technical requirements and conformity assessment procedures for personal protective equipment.*
- *Government Ordinance No. 436/2008 laying down the details of technical requirements and conformity assessment procedures for machinery.*
- SÚBP Decree No. 59/1982 Coll., setting out the basic requirements to ensure safety at work and safety of technical equipment as amended by SÚBP Decree No. 484/1990.
- SÚBP Decree No. 25/1984 Coll. to ensure safety at work in low pressure boiler houses.
- SÚBP Decree No. 374/1990 Coll. on safety at work and safety of technical equipment in construction work.
- SÚBP Decree No. 208/1991 Coll. on safety at work and safety of technical equipment in operation, maintenance and repair of vehicles.
- MŽP SR Decree No. 453/2000 implementing certain provisions of the Building Act.
- MŽP SR Decree No. 55/2001, on land use planning supporting documents and land use planning documentation;
- *MPSVR SR Decree No. 508/2009 laying down the details for ensuring occupational health and safety for working with pressure, lifting, electric and gas technical equipment and determining technical equipment considered as classified technical equipment.*
- MVRR SR Decree No. 58/2004 establishing groups of construction products with designated systems of attestation of conformity and details on the use of marks of conformity as amended by Decree No. 119/2006;
- *MVRR SR Decree No. 558/2009 establishing a list of construction products, which must be marked, the systems of attestation of conformity and details on the use of marks of conformity.*

- *MZ SR Decree No. 524/2007 setting out the details on the Radiation Monitoring Network.*
- *MZ SR Decree No. 528/2007, setting out the details on the requirements for limitation of exposure from natural radiation.*
- *MZ SR Decree No. 545/2007, laying down the details on requirements for ensuring radiation protection in activities leading to exposure and activities important in terms of radiation protection.*
- *MV SR Decree No. 533/2006 on details regarding protection of the public against effects of hazardous substances.*
- *ÚJD SR Decree No. 46/2006 on special materials and equipment, which fall under the regulation by the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic.*
- *ÚJD SR Decree No. 47/2006 on details of maximal limits of quantities of nuclear materials and radioactive waste, where nuclear damage is not anticipated.*
- *ÚJD SR Decree No. 48/2006 laying down the details on the method of notification of operational events and events during transportation and the details on investigating their causes.*
- *ÚJD SR Decree No. 49/2006 on periodical nuclear safety assessment.*
- *ÚJD SR Decree No. 50/2006 laying down the details on requirements for nuclear safety of nuclear installations during their siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation, decommissioning and closure of disposal facility, as well as criteria for categorization of selected equipment into safety classes.*
- *ÚJD SR Decree No. 51/2006 laying down the details on the requirements for ensuring physical protection.*
- *ÚJD SR Decree No. 52/2006 on professional competence.*
- *ÚJD SR Decree No. 53/2006 laying down the details on the requirements for nuclear materials, radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel management.*
- *ÚJD SR Decree No. 54/2006 on registration and control of nuclear materials and on notification of selected activities.*
- *ÚJD SR Decree No. 55/2006 on the details in emergency planning for the case of incident or accident.*
- *ÚJD SR Decree No. 56/2006 laying down the details on the requirements for the quality system documentation of the holder of authorization, as well as the details on the requirements for the quality of nuclear installations, the details on the requirements for the quality of selected equipment and the details on the scope of their approval.*
- *ÚJD SR Decree No. 57/2006 laying down the details on the requirements during transportation of radioactive materials.*
- *ÚJD SR Decree No. 58/2006 laying down the details of the scope, content and the method of preparation of documentation of nuclear installations necessary for individual decisions.*
- *The Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (1957).*
- *Council Regulation (Euratom) No. 87/3954/Euratom of 22 December 1987 laying down maximum permitted levels of radioactive contamination of foodstuffs and of feedingstuffs following a nuclear accident or any other case of radiological emergency as amended by Council Regulation No. 89/2218/Euratom of 18 July 1989.*

- Commission Regulation (Euratom) No. 90/770/Euratom of 29 March 1990 laying down maximum permitted levels of radioactive contamination of foodstuffs and of feeding-stuffs following a nuclear accident or any other case of radiological emergency.
- Council Regulation (Euratom) No. 1493/93 of 8 June 1993 on shipments of radioactive substances between member states as amended.
- Council Regulation (Euratom) No. 2587/1999 of 2 December 1999 defining investment projects, which must be notified to the European Commission in compliance with the Article 41 of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community.
- Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1209/2000 of 8 June 2000 determining procedures for effecting the communications prescribed under Article 41 of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community as amended by the Commission Regulation (Euratom) No. 1352/2003 of 23 July 2003.
- Council Regulation (EC) No. 1334/2000 of 22 June 2000 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of dual use items and technology as amended.
- Commission Regulation (Euratom) No. 302/2005 of 8 February 2005 on the application of Euratom safeguards.
- Commission Regulation (Euratom) No. 66/2006 of 16 January 2006 exempting the transfer of small quantities of ores, source materials and special fissile materials from the rules of the chapter on supplies.
- Directive 62/302/EC of 5 March 1962 on freedom to take skilled employment in nuclear energy.
- Council Directive No. 89/618/Euratom of 27 November 1989 on informing the general public about health protection measures to be applied and steps to be taken in case of radiological emergency.
- Council Directive No. 90/641/Euratom of 4 December 1990 on the operational protection of outside workers exposed to the risk of ionizing radiation during their activities in controlled areas.
- Council Directive No. 96/29/Euratom of 13 May 1996 laying down basic safety standards for the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionizing radiation.
- Council Directive 2006/117/Euratom of 20 November 2006 on the supervision and control of shipments of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel.
- Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom of 25 June 2009 establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations.
- Council Directive 82/501/EEC of 24 June 1982 on the major-accident hazards of certain industrial activities.
- Council Decision 87/600/Euratom of 14 December 1987 on Community arrangements for the early exchange of information in the event of radiological emergency.
- Commission Recommendation of 15 December 2005 on guidelines for the application of Regulation (Euratom) No. 302/2005 on application of Euratom safeguards.

Safety Guides of ÚJD SR:

BNS I.12.1/1995	Requirements to ensure quality of the information software
BNS I.4.1/1999	Single failure criterion
BNS III.4.1/2000	Requirements for issuing authorization by ÚJD SR for use of fuel in WWER-440 reactors
BNS III.4.3/2000	Requirements on assessment for fuel loading
BNS I.2.6/2000	Requirements of ÚJD SR for chap. 4 of the Safety Report "Core design"
BNS II.3.1/2000	Evaluation of acceptability of faults detected during in-service control of classified equipment of nuclear installations
BNS I.9.2/2001	Ageing management of nuclear power plants – Requirements
BNS I.9.1/2003	Safety of nuclear installations during their decommissioning (issued as reprint of I.9./1999)
BNS I.11.2/2003	Requirements for performance of safety analyses for processes of abnormal operation with an automatic reactor protection failure (issued as reprint of I.11.2/1999)
BNS I.12.1/2003	Requirements for quality assurance of computer information software (issued as reprint of I.12.1/1995)
BNS II.3.3/2004	Metallurgical products and spare parts for nuclear installations
BNS III.4.4/2004	Requirements for realization and evaluation of test results of the physical start-up
BNS I.8.1/2005	Specification on the scope of Preliminary plan of physical protection and Plan of physical protection in line with the Decree laying down the details concerning physical protection of NI, NM and RAW
BNS IV.1.3/2005	Requirements for design and operation of spent nuclear fuel storage facility
BNS I.2.5/2005	Requirements of ÚJD SR on chap. 16 of the Pre-operational safety report "Limits and Conditions"
BNS I.11.1/2006	Requirements for elaboration of safety analysis for nuclear power plants
BNS II.3.4/2006	Rules for the design, manufacturing and operation of monitoring systems to monitor degradation of safety important components of NI. Part 1. Corrosion Monitoring
BNS I.4.2/2006	Requirements on elaboration of analysis and PSA studies
BNS II.2.1/2007	Requirements on fire safety assurance of nuclear power plants and fire safety of nuclear installations in terms of nuclear safety
BNS II.3.1/2007	Evaluation of acceptability of faults detected during in-service control of classified equipment of nuclear installations
BNS II.3.3/2007	Metallurgical products and spare parts for nuclear installations. Requirements
BNS II.5.1/2007	Welding of nuclear equipment (Basic requirements and rules)
BNS II.5.2/2007	Supervision of welding and the quality of welded joints of mechanical and technological components
BNS II.5.3/2007	Filler materials for welding of mechanical and technological components of nuclear installations. Technical requirements and rules

BNS III.4.4.2007	Requirements for realization and evaluation of test results of the physical start-up
BNS II.1.1/2008	Registration and control of nuclear materials
BNS I.1.2/2008	The scope and the content of the Safety Report
BNS I.11.1/2008	Requirements for deterministic safety analysis
BNS I.7.4/2008	Complex periodic safety review
BNS II.5.4/2009	Qualification of systems for non-destructive test in nuclear power engineering (revision 2)
BNS II.5.6/2009	Rules on design, manufacturing, assembly, repairs, replacements and reconstruction of mechanical and technological components of classified equipment of WWER 440 nuclear power plants
BNS II.5.5/2009	Examining of mechanical properties, chemical composition a selected characteristics of resistance of material and welded joints against rupture under limit load conditions of mechanical and technological components of equipment of WWER 440 nuclear power plants

Annex VII. List of International Expert Reports and Safety Reports

List of safety documentation and of international missions focusing on safety of NI for spent fuel and RAW management in SR (tab. G.1):

NI	Preceding documentation	<i>PpBS/Decommissioning phase Plan</i>	Periodical assessment	International missions
NPP A-1	EIA in the framework of decommissioning	<i>Plan for 2nd phase of decommissioning - 2008</i>	1980, 1992, 1995-98 2007	
MSVP	Preliminary Safety Report (reconstr. 1997)	1987, 9/1998 4/2010	12/2009	
MSVP EMO	Reference SR, EIA (for BSC)	1987, 9/1998	2000 (after reconstruction)	
TSU RAO	Preliminary SR, EIA (for BSC)	1998 (pre BL 1994, 2002) 8/2010	5/2009	
FS KRAO	Preliminary SR 2004	2006		
Integral storage	<i>Intent 2011</i>			
RÚ RAO	Reference and Preliminary SR	4/1999	4/2011	WATRP 1995

Safety Reports and assessment documents of missions (taken from the NR concerning Nuclear Safety Convention 2007):

1. Safety Report of NPP V-1 after gradual reconstruction 5/2001
2. Pre-operational safety report for the National RAW repository 4/1999
3. Pre-operational safety report – transport of solid RAW in ISO containers 1/2000
4. Pre-operational safety report – re-qualified fragmentation workplace for treatment of metal RAW with surface contamination up to 3000 Bq/cm² 4/2001
5. Pre-operational safety report for MSVP 9/1998
6. WENRA: Nuclear Safety in EU Candidate Countries 10/2000
7. IAEA: Review of Results of the Gradual Upgrading at Bohunice WWER-440/230 NPP Units 1 and 2 11/2000
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|-----|---|---------|
| 10. | International Conference on the Strengthening of Nuclear Safety in Eastern Europe – IAEA Report | 6/1999 |
| 11. | Final Report of the IAEA EBP and other Related IAEA Activities on the Safety of WWER and RBMK NPPs | 1998 |
| 12. | <i>5-BSP-001 Safety Report of NPP V-1 after gradual reconstruction</i> | 11/2000 |
| 13. | <i>JAVYS/PHJB-V-1/ZS/2009 Technical Report – Periodical safety assessment of NPP V-1</i> | 12/2009 |
| 14. | <i>5-BSP-001 Pre-operational safety report of NPP V-1</i> | 3/2010 |
| 15. | <i>A-01/A1 Safety Report of NPP A-1 on the current condition</i> | 11/2005 |
| 16. | <i>Technical report – Periodical safety assessment of NPP A-1 after the 1st phase of decommissioning</i> | 10/2007 |
| 17. | <i>A-01/MSVP Pre-operational safety report for MSVP</i> | 4/2010 |
| 18. | <i>Technical report – Periodical safety assessment NI MSVP</i> | 12/2009 |
| 19. | <i>A-01/TSÚ RAO Pre-operational safety report for TSÚ RAO at Jaslovské Bohunice</i> | 8/2010 |
| 20. | <i>Technical report – Periodical safety assessment RÚ RAO</i> | 4/2011 |
| 21. | <i>A-01/RÚ RAO Pre-operational safety report RÚ RAO</i> | 2011 |
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Documentation submitted by the Slovak Republic to meet the provisions of Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty in accordance with the interpretation contained in the COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION of 6 December 1999 on the application of Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty (notified under document number C(1999) 3932) (1999/829/Euratom), published on 16 Dec. 1999 in the Official Journal of the European Communities, No. L 324:

- Technology for treatment and conditioning of RAW at Jaslovské Bohunice site
- Integral storage of RAW at Jaslovské Bohunice site
- Decommissioning of the nuclear power plant A-1 (phase I)
- Decommissioning of the nuclear power plant A-1 (phase II)

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