6. NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS
The aim of the regulatory activity in the field of nuclear materials management is to secure that the nuclear materials are used in compliance with the UJD permit and that they are not misused.
To achieve this, UJD:
- Issues permit for nuclear materials management only to those applicants who prove their capability to use nuclear materials in compliance with legal regulations and international commitments of SR; the applicant must secure that the nuclear materials are not misused for production of nuclear weapons, or other activities which are in contradiction with the international commitments of SR (system of accountancy and physical protection) and that the health of people is not endangered by their use
- Performs inspections focused on compliance with the conditions of the UJD permit.
Accontauncy and control of nuclear materials
The Inspection program of UJD in the field of accountancy and control of nuclear materials was designed to meet the requirements resulting from the Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons ("Agreement "). Within the Slovak legislation this activity is performed according to the "Atomic Act " and according to the UJD Decree No. 198/1999 Coll. l., which came into force in the second half of 1999.
In 1999, UJD performed 42 inspections of nuclear materials at nuclear installations and at other holders of nuclear materials, of which 29 inspections were performed in co-operation with the IAEA.
The main content of inspections performed jointly with the IAEA was inspection of fresh and spent fuel at NPP Bohunice and NPP Mochovce, As well as inspection of spent fuel prepared for transportation to abroad:
- at NPP A-1 Bohunice inspection of spent fuel assemblies was based on an indirect method of verification, i. e. inspection through surveillance equipment of the IAEA. In 1999 there were two unplanned inspections focused on inspection of spent fuel prepared for transportation to the Russian Federation,
- in Interim spent fuel storage at Bohunice the containers with spent fuel brought in from NPP V-1 and NPP V-2 Bohunice were checked using Cherenkov camera.
- at NPP V-1 and NPP V-2 Bohunice and NPP Mochovce the fresh fuel was inspected in the fresh fuel storage (checking the production numbers according to the documentation and measurement the presence of 235U using multi-channel analyzer) , spent fuel in fuel ponds, and the correctness of the reactor cores fuel loading after each refueling or after the first fuel loading at Unit 2 of NPP Mochovce were inspected. At the same time during each inspection the IAEA seals were checked for integrity, and the record of surveillance equipment of the IAEA was evaluated. One inspection at NPP Mochovce was focused on installation of a new type of IAEA surveillance equipment-SDIS.
Another area of nuclear materials inspection was inspection at holders of nuclear materials outside of nuclear installations on the entire territory of the Slovak Republic. There were 13 individual inspections of UJD performed there. Regulatory activity in the field of accountancy and control of nuclear materials includes also checking and processing of the reports on inventory changes of nuclear materials and special reports from holders of nuclear materials. Accounting reports, special reports and advance notifications for the IAEA have been prepared and sent according to subsidiary arrangements to the Agreement.
Transportation of nuclear materials
Approval of package design and transportation of nuclear materials and radioactive waste was made in compliance with the "Atomic Act"and according to the document of UJD "Conditions for transportation of nuclear materials on the territory of Slovakia", and according to the UJD Decree of No. 284/1999 Coll. l. on details of transportation of nuclear materials and radioactive waste, which came into force in November 1999. Both documents contain the requirements of the IAEA for safe transportation of radioactive materials.
During the period under assessment there were:
- 2 transports of fresh fuel from the Russian Federation to NPP Bohunice and 3 transports to NPP Mochovce; the fuel is stored in the storage of fresh fuel at NPP Mochovce and NPP V-1 and V-2 Bohunice,
- 1 transport of uranium concentrate from the Czech Republic through the territory of SR into the Russian Federation,
- 2 transports of spent fuel from NPP A-1 Bohunice to the Russian Federation using T-15 containers to transport remaining 32 spent fuel elements, by which transport of spent fuel from NPP A-1 Bohunice into the Russian Federation was completed. Transportation of nuclear fuel was provided by the Slovak Railways. Spent fuel being cooled for 3 years in the storage pools of all 4 units of NPP Bohunice was transported to the Interim spent fuel storage Bohunice. UJD performed inspections on selected transports of fresh fuel and each transport of spent fuel. All transports of nuclear materials in 1999 were made in compliance with the conditions of permit from UJD, there were no significant shortcomings found.
Physical protection of nuclear installations and nuclear materials
The main focus of UJD in the field of physical protection in the assessed period was on inspection of the operational physical protection system at the NPPs Bohunice site (AKOBOJE -automated system of security protection of the nuclear power plant) and on inspection of a similar AKOBOJE system at NPP Mochovce during the operation of Unit 1 and at the time of preparation of Unit 2 NPP Mochovce commissioning.
In connection with gradual reconstruction of NPP V-1 Bohunice and the Interim spent fuel storage facility at Bohunice, UJD issued an approval of changes related to the regime measures in NPP Bohunice so that the existing physical protection of relevant objects is not interfered with and the contractors can continue in works on approved projects.
Inspection activity at NPP Mochovce was focused on inspection of the AKOBOJE security system condition at NPP Mochovce during operation of Unit 1, and on checking the compliance of conditions of the equipments contained in the phase II of AKOBOJE implementation, which UJD requested to put into permanent operation before Unit 2 commissioning, with the safety documentation. Inspections by UJD proved full performance of the AKOBOJE security system at NPP Mochovce.
Physical protection of NPP Bohunice and NPP Mochovce during the evaluated period continued to be provided by a private security service G-5 Ltd. which had the approval of UJD to perform security service in co-operation with the police response forces until the end of 1999. The Board of Directors of the Joint Stock Company Slovenské elektrárne decided about giving a notice of termination as of 1. 4. 1999 for the contract on providing security services for physical protection of NPP Bohunice and NPP Mochovce; the notice period is one year. In this connection the operators applied for an approval to prolong the regime protection by the security service G-5 Ltd.
During 1999, UJD performed 14 inspections focused on physical protection of nuclear installations and nuclear materials. Based on the requirements of UJD two of these inspections were concentrated on verification of readiness of the technical parts of the AKOBOJE security system for Y2K, while the system testing was made in compliance with internationally recognized methodology. Shortcomings found during individual inspections were solved by the operators continuously in compliance with the measures imposed by UJD. Inspections of the physical protection during transportation of fresh fuel from the Russian Federation to NPP Bohunice and during transportation of spent fuel from NPP A-1 Bohunice to the Russian Federation was performed by UJD in 1999 as a part of inspection of nuclear material transportation. In 1999, there were no extraordinary events noticed which would require intervention by security services participating on physical protection of nuclear installations and nuclear materials.
Illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials
In 1999, there was 1 case of theft of nuclear material -in August an unknown perpetrator stole a container from depleted uranium containing radioactive source from the sugar mill in Pohronský Ruskov. The case is being investigated by the police. UJD has continued in co-operation with the IAEA in updating the database on illicit trafficking of radioactive materials. The regional project of the IAEA has been launched with the presence of Slovak experts focused on assistance to the member states in combating illicit trafficking of radioactive materials.